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Thesis Abstract
Judaism is a religion that emphasises the importance of a set of practical 
commandments and in the history of Jewish philosophy various attempts have been 
made to rationalise or justify these commandments. In this thesis I try to establish a 
general model for the justification of practices through a critical examination of two 
such attempted rationalisations. However, the study is framed within the more general 
question of whether or not there can be such a thing as Jewish Philosophy as a 
genuinely substantive discipline. Thus, I take the particular topic of rationalising the 
commandments as a ‘case study’ in order to see whether we can do substantive Jewish 
philosophy at least in the practical sphere.
In the main body of the thesis I look at the methods of rationalisation of Moses 
Maimonides and Joseph Soloveitchik and argue that despite being based on very 
different scientific models they share a central methodological presumption that I term 
the Priority of Theory (PoT). I outline the main features of this PoT approach to 
justification and offer a critique of it based primarily on the argument from 
uncodifiability. I then offer an alternative method of justifying practices - the Priority of 
Practice approach (PoP) - based on an analysis of the Judaic concept of faith and certain 
remarks by Soloveitchik that are in tension with his main model of rationalisation 
discussed earlier. This PoP method stresses the limits of propositional approaches to 
the justification of practices and the need for a more pragmatic approach.
In conclusion I consider again the framing question concerning Jewish philosophy, 
concluding that if we accept the meta-philosophical conclusions reached regarding 
practical justifications, the sense in which we can do practical Jewish philosophy is 
restricted more by the limits of philosophy in the practical sphere than by those of 
Judaism.
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Chapter one
Introduction: Jewish Philosophy or Philosophy of Judaism?
This thesis is intended, in part, to be a contribution to the field of Jewish philosophy. 
However, the very notion of Jewish philosophy is seen as problematic by a number of 
writers. Philosophy is often believed to be an enterprise that searches for objective, 
universal truths that are available in principle to all rational enquirers insofar as they are 
rational. In contrast, Judaism is a particular religion shaped by a particular normative 
system as set out in a Torah that was intended for a specific nation. And within this 
contrast lies an immediate problem for the very concept of Jewish philosophy, a 
problem that has been given a concise philosophical formulation by Ze’ev Levy 
(amongst others) who writes:
How can a certain concept be truly philosophical and simultaneously Jewish in its essence?
. . . When one posits certain ‘values’ which are found in Jewish sources, then one of two 
conclusions must be valid: if the value has philosophical meaning, its Jewish origin is 
merely of historical interest: if it contains meaning that is uniquely Jewish, it ceases to be 
philosophical as the term is generally defined.1
This dilemma, which we shall subsequently refer to as Levy’s dilemma, asserts that the 
very particularity that would mark out a value as Jewish, at the same time singles it out 
as unphilosophical. The philosophical nature of the enterprise implies a search for 
universality whilst its essentially Jewish subject matter seems to be irredeemably 
particular and thus contrary to this universal nature of philosophy. The assumption 
therefore is that for a value to have philosophical meaning it has to have universal 
import and as such any Jewish content must either vitiate or be incidental to the 
philosophical nature of the enterprise.
Of course one could argue that there has to be such a thing as Jewish philosophy for it 
is the subject of those works written by Jewish philosophers throughout history. 
However, even with regard to the person who for many is the paradigmatic Jewish 
philosopher, Moses Maimonides, this has been disputed. Thus, Leo Strauss, one of the 
great Maimonidean scholars, has written concerning Maimonides’ philosophical 
magnum opus, The Guide o f the Perplexed,
that it is not a philosophic book - a book written by a philosopher for philosophers - but a 
Jewish book: a book written by a Jew for Jews. Its first premise is the old Jewish premise 
that being a Jew and being a philosopher are two incompatible things. . . .  A Jew may
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make use of philosophy and Maimonides makes the most ample use of it; but as a Jew he 
gives his assent where as a philosopher he would suspend his assent.2 (Emphasis added).
It is this predicament that has led a number of thinkers to the conclusion that there can 
be no such thing as Jewish philosophy in the same way as there can be no Jewish 
science or Jewish mathematics. Indeed, those Jews who have contributed to science or 
mathematics have done so to the disciplines as a whole for these subjects cannot 
contain laws, principles or concepts that are only applicable to certain ethnic groups 
and, it is claimed, the same is true of Jewish philosophy. The question therefore, is 
whether or not this is a genuine dilemma or, put another way, whether there can be such 
a thing as Jewish philosophy as a genuinely distinct discipline (rather than there being 
Jewish philosophy in the sense that there are subjects like Greek or German philosophy 
which are not distinct from philosophy as a whole but are merely general philosophy 
done by Greeks or Germans respectively).3
As noted above though, Levy’s dilemma presupposes a certain conception of rational 
enquiry -  the universalistic conception. This view which has often been identified as 
the Enlightenment view is summed up by one of its most prominent critics Alasdair 
MacIntyre as follows:
Rational justification was to appeal to principles undeniable by any rational person and 
therefore independent of all those social and cultural particularities which the 
Enlightenment thinkers took to be the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular times 
and places.4
The assumption is that there is some pure abstract rationality common to everyone in so 
far as they are rational and that anybody has to use if they are to be counted as rational 
enquirers at all. This universal form of rationality is independent of any cultural or 
intellectual allegiances and though the truths that it yields may find different 
expressions in different cultural circumstances, they are, as Robert P. George writes 
(with respect to moral universalism in particular), ‘nevertheless captured in sound 
practical judgements that may be formed by any thinking person.’5 
It is this view of rationality that motivates our dilemma and it is certainly an attractive 
one, with echoes of an idea that traces right back to the ancient Aristotelian contention 
that rationality is the essence of man. To reiterate with regards to the dilemma, if a 
value contains meaning that is uniquely Jewish it ceases to be philosophical. Levy is 
therefore assuming that in order for a concept to be philosophical it has to be universal 
in the sense stated above, i.e. it must be available to all rational enquirers irrespective
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of their religious, or indeed any other, allegiances, which implies that it must be 
justified according to the universal principles of rationality that all these rational 
enquirers supposedly accept. Thus any particular truths of Judaism that cannot be 
justified in this way are immediately discredited philosophically and are said to be 
opposed to reason. The general philosophical world view, by utilising the pure abstract 
rationality that the universalists see as exclusively constitutive of what it is to be 
rational, is identified as the rational world view.
However, MacIntyre believes, in opposition to such universalism, that it is an illusion 
to believe that there is one universal form of rationality that can be used to solve all of 
our disputes. In fact we find that there are competing accounts of rationality and these 
are most visible with respect to practical rationality, where we find the most intractable 
disputes stemming from these differing accounts. In the practical sphere there are social 
norms that do not extend to all of humanity but only govern conduct in particular 
groups, and these particularistic norms can only be justified by similarly particularistic 
conceptions of practical rationality:
There is no place for appeals to a practical rationality-as-such or a justice-as-such to which
all rational persons would by their very rationality be compelled to give their allegiance.
There is only the practical-rationality-of this-or-that-tradition and the justice-of-this-or-
that-tradition.6
This statement, it seems to me, is of particular interest to the Jewish philosopher. 
Firstly, the passage appeals to the idea of practical rationality, seeming therefore to 
make an underlying assumption (that we could again trace back to Aristotle) that this 
can be distinguished from theoretical rationality. It would appear from this, therefore, 
that we could address our question concerning the possibility of doing Jewish 
philosophy to two different realms -  the theoretical and the practical -  since each has 
its own type of rationality that Judaism might grapple with.7 To take some examples 
drawn from the history of Jewish philosophy, questions such as those concerning the 
nature of God and His attributes we might term theoretical; those regarding the 
rationality or otherwise of Jewish practice one might assign to the realm of practical 
philosophy.
The immediate significance of this distinction is clear from the quoted passage itself. In 
the theoretical realm, the underlying universalist premise of Levy’s dilemma might 
appear convincing. Certainly for a traditional realist about God, it might be thought that 
questions about His nature, for example, must have a single correct answer to which it
is hoped rational enquiry will lead us. However, if in the practical realm particularism 
can be upheld we might be able to find something of philosophical value in Judaism’s 
particularistic approach to practical questions that need not live up to the universalistic 
standards of Levy’s dilemma. The Jewish world view may have its own conception of 
practical rationality and thus have a view of practice that is particular to it but 
nevertheless still ‘philosophical’ (in some yet to be specified sense).
What makes this of even greater significance for the Jewish philosopher though, is the 
fact that Judaism is a religion that gives great emphasis to the practical sphere. Within
O fth n H n Y  TnHc»icm th p  p m n lio c ic  ic  rvn o harlxr n f  _ fKo l-i ol0VV1 oV% _ iw o ln ^ a r
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and extends the commandments and laws traditionally conceived to have been handed 
down in written and oral form since biblical times. Indeed, all the forms of Judaism, 
whether or not they adhere to the halakhah itself, see the practical import of Judaism as 
central. Thus, the reform philosopher, Steven Schwarzschild, believed that the most 
important characteristic of the coherent rational system of Judaism is the primacy that it 
gives to practical reason, which he calls the ‘Jewish twist’. In his opinion it is this that 
all Jewish philosophers have introduced into the general philosophical systems with 
which they have grappled.8
Given the centrality of practice in Judaism, it is surely important for any 
philosophically minded Jew to address the question of whether or not Jewish practice, 
however conceived, is rational. And yet, while one of the central problems that 
exercised the minds of many medieval Jewish philosophers was that of Ta’amei ha- 
Mitzvot (rationalising the commandments), with one or two notable exceptions it is an 
area that has not been given much systematic attention in contemporary Jewish 
philosophy. If, though, Jewish practice is to be intellectually respectable, surely the 
question of its rationality (or otherwise) is a central one. Moreover, since it is in the 
practical sphere that particularist approaches have taken root, consideration of this issue 
might well yield an escape route from Levy’s dilemma, at least in the practical sphere. 
The topic that will form the main focus of the thesis therefore, is precisely that of 
whether and how we can rationalise the commandments, though we will be utilising 
our critical examination of Judaic approaches to the question of rationalising the 
commandments to generate a general model of rationalising practices. In essence 
therefore we will be confronting Levy’s dilemma head on. For we will be looking at 
what we can find of general philosophical value in a Jewish approach to rationalising 
practice. To return to Levy’s dilemma though, if what we find is of general
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philosophical interest, to what extent is it substantively Jewish? Particularism may have 
a part to play, but evidently if the Jewish approach is particularistic, in what sense will 
it have general philosophical value? Thus, our investigation of the issue of rationalising 
the commandments can be seen as a ‘case study’ in order to answer the question of 
whether or not there can be such a thing as practical Jewish philosophy as a genuinely 
substantive discipline.9
In the remainder of this first introductory chapter therefore, we will be setting up the 
general question concerning the possibility of doing Jewish philosophy by looking at 
how some of the most popular attempts to define Jewish philosophy measure up against 
Levy’s dilemma. These introductory remarks are only intended to map out in a very 
general fashion the sorts of paths that can be taken by Jewish philosophers in their 
attempts to do Jewish philosophy. More rigorous and detailed definitions and 
considerations of arguments for and against the options, at least in their application to 
practical Jewish philosophy, will appear in the remainder of the thesis when we 
consider them in relation to our specific topic of Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot.
1. Jewish Philosophy as the Product of Confrontation
There have been many definitions of what constitutes Jewish philosophy, some more 
worthy of serious philosophical analysis than others.10 However, the definition that 
appears most often is the one implicit in the oft-quoted observation made by Julius 
Guttmann at the beginning of his classic book on the philosophies of Judaism:
The Jewish people did not begin to philosophise because of an irresistible urge to do so.
They received philosophy from outside, and the history of Jewish philosophy is the history 
of the successive absorption’s of foreign ideas which were then transformed and analysed 
according to specific Jewish points of view.11
It is generally accepted that Judaism did not begin to philosophise because of any 
internal compulsion to do so and Menachem Kellner in his article ‘Is Contemporary 
Jewish Philosophy Possible? -  No’, takes this legitimate historical observation to be 
definitive of Jewish philosophy ‘in the classic sense’.12
Kellner’s basic idea is that Jewish philosophy was generated by the clash between two 
opposing world views: the Jewish world view and that of general philosophy. Limiting 
ourselves for the moment to the theoretical sphere, the thought is that we begin with 
two sets of conflicting truth claims about reality and Jewish philosophy is somehow 
generated by this clash. However, in order to understand how this clash yields Jewish
philosophy we need to make a number of important assumptions, summarised by Emil 
Fackenheim as follows:
That reason and revelation cover at least in part the same ground; that there is at least 
some apparent conflict between them; and that the conflict is apparent only, that it can be 
resolved without violence to either reason or Judaism. Without the first and third o f these 
additional assumptions there would have been no possibility o f a Jewish philosophy and 
without the second no necessity for it.13 (Emphasis added).
The first by no means obvious assumption is the idea that revelation must be 
interpreted as constituting, at least in part, a world view that makes truth claims about 
topics such as the nature of God or the problem of creation. The fact is that this 
assumption is not universally accepted. It is possible to take a quasi-Mendelssohnian or 
Hirschian line regarding revelation according to which it is senseless ‘to apply the term 
theology to the Torah . . . [0]f the inner essence of the Godhead and the supernatural 
we find in the Torah nothing at all.’14
On such a view there could not be any conflict between the world views of the Torah 
and philosophy since the Torah does not for the most part offer us such truth claims, at 
least not as part of a systematic world view. Nonetheless, the point is that for this 
definition of Jewish philosophy to get off the ground, one has to accept that Judaism is 
making serious truth claims in an attempt to offer solutions to the theoretical 
philosophical questions at issue.
Given this first assumption, the problem then arises of the apparent clashes between 
these two world views. For surely there can only be one correct answer to the question 
regarding, for example, whether the world is created or eternal. Given that there can 
only be one answer, Fackenheim’s further and most important assumption is that the 
appearance of conflict between the two world views must be just that -  an appearance. 
Fackenheim is here stating unequivocally that there can be no genuine conflict between 
Judaism and reason if we are to produce Jewish philosophy. The assumption is that 
philosophy = reason and since this reason is universal in that it is assumed to use 
universal argument forms to yield universal conclusions, it defines what it is to be 
rational or philosophical. Judaism, therefore, must in reality be consonant with its 
conclusions if we are genuinely to speak of a Jewish philosophy.15 
We can therefore summarise the conditions that we must accept if there is to be Jewish 
philosophy in the classic sense as Kellner defines it.
10
i) The Jewish world view makes legitimate truth claims.
ii) The opposing philosophical world view makes legitimate truth claims.
iii) The two sets of truth claims apparently conflict.
iv) The conflict is only apparent, since there can only be one truth.16
The essence of this view therefore is that despite appearances to the contrary, revelation 
and reason must speak with one voice if we are to do Jewish philosophy. Thus we see 
that the universalistic assumption comes into the very definition of Jewish philosophy 
inasmuch as it accepts that both world views must in fact converge upon a single truth 
since the very idea of there being such a universal truth is necessary for us to speak of 
philosophical rationality. If the reason/revelation distinction cannot be dissolved by the 
latter reinterpreting itself in accordance with the former, the universalist will rule out 
the particularistic revealed claims as unphilosophical.
What then does a Jewish philosopher do according to this model, which David Hartman 
has termed the way of integration,17 given the philosophical need for the Jewish 
(revealed) world view to conform to the general world view? Effectively, on those 
matters on which they differ, the Jewish philosopher must either reinterpret Judaism in 
accordance with the universal truths of the competing world view or admit 
philosophical defeat. According to this view, if reason can demonstrate certain truths 
and there are Jewish texts that, read literally, contradict these claims, we are licensed to 
reinterpret the texts in a non literal way so that they can in fact be seen to be making the 
same truth claims as the rational world view. The integrationists believe that we can use 
our reason to interpret God’s thoughts as expressed in the canonical texts even though 
they may appear not to be subject to our rational procedures when taken literally. The 
claim again seems to be that the Jewish world view has to undergo this universalistic 
transformation in order to be philosophical. Of course it is possible that the 
‘philosophical’ view might turn out to be mistaken in which case there would be no 
need for reinterpretation. However, in such a case, the reason for not reinterpreting the 
text would be that the philosophical world view was found to be wanting on rational 
philosophical grounds and as such was not actually a genuinely ‘philosophical’ world 
view.
Even according to this view of Jewish philosophy though, reason has its limits and it is 
when these limits are reached that we can rely on the truth claims of Judaism to fill in 
the gaps. Thus Judaism does not propound a doctrine that is contrary to reason in any
11
way but one that is entirely in accordance with it when reason is not overreaching itself. 
However, in those areas where reason cannot prove the point either way, revelation can 
be accepted on authority in order to provide answers to the supra-rational questions. It 
is extremely important on this view therefore, to identify those truths that have been 
genuinely demonstrated by reason in order that we only reinterpret the tradition where 
necessary.18 Generally though, according to the universalist Jewish philosopher, Jewish 
philosophy would consist of the investigation of the extent to which a harmonisation of 
two conflicting views is possible.
Of course one might take an approach to the clash of world views that disregards 
human rationality, rejecting the truth claims of the ‘rational’ world view in favour of 
those of the revealed world view. However, such a reaction would not yield a method 
of doing Jewish philosophy, but is a case of what one might call, borrowing some 
terminology employed by David Armstrong in his work on universals, Ostrich 
Judaism.19 Such Jews make truth claims about God and the universe but hide their 
heads in the sand rather than address any of the problems that these truth claims raise. 
The way of integration on the other hand encourages the use of our reason and holds 
that its conclusions do not conflict with the similarly universal truth claims of the 
tradition which, though often couched in non literal terms, is nonetheless making the 
same truth claims.
To summarise the argument so far then, we see that Kellner believes that classically 
Jewish philosophy was generated by the apparent clash between the Jewish and 
philosophical world views. Given an acceptance of the universalistic assumption, this 
leads to a specific way of proceeding to do Jewish philosophy - there are universal 
truths of the philosophical world view that can be demonstrated according to the 
universal canons of theoretical rationality and the Jewish world view must simply 
measure up to these or cease to be philosophical. Jewish philosophy is therefore the 
integration of these two world views.
In defence of this view, it is certainly true that many of the classic works of Jewish 
philosophy have been attempts largely to integrate Judaism to a greater or lesser degree 
with the particular philosophical system contemporaneous with the thinker in question. 
Thus, Moses Maimonides took it upon himself to show that the teachings of the Torah 
were, for the main part, compatible with the form of Arabic Aristotelianism that was 
the dominant philosophical system of his day and this picture of Jewish philosophy as 
satellite to the great systems of Western thought continued right up to the late
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, in Hermann Cohen’s Neo- 
Kantian interpretation of Judaism.20 However, in the late twentieth century it has been 
argued that there is no such dominant opposing system with which to make Judaism 
cohere. There are no twentieth century ‘Great systems of Western thought’ and we are
91just left with what Fackenheim calls ‘the systematic labour of thought’
How are we to do Jewish philosophy in such a situation? Kellner believes that without 
the conflicting world views we simply cannot do Jewish philosophy. He does in fact 
seem to believe that there is a current opposing world view supplied by science.
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is that there is no agreed interpretation of Judaism that could be pitted against an 
opposing world view were there to be one. There are in fact many competing 
interpretations on the contemporary scene; Orthodox, Reform, Liberal, 
Reconstructionist etc. But, according to Kellner, in order for Jewish philosophy to be 
possible in the classical sense, we have to identify an agreed interpretation of the world 
view of Judaism as well as an opposing world view that we can integrate with it. The 
fact that we cannot identify the former means that there cannot be a contemporary 
Jewish philosophy but rather only hyphenated versions of it - Orthodox-Jewish- 
philosophy, Reform-Jewish-philosophy etc.
However, we should note that at this point Kellner’s problem with contemporary 
Jewish philosophy is not the methodological problem that we quoted originally but a 
problem with finding the raw materials to work with in the first place. This is not a 
conceptual problem with the very idea of Jewish philosophy, simply a practical one 
with the current diversity of Jewish views.
2. Jewish Philosophy as Process
Kellner’s view would appear to vindicate Eliezer Berkovits’ claim that ‘at this time we 
have neither a theology nor a philosophy of Judaism that does justice to the essential 
nature if Jewish teaching about God, man and the universe as expressed in the classical 
sources of Judaism, nor one that can be maintained with contemporary philosophical 
validity.’22 This contingent historical fact though is not the end of the matter for there is 
in fact a form of the conceptual problem that we started with that is relevant to the 
definition of Jewish philosophy that we have been discussing. In order for there to be a 
genuine Jewish philosophy of the form that Kellner describes, there have to be certain 
universal canons of rationality that we can use to decide whether or not a competing
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world view has demonstrated a certain point that conflicts with Judaism (so that we 
know when to vindicate the alien world view and reinterpret the Jewish texts). But the 
assumption of universalism presupposes that the general philosophical world view has 
been formed according to these universal canons or else it would not be philosophical 
by definition. The Jewish world view must simply conform to its conclusions thus 
formed. This returns us to a modified version of Levy’s original dilemma that I quoted 
at the beginning - if the content that is vindicated is that of the Jewish world view, then 
this can only be because its conclusion is the same as the universally valid opposing
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philosophical. The Jewish philosopher is therefore left with a choice between having to 
admit the irrationality of his views and giving up on philosophy altogether, or 
undertaking the literary enterprise of attempting to interpret Jewish texts in such a way 
as to make them say the same as the universally valid opposing world view.23 
We therefore encounter the first horn of Levy’s dilemma if we accept Kellner’s 
definition of Jewish philosophy, for its content is not distinctively Jewish. However, 
though it is the content that makes the philosophy fall foul of our dilemma, this is only 
so, because of the prior methodological assumption - that there are certain universal 
rational procedures that the Jewish world view must be measured against and that 
produce certain universal truths that all must subscribe to. This would obviously seem 
to eliminate any particularistic Jewish aspects of the philosophy, making Jewish 
philosophy universal or in other words showing that Jewish philosophy, if it is to be a 
valid enterprise must in fact reduce to general philosophy. By bowing to the dictates of 
universal reason, one is admitting that he has nothing to contribute to philosophy qua 
Jewish philosopher i.e. if revelation is universal, the philosophy is not Jewish in any 
substantive way. So we are led from the supposed clash between reason and revelation 
via the assumption that the truths of reason must be universal, to the denial of the 
possibility of doing Jewish philosophy in this way.
But what, therefore, is left for the Jewish philosopher to do? Firstly he could take issue 
with Kellner’s definition of Jewish philosophy as the integration of two opposing world 
views. One could argue with the historical point that there ever was a commonly agreed 
interpretation of Judaism, as Barry Kogan does in his reply to Kellner’s article, and 
therefore the problem of there not being one available today is in fact a pseudo 
problem. All we need to have in order for there to be Jewish philosophy according to 
Kogan is a shared agenda of philosophical problems generated by the canonical texts
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and our commitment to them, though one might then argue over the universalistic 
definition of what makes something a philosophical problem. Moreover, even though 
Kogan is correct to stress that Judaism was never monolithic, the splits that existed 
previously were set against the background of a shared framework of fundamental 
beliefs and action - the halakhah - a unifying framework that is missing today (and that 
means that it might even be difficult to set a shared agenda of problems). However, it is 
Kogan’s criticism of the other condition for the continuation of Jewish philosophy that 
is more interesting for our purposes. For Kogan argues, with respect to the point that 
there is no opposing world view with which Judaism could take issue, that Kellner is 
construing philosophy as product rather than process. What exactly is this distinction 
and what is its bearing on our problem?
If one sees philosophy as a product then one sees it as a set of substantive conclusions 
about the nature of reality and it is this philosophy as product that is no longer an 
option for Jewish philosophy if we follow Kellner’s analysis. According to Kellner, 
integrating two such products generates a further product - Jewish philosophy. But 
since, in his opinion, there are no longer any universally accepted products for the 
Jewish philosopher to so integrate, there cannot be contemporary Jewish philosophy in 
this ‘product’ sense. However, there is, according to Kogan, philosophy as process in 
which the doctrine is less important than the activity of philosophising which he 
characterises as ‘an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly’,24 an ‘effort’ that takes 
the form of the methods of modem analytical philosophy.
The extreme difficulty of defining either analytic philosophy or the analytic method has 
often been noted. However it is often characterised in terms of the so-called linguistic 
turn. Thus, as Michael Dummett has written,
What distinguishes analytic philosophy . . .  is the belief, first, that a philosophical account 
of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that 
a comprehensive account can only be so attained.26
The analytic philosopher attempts to clarify the nature of a conceptual system and the
idea is that the focus on an objective product of thought such as language makes our
investigation into the less accessible realm of thought itself more tractable. The analysis
itself might involve defining the basic term* of a scheme, examining its rules of
inference or looking at the conditions that it sets for meaningful discourse. But the main
point that Kogan makes is that the analytic method is concerned less with providing
substantive views about reality and more with analysing a certain conceptual scheme. It
15
is not concerned with the extralinguistic (or extraconceptual) reality under investigation 
at all but rather with the subject area itself of which it is supposed to give an ahistorical 
conceptual and critical analysis. Thus it is always the philosophy o f some subject or 
other and applying this process of analysis to Judaism would therefore produce a 
philosophy of Judaism which is not Jewish philosophy in the classical sense of 
philosophy as product but in the modem sense of philosophy as process.
According to Kogan therefore, in contemporary philosophy, the methods of philosophy 
take precedence over historical products and these methods can certainly be brought to 
bear on Judaism, even if only on the different forms of it. This then yields our second 
definition of Jewish philosophy as the application of the modem analytical method to 
the subject matter of Judaism. The question is whether or not this constitutes doing 
Jewish philosophy according to the terms of our dilemma.
3. Product v Process
Kellner does not accept that Kogan’s method of applying the general methods of 
philosophy to Judaism is a legitimate way of doing Jewish philosophy. He is aware of 
this product/process distinction but uses it precisely to distinguish Jewish philosophy 
from the philosophy of Judaism. According to Kellner it is only his philosophy as 
product that could qualify for the title of Jewish philosophy whereas philosophy as 
process yields something else - the philosophical analysis of Judaism. Whilst Kellner 
readily admits that one could approach Judaism in this latter way, he does not believe 
that this would constitute doing Jewish philosophy. What, though, is the precise basis 
for this supposed distinction?
Kellner seems to assume that if we want to call something Jewish philosophy, the 
semantics of the phrase are such that it implies that the word ‘Jewish’ in this composite 
is qualifying the word ‘philosophy’. It implies that one is somehow philosophising 
Jewishly. So in order to be called Jewish philosophy, the Judaism has to define the 
form that the philosophising takes in the same way that in the phrases ‘analytic 
philosophy’ and ‘historical philosophy’ it is the first word in the phrase that describes 
the way that the philosophy is being done. So we end up with a distinction between 
Jewish philosophy and the philosophy of Judaism that turns on certain linguistic
conventions. We use the grammatical form ‘________ philosophy’ when we wish to
indicate that the philosophy is being done in a way that is dictated by the term that 
would fill in the blank. Thus, to call something Jewish philosophy requires that the
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philosophy is being done Jewishly just as in analytic philosophy the philosophy is being 
done analytically. But, given universalism, it is precisely this that we have argued 
cannot be done in Jewish philosophy as product, for that would entail a specifically 
Jewish product, which would be ‘unphilosophical’.
The philosophy of Judaism though is described as the practice of applying the universal 
tools of philosophical analysis to the subject matter of Judaism, which, philosophically 
speaking, is a perfectly legitimate enterprise. However, Kellner’s point is that though 
we can certainly apply the universal methods of philosophy to the various 
interpretations of Judaism in order to offer a neutral philosophical analysis of them, this 
type of enterprise does not constitute Jewish philosophy, for that title implies that the 
Judaism is dictating the method of philosophising. But since there cannot be a religion- 
specific philosophical method, we cannot call Kogan’s philosophy as process Jewish 
philosophy for there can be nothing Jewish about the philosophical process being 
applied if it is to be genuinely philosophical. Thus again we see that the universalistic 
assumption is being used by Kellner to rule out Kogan’s definition of Jewish 
philosophy. Moreover, the philosophical process is, and if one accepts the universalistic 
assumption has to be, a neutral tool for the analysis of any subject matter. As such 
according to Kellner, it does not yield a product that could or could not be consistent 
with Judaism and therefore does not allow for Jewish philosophy in his ‘classic sense’ - 
as product.
However, there are two important points that we ought to raise concerning Kellner’s 
argument here. The first is that if he is correct, it becomes difficult to see why we 
should grace the medieval type of philosophy as product with the exclusive right to the 
title of Jewish philosophy as Kellner appears ready to do. He has ruled out the 
possibility of Jewish philosophy as process on the grounds that there cannot be a 
religion specific philosophical process as stated in our original dilemma. But why then 
should Jewish philosophy as product be graced with this title? Presumably if Jewish 
philosophy as process would require a specifically Jewish process in order to deserve 
the title of Jewish philosophy, then Jewish philosophy as product would require a 
specifically Jewish product. Perhaps Kellner believes that the Jewish world view 
determines at least to some degree or other, the final philosophical product to emerge 
from the clash of opposing world views. But as we have seen previously, he believes 
that the only way to do Jewish philosophy is to integrate Judaism with the universal 
views of philosophy and thus the content that is produced must be universal. But if that
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is the case, why is this universal product any more Jewish than the universal process 
that Kellner dismisses as not having any relevance to a definition of Jewish 
philosophy? Once one accepts the universalistic terms that Levy’s dilemma is stated in, 
it appears to me that it surely applies at both the level of Jewish philosophy as product 
and at the level of Jewish philosophy as process. Kellner, it seems to me, cannoti
consistently accept the former and reject the latter once he accepts these universalistic 
terms. Thus, whether one is dealing with two opposing products as the medievals had 
done, or with the analysis of one of the competing interpretations of Judaism as 
modems do, one is using universal canons of rationality in either case, whether to 
produce substantive conclusions about reality or conclusions about a certain subject 
matter and it is this universalism rather than any product/process distinction that seems 
to cause problems for the concept of Jewish philosophy.
Thus, it appears to me that the conclusion that we must draw from Kellner’s arguments 
is in fact more radical than those he would have us draw. If we accept both his 
universalism and the point that Jewish philosophy is supposed to be a substantively 
Jewish enterprise we would conclude that we could not do Jewish philosophy at all. We 
can, and could only ever, do what Kellner terms the philosophy of Judaism, which 
involves the application of universal canons of rationality to Judaism.
The second and more pertinent point, however, is that even if this is so, it seems that 
there is much work for the philosopher of Judaism to do, so why quibble about the 
semantics of whether to call this Jewish philosophy or the philosophy of Judaism? For, 
the conclusions that we have reached so far are as follows:
a.) Kellner’s definition of Jewish philosophy as the product of a clash of opposing 
world views falls foul of Levy’s dilemma which, in assuming that philosophical 
products must be universally valid in order to be philosophically valid, rules out the 
possibility that there could be anything substantively Jewish about Kellner’s product if 
it is to be at the same time philosophical.
b.) Kogan’s definition of Jewish philosophy as the application of a universal 
philosophical process to the subject matter of Judaism has similarly been ruled out on 
the grounds that there cannot be a specifically Jewish mode of philosophical analysis. 
One could do a subject called the philosophy of Judaism but this is not to be called 
Jewish philosophy according to Kellner.
We now though raise the question of whether it really matters what we call the 
enterprise that Kogan counsels. For we seem to have a definition of Jewish philosophy
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as process that, if you so wish, you can call philosophy of Judaism, but that nonetheless 
seems to be a perfectly legitimate philosophical enterprise, or at least as worthwhile as 
any other ‘philosophy of’ whether it be philosophy of science, philosophy of law etc. 
The real question therefore is how this definition relates to Levy’s dilemma.
4. Autonomous Jewish Philosophy
It appears to me that whether or not Kogan’s philosophy as process yields a substantive 
form of Jewish philosophy depends on how one characterises the process of 
philosophical analysis. For Kogan defines his process as an atomistic conceptual 
analysis of a certain given content that allows both for systematisation and critique of 
that content. Thus he writes:
Analysis is a process of breaking down ideas or statements into their logical components, 
and tracing their interrelations, presuppositions, and implications. . . . Systematisation is 
the process of laying out in orderly fashion a network of concepts or statements in a given 
area according to some pre-established norm.. . .  Thirdly, philosophy involves the critique 
of our concepts, systems and statements. This is not a matter of trying to tear apart or 
destroy a particular position, but of appraising its strengths and weaknesses in terms of 
truth and falsehood.27
What we are presented with is an apparently neutral tool for linguistic philosophical 
analysis that can be applied indiscriminately to any subject matter. This universal form 
of linguistic analysis imposes certain systematic and it appears substantive conditions 
of rationality upon all modes of discourse and as such can be used as a critical tool for 
their modification. What is central here is the idea that this form of analysis can be used 
as a critical tool and we can assess our systems for truth and falsehood.
However, questions arise regarding this characterisation of rational analysis, especially 
when dealing with the practical sphere. Most importantly, one can ask whether there 
can be such a universal mode of analysis, As MacIntyre writes, certain logical laws are 
most probably a necessary condition for any attempt at analysis. However,
observance of the laws of logic is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for 
rationality, whether theoretical or practical. It is on what has to be added to observance of 
the laws of logic to justify ascriptions of rationality -  whether to oneself or others, whether 
to modes of enquiry or to justifications of belief, or to courses of action and their 
justification -  that disagreement arises concerning the fundamental nature of rationality and 
extends into disagreement over how it is rationally appropriate to proceed in the face of 
these disagreements.28
One would, in the case of analytic philosophy, look at a certain form of Judaism and 
analyse its basic terms and the nature of its truth claims by utilising the accepted canons
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of rationality of modem philosophy. Thus it would be the accepted norms of rationality 
of this philosophical culture that will be deciding the question of the validity of the 
concepts and inferences made within the system of Judaism. However, if we question 
the idea that there is some neutral mode of analysis that is sufficient to yield rationality 
and that we can apply critically to all practices, then this may turn out to be a misguided 
approach to practices. That is not to say that we should rule out philosophical analysis 
altogether. However, much depends, as we have said, on how one understands this 
analysis.
The analysis of a particular practical system might well be a philosophically important 
enterprise in that it will reveal the rationality of the system being studied. But that is 
only so if we do indeed attend to the rationality of the system itself and that is almost 
always going already to include within it certain presuppositions other than the barest 
of logical principles. There may well be certain logical conditions to which all practices 
must conform. But when it comes to the justification of these practices, a thicker 
conception of rationality is more often than not necessary, one that is likely to make 
certain ethical assumptions that go beyond universal, neutral, logical criteria. Thus, it is 
not as if we can apply some universal form of rational analysis to any given subject 
matter. Rather, the very logic of a certain practical system might be governed by 
rational norms particular to that practice and it is this that we should be analysing. 
Given this, it seems to me that Kogan’s attempt to define Jewish philosophy might still 
fall foul of Levy’s dilemma inasmuch as it still grants a certain supposedly neutral 
universal mode of analysis sovereignty over the subject matter of Judaism which cannot 
therefore retain its particularity.
It is this sort of particularistic analysis that the modem thinker Joseph B. Soloveitchik 
has therefore attempted to introduce into the sphere of Jewish philosophy. Soloveitchik 
wishes to develop a system that would preserve the autonomy of a practical Jewish 
philosophy by allowing us to work out Judaism’s own unique autonomous norms. 
Soloveitchik, therefore, attempts to avoid the whole problem of subordination to 
external norms by rejecting the second horn of Levy’s dilemma and attempting to find 
Judaism’s own canons of rationality via a specific method in order to yield an 
authentically Jewish philosophy.
Soloveitchik’s explicit attempt to develop a method for forming this autonomous world 
view can be found in his 1944 work The Halakhic Mind, which begins with the 
statement that the contemporary philosophical climate was the most promising ever for
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‘the meditating homo religiosus', (HM, p. 3) given the methodological schism that had 
opened up between science and philosophy. It is this schism that is the central 
foundation for his assertion of methodological independence for the religious 
philosopher. According to Soloveitchik, whilst the scientist and philosopher were in 
agreement as to how one should study reality, the religious personality had to make a 
choice between three equally unpalatable alternatives: either a) developing an 
apologetic philosophy that utilised the scientific/philosophic approach, b) admitting his 
inability to understand the world or c) having to revolt against reason. The implication
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with the universal rational approach and the philosopher of religion either has to share 
this method or admit the non-philosophical nature of his enterprise.
The particular form of universalism that Soloveitchik is worried about here turns out to 
be the outlook known as scientism which is identified by Jurgen Habermas as the 
prevailing attitude towards science within the scientific community itself and has been 
defined by him as follows.
‘Scientism’ means science’s belief in itself: that is the conviction that we can no longer 
understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge 
with science.29
According to advocates of scientism the methods of the natural sciences have 
established themselves in the minds of many thinkers as the only legitimate method for 
uncovering truths about reality and in order, therefore, to understand reality one has to 
use those methods. Thus we find philosophers like Quine believing that it is science 
that inquires into the nature of reality, providing us with our world view. This scientific 
enquiry is not subject to further legitimisation by philosophy, which is supposed to 
confine itself to addressing the question of how we have come to have the thought of 
the objects of physical theory in general. We therefore have scientific method and 
scientific knowledge held up as the paradigm to which all areas of discourse must 
measure up. This identification of rationality per se with the particular form of 
scientific rationality is obviously only one of the forms that the universalism that we 
have discussed can take, but it is a very attractive one given the consensus that the 
rational procedures of science seem to secure.
In opposition to this though, Soloveitchik believed that he could establish an
autonomous method for the Jewish philosopher. However, he insists that the
methodology of the homo religiosus whilst autonomous is not thereby non-
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philosophical and the religious philosopher has to develop his own rational approach to 
the philosophical questions at issue.
The homo religiosus calmly but persistently seeks his own path to full cognition of the 
world. He claims freedom of methodology; he has faith in his ability to perform the miracle 
of comprehending the world; and notwithstanding the mysterium tremendum, he eschews 
non-rational methods as a means to the realisation of his goals. (HM, p. 4).
So for Soloveitchik rationality is not to be equated with scientific rationality or for that 
matter with any universal philosophic rationality. There are other rational methods of 
forming a philosophy and Soloveitchik believes, therefore, that the first question that 
we need to address is that of the method that should be used in order to produce our 
autonomous outlook.
It is for this reason that we must take care when speaking of the philosophical analysis 
of Judaism. For if we accept MacIntyre’s claim that there is no such thing as practical 
rationality as such, then if we do not approach a practice through its own norms, we 
may well be subordinating it to an illusory and distorting form of ‘universal’ rationality. 
Indeed, according to Soloveitchik, such a universalist approach reduces religion to a 
form of instrumentalism or technical wisdom and this is exactly what Maimonides’ 
approach to Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot achieves in his opinion. Judaism is seen as a means to 
the production of certain universal ends and as such can be changed and adapted as the 
efficacy of these means varies. For Soloveitchik therefore, part of the problem with 
Maimonides’ scientific method is it is intimately bound up with a problematic 
universalistic conception of rationality that it applies in the realms of theory and 
practice.31 However, if we believe that we can engage in a mode of analysis, part and 
parcel of which is the revelation of the particularistic norms of the practical rationality 
of the practice itself, then we may very well be able to do a more substantive form of 
Jewish philosophy of the type that Levy’s dilemma attempts to rule out. It is 
Soloveitchik’s belief that we may be able to do Jewish philosophy in precisely that 
sense.
5. The project
We have so far sketched two suggested general models of Jewish philosophy. The 
former as set out by Kellner and Kogan and classically practised by Maimonides could 
be characterised as universalist and the latter as set out and practised by Soloveitchik 
might be termed particularist. The important point that we have attempted to outline in
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this introduction is that the type of anxiety that Soloveitchik shows with respect to the 
Maimonidean approach may be well founded. The universalist assumes that there is an 
exclusive univocal notion of reason that is equated with the rational/philosophical 
world view. If revelation conforms to it, it ceases to have its own substantive content, 
and if it does not conform to it is by definition irrational. Soloveitchik, by taking a 
particularist line, wishes to upset the universalist’s equation and say that it may in fact 
be the case that a particularly Jewish view is perfectly rational but according to a 
different conception of rationality. Of course certain truths of revelation could be 
universal, but the important point is that if there are certain particularistic claims, these 
needn’t be seen as unphilosophical just because a particular conception of rationality 
may have led us to them. The Soloveitchikian argument therefore is that if we can find 
room for particularism, it is possible that the second horn of Levy’s dilemma 
evaporates. The uniquely Jewish meaning of a philosophical truth may not mean that ‘it 
ceases to be philosophical as the term is generally defined’, but that it ceases to be 
philosophical as the term is narrowly defined by those who utilise a specific conception 
of rationality, which may not make it unphilosophical at all.32
The title of this thesis is ‘Justifying One’s Practices: Two Models of Jewish 
Philosophy’, and it might therefore be thought at this stage that the two models of the 
title refer to these two models that we have been discussing. Indeed, both the 
universalist and particularist approaches can be applied specifically to the realm of 
practice. The universalist approach would, as Oliver Leaman has put it, ‘see how our 
religious customs and practices fit into a universal pattern of morally appropriate 
behaviour’.33 The particularist approach on the other hand would attempt to fit the 
practices into a set of unique autonomous norms of Judaism. In chapters two and three 
we will critically examine these two contrasting approaches to Jewish practice by 
looking at the models of Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot of Maimonides and Soloveitchik 
respectively.
However, these two models are not in fact the two models of our title and we will begin 
in chapter four to develop the central argument of the thesis by showing that despite 
their differences, the models of both Maimonides and Soloveitchik share a central 
methodological presumption that I term the Priority of Theory (PoT).34 This approach 
will be outlined in some detail before we argue in chapter five that it is in fact an 
inappropriate model for rationalising practices.
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Gillian Rose has remarked with regard to the question of doing Jewish philosophy that 
the very question ‘Is there a Jewish Philosophy?’ allows philosophy to define ‘the very
<jc
form of the approach’. Howard Wettstein in his article ‘Doctrine’ states the point that 
she is making more explicitly, arguing that ‘theological doctrine is not a natural tool for 
thinking about biblical/rabbinic Judaism’.
It seems reductive and misleading to represent this as a system of doctrine, a set of well-
formed beliefs, a system of thought.37
As applied to the sphere of practice, the idea would be that whether the norms and 
concepts that we form are universal or particular is not the point. For maybe the very 
attempt to impose such a systematic straitjacket on the practice is misguided at the 
outset. Our main contention will be that the sort of philosophical approach that is 
shared by both the particularist Soloveitchik and the universalist Maimonides is 
inappropriate for doing practical Jewish philosophy.
At the same time though, this need not necessarily mean that we should give up on 
philosophy. Thus, in chapter six we will offer an alternative method of justifying 
practices, which I term the Priority of Practice approach (PoP), based on an analysis of 
the Judaic concept of faith and some of Soloveitchik’s more tentative remarks on 
rationalisation. It is this possibility that I am primarily interested in -  the development 
of a philosophical approach to the justification of practices that to some extent breaks 
out of the traditional universalist/particularist distinction altogether.
Apart, therefore, from the very general aim of resurrecting systematic reflection on the 
rationality (or otherwise) of Jewish practice, the intention in this thesis is to set up a 
new model for practical justification that arises out of consideration of the topic of 
Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot within Jewish philosophy. At the same time though the wider 
implications of this study regarding the relationship between Jewish and general 
philosophy in the practical sphere will also be considered. Thus, finally, in conclusion, 
we will look again briefly at the bearing of our investigation on the initial question 
regarding the possibility of doing practical Jewish philosophy.
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Chapter two
Rationalising the Commandments I: The Maimonidean Method.
In this chapter we will be discussing the first of our two models for rationalising the 
commandments, the Maimonidean method, as set out in his philosophical magnum 
opus, the Guide of the Perplexed.1 One of the most significant aspects of the chapters of 
the Guide where we find his rationalisation is the constant emphasis he puts on the 
parallels between the realms of nature and law. Thus, David Hartman writes that 
Maimonides’ rationalisation of the commandments was an attempt to ‘achieve a unified 
understanding of nature and Torah revelation’,2 and Josef Stem states that Maimonides 
saw no discontinuity at all between the two domains of nature and law.
The parallel Maimonides constantly emphasises between the Law and divine i.e. natural, 
acts is not a parallel between two different domains but within one domain. Just as 
knowledge of God’s attributes of action, His governance of nature, is attained through 
study of natural science, so one understands why and how the Mosaic commandments came
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to be legislated by studying their natural causes.
Indeed, according to Stem, Maimonides’ rationalisation of the commandments amounts 
to a natural science of the Law and in his opinion there are good reasons to believe that 
Maimonides believed explanations of human behaviour to be as deterministic as natural 
explanations.4
In what follows therefore, we will be putting particular stress on the scientific nature of 
the Maimonidean rationalisation and primarily we will be arguing that Maimonides 
uses an Aristotelian method of scientific explanation in order to rationalise the 
commandments. Thus, we will begin with an exposition of the Maimonidean method in 
the light of Aristotle’s theory of scientific explanation before going on to look at some 
of the problems with it.
1. Maimonides’ Question
The first thing that we need to be clear about is what question Maimonides is asking. 
Obviously he is asking whether the commandments are rational or not. However, this is 
a rather elliptical way of asking the question that Maimonides is in fact concerned with. 
Stem therefore, distinguishes between two different questions that Maimonides could 
be answering with respect to rationalising the commandments, calling them the 
commandment question and the performance question respectively. The former
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question asks for the reason behind God’s commanding a particular commandment. 
Thus we are attempting to understand why God should have legislated a particular law, 
or how rationality is manifest in that commandment’s being given. The performance 
question on the other hand asks why it is rational for me to perform this commandment. 
Though the two questions often admit of the same answer, they can come apart. Thus it 
is important to stress that Maimonides’ primary focus is, according to Stem, on the 
commandment question. As Hartman puts it, Maimonides was interested in the 
question of whether the laws ‘reveal a God who acts by reasons that are intelligible to
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might have for us as individuals and was not ‘attempting to inspire one to observe the 
commandments, but to convince his reader that nature and Torah reveal the same 
God.’6
The point here is that we can look at reason-explanations in two different ways, from a 
motivational perspective or a normative perspective. Maimonides is not interested in 
the former, in the actual reasons that a person would give to explain his performance of 
the commandments. Rather, he is asking why it is right to perform that commandment. 
He is interested so to speak in God’s reasons for giving the commandments. The idea is 
that given that God is perfect, His reasons are bound to be rational from a normative 
perspective, whether that is because what He commands is constitutive of the rational 
or because He is bound to adhere to independent norms of rationality. The fact remains 
that His reasons are bound to be the right ones and they are the reasons that we should 
perform the commandments, regardless of the actual reasoning that we in fact use. 
Maimonides was concerned with the rational intelligibility of God’s reasons and not 
with our subjective psychological states. By taking a first person perspective on the 
commandment question, which given that the ‘person’ is God constitutes taking a third 
person perspective on the performance question, he is asking what would make it 
rational for me to perform a certain commandment regardless of my own desires, 
attitudes or beliefs.
2. Maimonides’ Intellectualism
According to Maimonides, there are those that do not believe that reasons should be
given for any law, believing that if there were any utility in the laws for humans this
would somehow lessen their divinity. Inscrutability is somehow supposed to be a mark
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of divinity. Of course the question of whether or not God’s commandments are merely 
dependent on His will or have some independent form of rationality that stems from 
their content is a question with a long history, given its best known formulation in 
Plato’s Euthyphro. Within Judaism, the question of the ta’am (usually translated as 
reason) for the commandments had been discussed since Talmudic times, but more 
often than not, the request for a 1 ta’am' was a request for the scriptural basis for and 
subsequent derivation of a commandment, not its philosophical justification.7 In a 
philosophical context Philo had devoted much space to the philosophical question of
O
the rationality of the commandments. However, it was Saadi a Gaon, ‘the first to 
undertake a systematic philosophical justification of Judaism’,9 who brought the topic 
to the fore in the medieval context with his introduction of the specific category of 
rational commandments.10 Of course Saadia himself was much influenced by the 
Mu’tazilite school of Kalam theologians for whom God was subject to an objective 
standard of justice, a view opposed by the Ash’arite school according to whom God 
must be the only source of value since it would limit God’s omnipotence to restrict Him 
to an independent moral standard. Against a background in which this Ash’arite view, 
with Al-Ghazali as its most influential proponent, had become the theological 
orthodoxy in the Islamic world, Maimonides comes down unequivocally on the side of 
intellectualism in an extreme form.
Maimonides begins his exposition of the rationalisation of the commandments (GP, 
111:25, 502-503) by first dividing actions into four classes with a view to explaining 
God’s ‘actions’ in nature:
i) Futile actions - those undertaken with no end in view.
ii) Frivolous actions - Those that have low ends ("unnecessary and not very
useful")
iii) Vain actions - those in which the end aimed at is not achieved.
iv) Good and Excellent actions - Those which have noble ends (‘necessary or
useful’)
Maimonides argues that one is led by ones intellect to conclude that all of God’s actions 
must surely fall into the fourth class for one cannot say that Gods actions are vain, futile 
or frivolous given His perfection. Thus we have a philosophical argument, according to 
Maimonides, for saying that there must be some rational purpose behind all of God's 
works in nature. Most central to our argument though is the extension of the same
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reasoning in the subsequent chapter from God’s actions in nature to the laws that He 
has commanded. Thus, by the simple application of his general reasoning regarding 
God’s actions to the particular subset of those actions that is the commanding of laws, 
he concludes that the laws must all be ‘good and excellent’. Here, therefore, we have 
the first example of Maimonides’ using reasoning in the realm of nature to illuminate 
the realm of law and the use of this analogy at the outset is highly significant in 
dictating the route that the subsequent rationalisation takes.11
The analogies become especially clear if we consider how Maimonides interprets
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has acted directly in order to produce something. However, according to Maimonides, 
this in fact merely means that He is the First Cause of what is produced as indeed He is 
of the Universe per se. But this action is not therefore, to be seen as some sort of divine 
intervention in the natural order. Indeed, Maimonides’ conception of God means that he 
wishes to minimise reference to such interventions as much as possible and he 
explicitly separates himself from those who would have us see direct divine 
intervention at every turn about whom he writes
They like nothing better, and, in their silliness, enjoy nothing more, than to set the Law and 
reason at opposite ends, and to move everything far from the explicable. So they claim it to 
be a miracle, and they shrink from identifying it as a natural incident. . . . But I try to 
reconcile the Law and reason, and wherever possible consider all things as of the natural 
order. Only when something is explicitly identified as a miracle, and reinterpretation of it 
cannot be accommodated, only then I feel forced to grant that this is a miracle.12
But what then does the Torah mean when it ascribes such acts to God? What it means, 
Maimonides tells us, is that he is the First cause of such ‘action’.
It is very clear that everything that is produced in time must necessarily have a proximate 
cause, which has produced it. In its turn that cause has a cause and so forth till finally one 
comes to the First Cause of all things, I mean God’s will and free choice. For this reason all 
those intermediate causes are sometimes omitted in the dicta of the prophets, and an 
individual act produced in time is ascribed to God. . . . We and other men from among 
those who study true reality have spoken about it, and this is the opinion of all the people 
adhering to our Law. (GP, 11:48,410).
In the Torah therefore, acts that are ascribed to God in fact have perfectly natural 
scientific explanations and the reference to God is a reference to Him as the First cause 
or ground of nature in general. The substantive explanatory work is done by the natural 
causes of which God is simply the ultimate ground. To call God the cause of something 
is therefore, as Stem points out, to presuppose a natural order in Maimonides’ opinion,
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rather than to deny it. Reference to God’s action in nature is in fact reference to the laws 
of natural science.
Most importantly, for Maimonides, the act of commanding laws falls under the general 
category of God’s actions. Thus, we see that according to Maimonides, to say that God 
commanded something is also simply to say that God is the efficient cause of that 
thing’s coming into being.
The term ‘command’ is figuratively used of God with reference to the coming to be of that 
which He has willed. (GP, 1:65,159).
As such, this action is also to be explained by reference to a scheme of natural 
causation. A form of reasoning parallel to that used to understand God’s acts in nature 
is therefore to be applied to the understanding of God’s commanding the people as 
indeed is any notion of speech that attaches to God. Just as the ascription to God of 
actions in nature are to be understood in terms of their intermediate natural causes, so 
the ascription of commands to God are to be understood in terms of their intermediate 
natural causes and it is these that we must look to in order to understand the rationality 
of these laws. The extension of the reasoning regarding God’s actions in general to His 
commandments in particular at the beginning of Maimonides’ discussion of Ta’amei 
ha-Mitzvot does more therefore, than simply establish that the latter like the former are 
‘good and excellent’ rather than futile, frivolous or vain. What it does is sets up the 
naturalistic parameters to which the subsequent investigation into the commandments 
must adhere. Thus, the generally scientific nature of the investigation is made clear 
from the outset.
This discussion also brings out a further important point about Maimonides’ 
rationalisation. For we have said that we are looking at the purposes of the law and 
equated this with looking at their natural causes. And it is significant that Maimonides 
uses ‘purpose’ and ‘cause’, along with a number of other terms interchangeably in his 
discussion of rationalising the commandments as is made clear in the following 
passages.
There is a group of human beings who consider it a grievous thing that causes should be 
given for any law; what would please them most is that the intellect would not find a 
meaning for the commandments and prohibitions. What compels them to feel thus is a 
sickness that they find in their souls.. . .  For they think that if those laws were useful in this 
existence and had been given to us for this or that reason, it would be as if they derived 
from the reflection of some intelligent being. If, however, there is a thing for which the 
intellect could not find any meaning at all and that does not lead to something useful, it 
indubitably derives from God; for the reflection of man would not lead to such a thing. It is
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as if, according to these people of weak intellects, man were more perfect than his Maker; 
for man speaks and acts in a manner that leads to some intended end, whereas the deity 
does not act thus, but commands us to do things that are not useful to us and forbids us to 
do things that are not harmful to us. (GP, 11:31,523-4, emphasis added).
There are also people who say that every commandment and prohibition in these Laws is 
consequent upon wisdom and aims at some end, and that all Laws have causes and were 
given in view of some utility (GP, 111:26, 507, emphasis added).
That Maimonides equates uncovering the wisdom of the commandments with 
uncovering their causes, utility and end, as well as with explaining their meaning can be 
attributed to his Aristotelianism, most particularly his Aristotelian concept of 
explanation.13 In order therefore to understand these links we must first look at the 
Aristotelian account of explanation.
3. The Aristotelian Conception of Scientific Explanation
The concept of explanation is central to Aristotle’s view of scientific knowledge or 
episteme. For Aristotle, we can only gain deep understanding of something if we know 
‘the why’ of it (to dia ti), the explanation that tells us what it is and how it has come to 
be such as it is. Moreover, Aristotle identifies understanding the ‘why’ of a thing with 
grasping its primary cause (he prote aitia).
Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they 
have grasped the ‘why’ of it (which is to grasp its primary cause).14
Thus, for Aristotle scientific knowledge requires explanation and having an explanation 
is a matter of having causal knowledge. However, we should note that the relationship 
between Aristotle’s causes and our modem day notion of causation is a subject of some 
debate. 15 Certainly for Aristotle understanding involves explaining why something is 
so, which is to cite its cause in a broad sense of the word. Moreover, Aristotle himself 
famously gives us his doctrine of the four causes. However, many scholars believe that 
we would do better to refer to these as the four ‘becauses’ since we can make far better 
sense of what Aristotle writes if we understand him as being concerned more with types 
of explanation than with our modem notion of causation.16 Though we will sometimes 
retain the traditional terminology of causation in the ensuing discussion, it is this view 
that Aristotle is primarily giving an account of explanation that we will be following. 
What then are these four ‘causes’ that yield explanatory knowledge? The material, 
formal, efficient and final causes are four different ways of answering the ‘why’
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question, a question that needs to be answered if we are to gain episteme. However, 
these four ‘causes’ are not four different ontological causes but are rather four ways of 
referring to the two ontological factors that are fundamental to explanation for 
Aristotle: form and matter. The material cause refers to the matter and the other three 
causes refer to the notion of form in differing ways.17 This latter concept of form is the 
fundamental explanatory concept in Aristotelian science. Indeed, according to Aristotle 
the fundamental explanatory premises of science are simply definitions that state what 
the forms of the various substances are. These forms, to which in the end result matter 
is subordinated, are the essential natures of substances that account for their being what 
they are.
Maimonides, as Pines points out, shares the Aristotelian idea that science should aim to 
‘set forth the causes of the physical phenomena and disclose their natural order.’18 
Moreover, the concept of form holds the same fundamental position in Maimonides’ 
thought as we see in the very first chapter of the Guide where he writes in his 
explanation of the term ‘image’ as predicated of God:
The term image is applied to the natural form, I mean the notion in virtue o f which a thing
is constituted as a substance and becomes what it is. (GP, 1:1,22, emphasis added).
We see, therefore, that if the Maimonidean rationalisation wishes to furnish us with 
knowledge of the reasons for the commandments, this will involve finding the 
explanation of the subject matter, which involves grasping its ‘causes’. And for our 
purposes, it is the Aristotelian idea of final or teleological explanation that is most 
central for it is this that Maimonides makes use of in his rationalisation and that allows 
us to account for his use of ‘explanation’, ‘causation’ and ‘purpose’ as virtual 
synonyms.
There is much controversy over how to interpret Aristotelian teleological explanation. 
What is not controversial though is that final causes in Aristotle explain something by 
being that for the sake of which something is done or exists. Thus, in natural science, 
teleological explanation is especially found in biology, where it explains how a part of 
an organism contributes to the realisation of that organism’s functioning and 
development. The ‘purpose’ is the explanans that renders the explanandum intelligible. 
The idea that certain things in nature are for  something is therefore quite acceptable and 
does not require that one to impute conscious aims and purposes to nature, an idea that
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has led many to dismiss Aristotelian natural teleology as an interesting but ultimately 
obstructive part of the history of science.19
What appears to interest Maimonides here though is the idea of teleology as what 
Wieland terms a concept of reflection: by ascribing a certain purpose to something we 
can enquire what the necessary conditions are for it to be achieved.20 This is the 
Aristotelian notion of hypothetical necessity, a necessity that works backwards from the 
end to the process that would achieve that end. Thus with manmade artefacts we see the 
notion of hypothetical necessity at work in the deliberation of the artisan. If, for 
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carrying out that function. Thus the end determines the form that the artefact must take 
and indeed the process of its production. This hypothetical necessity in the formation of 
artefacts is not a mysterious form of backwards causation but is the necessity of 
rationality which is present in the deliberation of the agent that allows us to reason 
backwards from the end to understand the process responsible for achieving it. What is 
immediately apparent here is the appearance of a normative rational element in the 
Aristotelian notion of explanation and thus Maimonides can utilise this Aristotelian 
concept of teleological explanation as a way of making the rationality of the 
commandments manifest.21
However, having a teleological explanation for something is not in itself sufficient to 
produce scientific knowledge of it. In order for something to qualify as episteme, and 
for us to therefore have a scientific explanation there are further constraints that have to 
be met as we see from the following passage
We think we understand something simpliciter (and not in the sophistical way incidentally) 
when we think we know of the explanation because of which the object holds that it is its 
explanation, and also that it is not possible for it to be otherwise. It is plain then that to 
understand is something of this sort. . . . Hence, if there is understanding simpliciter of 
something, it is impossible for it to be otherwise.
Whether there is also another type of understanding we shall say later: here we assert that 
we do know things through demonstrations. By a demonstration I mean a scientific 
deduction; and by scientific I mean a deduction by possessing which we understand 
something.
If to understand something is what we have posited it to be, then demonstrative 
understanding in particular must proceed from items which are true and primitive and 
immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusions. (In this 
way the principles will also be appropriate to what is being proved). There can be a 
deduction even if these conditions are not met, but there cannot be a demonstration - for it 
will not bring about understanding. 22
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It appears from here that there are two basic conditions for episteme: knowing the 
explanation for something (as discussed above) and knowing that the conclusion cannot 
be otherwise, i.e. scientific knowledge must be of necessary truths. Moreover, we see 
from this passage that a scientific explanation must be demonstrative. Let us begin with 
this latter idea first.
For Aristotle, not every deductive syllogism yields scientific knowledge, for scientific 
knowledge must be the result of a demonstration which is a deduction in which the 
premises are true, primitive, immediate, more familiar than, prior to, and explanatory of 
the explanandum.
The most basic idea that Aristotle is appealing to here is that a scientific body of 
knowledge must form an axiomatic system. Such a system, of which Euclid’s geometry is 
usually taken as the paradigm, takes a few true and certain simple principles or axioms as 
primary truths and derives by deductive proof all the other truths or theorems of the 
subject. The primary truths themselves though are not demonstrable but are rather 
acquired by induction, or the repeated perception of particulars through the intellectual 
virtue of nous. This is what Aristotle means when he writes that the premises must be 
primitive and immediate.24 From these we deduce certain conclusions and from these 
conclusions in turn we deduce further conclusions. Thus a system of scientific knowledge 
for Aristotle is a stack of demonstrative syllogisms that can be traced back in the first 
instance to true and non-demonstrable first principles.
In a system such as this, the axioms must also be more familiar than and prior to the 
conclusions. These two conditions, held by Barnes to be equivalent,25 are interpreted to 
mean that we must know the axiom, P, in order to know the conclusion, Q, but not vice 
versa. Finally, this in turn entails that the axioms also fulfil the final condition of being 
explanatory of the resultant theorems. The point here is that, to take Aristotle’s example, 
we could deduce from the facts that certain planets do not twinkle and that nearby planets 
do not twinkle, that these planets are near. But these facts do not explain their being near. 
What we have in this case is what Aristotle would term a ‘syllogism of the that’ which 
allows us to infer facts but does not give us an explanation. What we want in our 
explanatory system is a ‘syllogism of the because’, one in which the premises explain the 
conclusions -  the planets do not twinkle because they are near and not vice versa. It is this
0f%relationship that is the final condition on the premises of a demonstration.
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Aristotle’s second condition of scientific knowledge - that it can only be of necessary 
rather than contingent truths - though very difficult for the modem scientist to accept, can 
at least be explained from Aristotle’s own perspective by recalling that for Aristotle, our 
scientific deductions of must begin from definitions that state the forms of natural kinds. 
Thus, we begin with a statement that describes a certain natural necessity, an essential 
truth about a certain kind. But these statements of essences are statements of de re 
necessities rather than de dicto ones and Aristotle is not therefore claiming that scientific 
truths need be logically necessary truths. Rather, the truths that Aristotle is concerned with 
here are the fundamental (and necessary) laws of nature that state essences. What is 
important is that being statements about forms, these premises will fulfil the various 
conditions that the premises of a demonstration need to fulfil.
What we find then is that in an Aristotelian science, we deduce the characteristics a given 
substance has in virtue of its essential nature as stated in a basic definition. Thus, we 
begin from ‘necessary’ premises and proceed deductively i.e. in a necessity preserving 
fashion, through further ‘necessary’ premises to what will therefore be ‘necessary’ 
conclusions. We can therefore at least understand why Aristotle might have believed that 
scientific knowledge must be of necessary truths at least in the de re sense, though of 
course many would continue to question this general picture of science as a body of such 
deductively linked de re necessities,28 that cannot yield knowledge of particular facts or 
events but only of necessary laws 29 Indeed, it has often been noted that Aristotle himself 
does not stick to the demonstrative model in his scientific writings, though it does seem to 
be the ideal form that he believes a scientific system should take.30 
To conclude this brief examination of the Aristotelian model though, what we see is that a 
scientific explanation must be ‘causal’ in Aristotle’s sense, proceeding deductively from 
true and necessary ‘definition-stating’ first principles that among other things are 
themselves non demonstrable. And we should note that whatever the defects of the model, 
as Ackrill has pointed out, ‘we can safely credit Aristotle with the important idea that 
sciences aim at generalisation and simplicity’.31 What is of major significance for us is 
that Maimonides takes just such a scientific approach and extends its sphere of 
application from nature to the rationalisation of the commandments.
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4. Maimonides’ teleological rationalisation of the commandments
We have said that Maimonides makes use of teleological explanations in his 
rationalisation of the commandments. How though do final causes rationalise the 
commandments? Very simply, God’s revelation is shown to be rational in virtue of its 
being effectively directed to a certain specified end. As Eliezer Goldman notes, the 
rationality that is exhibited here is that of Weber’s means-end rationality which is an 
important aspect of rationality in action.32 For Maimonides, again emphasising the 
parallel with nature, just as God has arranged nature so that things have been created such
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to be explained in terms of what they are ‘for the sake of.’
In order, therefore, to give a teleological explanation we will need to find what the ends 
that the commandments aim at are. Maimonides thinks it obvious that the 
commandments were given in order to bring about the perfection of man, and this 
would be the realisation of his form. However, the question of what for Maimonides 
constitutes man’s perfection has been hotly disputed.
According to Maimonides, the commandments aim at two distinct types of human 
perfection -  that of the body and that of the soul.
The Law as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the body.
As for the welfare of the soul, it consists in the multitudes acquiring correct opinions 
corresponding to their respective capacity. . . .  As for the welfare of the body, it comes 
about by the improvement of their ways of living with one another. (GP, 111:27, 510)
As such, the commandments themselves can be split into intellectual commandments 
that were given to communicate a true opinion and perfect our souls, moral 
commandments that are there to build our moral character, and practical 
commandments that are there either to train one in acquiring the aforementioned 
intellectual and moral perfections or to regulate society. Thus, each commandment is 
related to either the intellectual or practical goal.
The True Law then . . . has come to bring us both perfections, I mean the welfare of the 
states of people in their relations with one another through the abolition of reciprocal 
wrongdoing and through the acquisition of a noble and excellent character.. . .  I mean also 
the soundness of the beliefs and the giving of correct opinions through which the ultimate 
perfection is achieved. (GP, 111:27, 511).
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However, as hinted at in this paragraph by his use of the term ‘ultimate perfection’, for 
Maimonides the two aims of the Law are arranged in a hierarchical order just as they 
are in Book X of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics.
[K]now that between these two aims one is indubitably greater in nobility, namely the 
welfare of the soul. (GP, 111:27,510).
The final end for man appears therefore, to be theoretical rather than practical for 
Maimonides as he states quite unequivocally in a number of places in the Guide. 33
The fourth species is the true human perfection; it consists in the acquisition of the rational 
virtues - 1 refer to the conception of intelligibles, which teach the true opinions concerning 
the divine things. This is in true reality the ultimate end; this is what gives the individual 
true perfection, a perfection belonging to him alone; and it gives him permanent 
perdurance; through it man is man. (GP, 111:54, 635).
This theoretical perfection which is gained by knowledge of God and ‘divine things’ is, 
of course, the form of man and as such is the fundamental explanatory concept in 
rationalising the commandments. Thus, since man’s form is the starting point for a 
teleological explanation of the commandments Maimonides can therefore give a 
scientific explanation of the rationality of the commandments in terms of a causal 
connection between them and man’s form. The commandments are rationalised either 
by virtue of their directly furthering the ultimate end by teaching true beliefs or by 
virtue of indirectly serving this end by inculcating moral virtues or being useful for 
society. The Torah is seen as a means to achieving these ends to the extent that is 
possible for all society. Moreover, since the Maimonidean explanations begin from our 
knowledge of the form of man we are able deduce the commandments from starting 
points that fulfil the various conditions of truth, necessity, ‘primitiveness’ etc.
However, there are problems with saying that Maimonides believes that we can have 
scientific knowledge of the commandments given that the commandments are often 
said by Maimonides to come under the rubric of generally accepted opinions and not 
primary intelligibles. Thus with regard to the Decalogue he writes that
the existence of the deity and His being one, are knowable by human speculation alone.. . .
As for the other commandments, they belong to the class of generally accepted opinions 
and those adopted in virtue of tradition, not to the class of the intellecta.(GP, 11:33, 364).34
This being so we would be unable to talk of scientific knowledge in the sphere of the 
practical for it seems that we could not speak of them as necessary truths of the sort that
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scientific deductions are supposed to produce. Indeed, the practical norms delivered by 
practical reason are said not to be susceptible of truth and falsity at all in the following 
famously problematic passage where Maimonides deals with the fall of man.
Through the intellect one distinguishes between truth and falsehood, and that was found in 
[Adam] in its perfection and its integrity. Fine and bad on the other hand, belong to the 
things generally accepted as known, not to those cognised by the intellect.. .  . Now man in 
virtue of his intellect knows truth from falsehood; and this holds good for all intelligible 
things. Accordingly, when man was in his most perfect and excellent state, in accordance 
with his inborn disposition and possessed of his intellectual cognitions... he had no faculty 
that was engaged in any way in the consideration of generally accepted things and he did 
not apprehend them. (GP, 1:2, 24-25).
It seems from this passage that according to Maimonides only the theoretical intellect 
deals with truth and falsity whilst the practical intellect deals with the relative 
distinction between the good and the bad. Such a distinction between the theoretical 
and practical sciences is apparently problematic for my contention that Maimonides is 
attempting to set up a science of practice in his rationalisation of the commandments 
equivalent to the science of nature.
The fundamental question here is whether or not Maimonides thought that the practical 
sphere was cognitive. Marvin Fox takes the view that he did not.
Maimonides has shown us that since moral rules are non-cognitive, they cannot be true or 
false and therefore cannot be the concern of the intellect. If all ethical distinctions are 
purely conventional, then it is a matter of special importance that we have the divine ethical 
teaching that alone can save us from the arbitrariness of social convention and positive 
law.35
In opposition to this reading, Hermann Cohen famously argued as part of his general 
argument for a more Platonic reading of Maimonides, that like Plato, Maimonides held 
that ethics should be seen as a science. Indeed, since according to Maimonides we 
cannot know God’s essence but only His ethical actions, knowledge of ethics becomes 
the highest form of knowledge since it is identified with knowledge of God.36 The view 
that we will put forward here combines what is correct in both Cohen and Fox for I will 
argue that Maimonides would apply the appellation ‘scientific’ to the practical realm of 
the commandments of the Torah, though not to the ethical or practical realm per se?1 
Let us begin by noting that we wish to hold that for Maimonides the exercise of the 
theoretical intellect on the intelligibles is the ultimate perfection for man. As such it 
might appear as if we could not include knowledge of practical affairs by means of the 
practical intellect as a part of this perfection. Indeed, Howard Kreisel has noted that
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Maimonides never explicitly mentions the Aristotelian idea of the practical intellect in 
order specifically to emphasise that ethics and politics are not subject matters for the 
intellect per se.38
However, that does not imply that the realm of the commandments is not a realm for 
intellectual cognition. This can be made clear if we look at the way in which 
Maimonides distinguishes between secular and religious morality. According to 
Maimonides, human systems of ethics are geared exclusively to the lesser perfection of 
the regulation of society whilst the divine law on the other hand is connected to the
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Accordingly if you find a Law the whole end of which and the whole purpose of the chief 
thereof, who determined the actions required by it, are directed exclusively toward the 
ordering of the city and of its circumstances and the abolition in it of injustice and 
oppression; and if in that Law attention is not at all directed toward speculative matters, no 
heed is given to the perfecting of the rational faculty, and no regard is accorded to opinions 
being correct or faulty . . . you must know that that Law is a nomos and that the man who 
laid it down belongs,. . .  to those who are perfect only in their imaginative faculty.
If, on the other hand, you find a Law all of whose ordinances are due to the attention being 
paid, as was stated before, to the soundness of the circumstances pertaining to the body and 
also to the soundness of belief -  a Law that takes pains to inculcate correct opinions with 
regard to God, may He be exalted in the first place, and with regard to the angels, and that 
desires to make man wise, to give him understanding, and to awaken his attention, so that 
he should know the whole of that which exists in its true form -  you must know that this 
guidance comes from Him, may He be exalted, and that this Law is divine. (GP, 11:40, 383- 
384).
Maimonides therefore distinguishes between general morality and religious morality by 
virtue of their telos. As Kreisel writes, in Maimonides’ system ‘it is the ultimate telos of 
the order which determines the form it takes and our evaluation of it.’39 
What all of this means in our Maimonidean context is that certain people will not have 
the systematic scientific knowledge of the commandments that relates them to their 
final contemplative end. They will only reach a lesser cognitive state that allows them 
to see the link to some moral end, which establishes the system as one traditional and 
conventional ethical system amongst others. This sort of cognitive state would enable 
them to form Aristotle’s practical syllogisms but not scientific demonstrations for the 
commandments that derive them from the ultimate form of man and establishes their 
laws as true and certain.
It is this that distinguishes a secular system from a religious system of morality. 
Religious morality is elevated from the status of a generally accepted opinion since the 
whole system is related to the higher contemplative end of theoretical perfection. This
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relationship, once cognised, allows us to gain scientific knowledge of the 
commandments and this distinguishes the divine law from the ethical systems put into 
place by human rulers which are not necessarily related to that end at all. As Kreisel 
writes, the systematisation itself causes a qualitative change in the status of these laws.
In changing the ultimate telos of the prohibitions of conventional morality and directing 
them to the attainment of intellectual perfection, the Divine Law changes the very essence 
of these prohibitions.40
Thus, we are arguing that it may be true that the intellect proper is the theoretical 
intellect and we can only directly cognise the forms that are its object. However, we can 
raise the status of our cognition of the practical sphere to that of scientific knowledge 
by drawing out the relationship of these practical matters to the form of man that serves 
as their end. Fox’s contention that according to Maimonides moral rules are non- 
cognitive is therefore correct in a sense, for as long as these rules remain in a purely 
moral setting devoid of any relationship to God, they cannot be known in the fullest 
sense. They need to be placed within a religious context in order for us to understand 
them in their full cognitive light. According to Maimonides therefore we can have 
genuine knowledge of these commandments but only if we can gain the necessary 
explanatory knowledge of them that relates them to the ultimate end for man.41 
Given this interpretation of Maimonides, how are we to understand the problematic 
passages quoted above? I believe that a careful reading of them shows that they make 
our epistemological distinction between different levels of knowledge rather than a 
metaphysical distinction that relegates the commandments in themselves to some lesser 
status than that of scientific truths. Taking the passage relating to Adam’s fall first, 
Maimonides tells us that Adam was originally endowed with intellect and that
It was because of this that it was said of him that he was created in the image of God and in 
His likeness. It was likewise on account of it that he was addressed by God and given 
commandments, as it says: And the Lord God commanded, and so on. For the 
commandments are not given to beasts and beings devoid of intellect. Through the intellect 
one distinguishes between truth and falsity. (GP, 1:2, 24)
What is significant here is that according to Maimonides, commandments were only 
given to Adam on account of his being endowed with an intellect that can distinguish 
between truth and falsity. The implication seems to be that, as we have argued, 
Maimonides believes that a divine system of Law -  the commands - can be known by
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the intellect. And Adam originally had such total demonstrative knowledge of the 
divinely ordained ethical norms.
Moreover, this interpretation allows us to answer one of the more general questions that 
people have regarding Maimonides’ account of the ‘fall’. For according to Maimonides, 
Adam originally only knew the distinction between truth and falsehood and not that 
between fine and bad, which he only acquired after his sin. The problem many people 
have with this explanation is that it seems paradoxically as if Adam has gained 
something rather than lost something as a result of his sin. i.e. knowledge of good and
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scientific knowledge of the commandments that comes as a result of philosophical 
speculation. After the fall though this knowledge is lost and he is therefore left in the 
lesser cognitive state that one has of a secular ethical system i.e. in terms of generally 
accepted standards of goodness and badness rather than in terms of their link to 
indisputable first principles. Adam becomes ‘absorbed in judging things to be bad or 
fine.’(GP, 1:2, 25).
The passage relating to the Decalogue at II: 33 is far more difficult to deal with.42 There 
Maimonides explicitly writes that excepting the first two, the commandments of the 
Decalogue ‘belong to the class of generally accepted opinions and those adopted in 
virtue of tradition, not to the class of the intellecta.’ (GP, 11:33, 364). Nonetheless, if we 
look at this sentence in the context of the whole passage, it seems to me that we can 
understand this phrase in terms of our epistemological distinction. The chapter at this 
point is discussing a quote from the midrash on Song of Songs I: 2 which says that only 
the first two commandments were heard directly from God by all the people, the 
remainder being communicated to them by Moses. Maimonides goes on to explain this 
in the following way:
For these two principles, I mean the existence of the deity and His being one, are knowable 
by human speculation alone. Now with regard to everything that can be known by 
demonstration, the status of the prophet and that of everyone else who knows it are equal; 
there is no superiority of one over the other. Thus these two principles are not known 
through prophecy alone. The text of the Torah says: Unto thee it was shown, and so on. As 
for the other commandments, they belong to the class of generally accepted opinions and 
those adopted in virtue of tradition, not to the class of the intellecta. (GP, II: 33, 364).
We are initially told that regarding the first two commandments the status of the 
knowledge of the prophet and that of everyone else is the same. The implication in what 
follows - ‘As for the other commandments.. - is that this somehow contrasts with the
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remaining eight commandments and it would appear logical for the contrast to be that 
with respect to these commandments the cognitive states of the prophet and the masses 
differ, with the prophet presumably being in the stronger cognitive position. However, 
if these eight commandments are essentially in themselves ‘generally accepted 
opinions’ (or adopted by of virtue tradition) and cannot be known, then the two groups 
could not have different levels of cognitive awareness with respect to them. Regardless 
of whether you were a prophet or a member of the general public, they would remain 
generally accepted opinions’. If, however, we understand the phrase regarding the status 
of the last eight commandments as telling us about the manner in which they are 
generally appropriated by the masses, then we can argue that they are not essentially 
‘opinions’. They can be known, but only by the prophet who can locate them within the 
sort of ultimate rational system that we have been discussing. What we are being told 
therefore is that in contrast to the first two commandments, which the masses can know 
in the same way as the prophet, the final eight are only ‘generally accepted opinions’ as 
far as the masses are concerned. If the problematic sentence is relativised to the masses 
we can again see it as referring to our epistemological distinction. On such a reading the 
passage as a whole seems to make more sense.
The intellectual religious task that remains for Maimonides therefore is to reconstruct 
this knowledge so as to come to know the commandments in their relationship to the 
ultimate end for man. Such a reconstruction is no easy task and Maimonides himself 
does not actually believe that he can construct such a system. Though all of the laws do 
have reasons, ‘we ignore the causes for some of them and we do not know the manner 
in which they conform to wisdom.’ (GP, HI: 26, 507). 43 Thus whilst there is a cause 
for each commandment, this does not mean that we can always access them. As Stem 
puts it, we must separate the ontological claim that the commandments have causes 
from the epistemological point that we may not always be able to discover them. Indeed 
Maimonides gives specific reasons for our inability to understand certain 
commandments as being either because of ‘the incapacity of our intellects or the 
deficiency of our knowledge’ (Ibid.), points that we shall return to later 
Nonetheless, Maimonides believes that in principle there is an ideal scientific 
demonstration of the commandments that could be reconstructed by utilising the 
explanatory method. He attempts to give us the ‘why’ of the commandments by 
showing how they fit into an overall theory that begins from minimal (by Maimonidean
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standards) universal and necessary assumptions about human nature which allow for the 
deduction of the entire system of commandments. Thus, I would agree with Twersky 
who writes that the rationalisation of the commandments is an entirely deductive 
enterprise for Maimonides which ‘at least in part is as precise and objective as any 
scientific discipline.’44
However, whilst this form of explanation seems viable for the moral laws, it is more 
problematic for many of the ritual laws or huqqim where it seems to be more difficult to 
see how they could possibly connect to the ultimate end. How for example does the 
sacrificial cult lead to man’s perfection? Maimonides, therefore, has to supplement his 
teleological explanations with historical/genetic explanations. The most informative 
example to look at in this connection is his explanation of sacrifices.
5. The rationalisation of sacrifices and genetic explanation
Maimonides believed that all the Laws have a cause.
It is, however, the doctrine of all of us - both of the multitude and of the elite - that all the 
Laws have a cause, though we ignore the causes for some of them and we do not know the 
manner in which they conform to wisdom. (GP, 111:26,507).45
Such a thoroughgoing intellectualism seems to be a new departure. Whilst traditionally 
the mishpatim (judgements) were identified with general morality and accepted as laws 
that could be seen to be rational, the commandments known as huqqim (statutes) were 
believed to be dependent entirely upon the will of God and not susceptible to any such 
rational backup. Maimonides though recasts this distinction by saying that the only 
difference between these two categories is the transparency of their utility to the 
multitude. The utility of the mishpatim is clear to the multitude, whilst that of the 
huqqim requires more research. He believes that such a thoroughgoing intellectualism is 
licensed by Deuteronomy 4:6.
For this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations which shall hear 
all these statutes and say, ‘Surely, that great nation is a wise and discerning people.’ 
(Deuteronomy 4:6).
How, the argument goes, could the nations of the world appreciate the wisdom and 
understanding of the Jewish people through their statutes if they are unintelligible in 
principle? Rather, there must be universal criteria of truth that we all share and that can 
be used to rationalise these laws.
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How though can they be understood to be rational? Essentially, Maimonides does not 
deviate from the teleological model of explanation that we have been discussing. He 
rationalises sacrifices by subsuming them under the general category of laws of worship 
in which Gods ‘first intention’ was ‘the apprehension of Him, may he be exalted, and 
the rejection of idolatry,’ (GP, 111:32, 527) which is part of the final intellectual 
perfection. Thus, the sacrificial laws were commanded in order to communicate ‘correct 
opinions’ to the masses and their instrumentality in producing this goal gives a 
teleological explanation of them akin to those given for the mishpatim. However, this 
explanation as it stands is extremely problematic since there does not seem to be any 
reason to assume that the sacrificial laws were either a necessary or sufficient condition 
for the communication of these correct opinions. Indeed, the sacrificial cult is a 
prominent part of what Maimonides refers to as the Sabian culture, the ancient 
polytheistic culture that utilised myth and magic in order to serve the stars and that 
according to Maimonides the Torah laws were supposed to be effacing. How therefore, 
would laws that incorporate seemingly idolatrous practices serve to produce correct 
opinions? In order therefore to give a full rationalisation of these commandments 
Maimonides supplements the teleological structure by adding a genetic or historical 
explanation. Such explanations explain the evolution of a certain system out of an 
earlier system, using historical information about the past together with certain general 
assumptions about the causal relevance of this information to the evolution of the 
system.
In the case of sacrifices therefore we find that Maimonides gives us a description of the 
Sabian modes of worship and explains how they were relevant to the evolution of the 
Judaic sacrificial cult via the psychological fact that people who become accustomed to 
certain ideas are unable to adopt a wholesale revision of those ideas. Had God 
commanded the abolition of sacrifices during that historical period it would have 
seemed to the people to be tantamount to abandoning the only possible form of 
worship. Taking this into account, God prescribed a modified version of the sacrificial 
cult, thereby safeguarding the people’s trust in the law and purifying the sacrificial cult 
of all its idolatrous elements thus transforming it into a more legitimate form of 
worship.46 Thus Maimonides combines certain psychological generalisations about 
human nature with historical information about the Sabian culture in order to show that 
the system of sacrifices were a kind of divine trick (termed ‘wily graciousness’ by
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Maimonides). The trick consisted of God using modified idolatrous practices in order to 
wean the people idolatrous worship altogether.
If you consider the divine actions - I mean to say the natural actions - the deity’s wily 
graciousness and wisdom, as shown in the creation of living beings, in the gradation of the 
motions of the limbs, and the proximity of some of the latter to others, will through them 
become clear to you.. . . Many things in our Law are due to something similar to this very 
governance on the part of Him who governs.. . .  For a sudden transition from one opposite 
to another is impossible. And therefore man, according to his nature, is not capable of 
abandoning suddenly all to which he was accustomed.. .  . For just as it is not in the nature 
of man that, after having been brought up in a slavish service occupied with clay, bricks, 
and similar things, he should all of a sudden wash off from his hands the dirt deriving from 
them and proceed immediately to fight against the children of Anak, so it is also not in his 
nature that, after having been brought up upon very many modes of worship and of 
customary practices, which the souls find so agreeable that they become as it were a 
primary notion, he should abandon them all of a sudden. (GP, 111:32, 525-8).
What we see here when faced with the huqqim is a clash between the ideal of what 
worship of God should be like and the demands of human nature given the historical 
circumstances of the legislation. Sacrifices are rational for they were necessary, given 
the exigencies of human nature, as a means to the final end of intellectual perfection. In 
general though we still end up with a teleological method of explanation for all the 
commandments and the genetic explanation merely shows how the hukkim are directed 
towards mans final end by God’s wisdom.47
There is though a problem with how these genetic explanations fit into the scientific 
model of rationalisation that we have been attributing to Maimonides. For these 
explanations must include mention of particular facts and therefore our explanations 
will not exclusively take the form of a deductive chain of necessary truths. In order to 
deal with this problem we need to distinguish between Maimonides’ own model of 
rationalisation and what we can call the Maimonidean method of rationalisation. From 
Maimonides’ own perspective, it does appear difficult to assimilate these historical 
explanations into the Aristotelian scientific system that we have described. One could 
argue that Maimonides might understand the particular historical facts contained in his 
explanations as expressing general deterministic trends in nature that could form part of 
a scientific rationalisation. Thus, we could see the particular facts from a ‘universal 
perspective’, as representing universal necessary truths about humanity.48 Or, in 
keeping with the Aristotelian model, we might wish to say that Maimonides’ pure 
teleological explanations are the ideal and that these genetic explanations would not 
form part of the ideal system. The textual evidence is at best ambiguous regarding
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whether Maimonides thought that his system of rationalisation was absolute or whether 
he expressed some reservations concerning certain rationalisations.49 
However, as we have previously mentioned, the disregard for particulars in a scientific 
explanation seems to show up a fault in Aristotle’s theory of scientific explanation 
rather than in the use of particular empirical facts. If therefore we were to admit such 
particular empirical facts into the structure of scientific explanation, we might be able 
to talk of a Maimonidean approach to the commandments that construe genetic 
explanations as genuine scientific explanations. This option is indeed open to us by 
virtue of the model of explanation put forward by Carl Hempe! in his article ‘The 
Function of General Laws in History.’50
According to Hempel, the understanding of a historical event, E, can be modelled on 
the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation. Understanding a historical 
event E consists in our ability to explain or predict it by ‘indicating the causes or 
determining factors of E’.51 A full explanation therefore involves citing the antecedent 
casual conditions (Ci.. .  Cn) together with empirically well confirmed general laws (LI. 
. . Ln) that link these conditions to E in a lawlike fashion. From these factors we can 
deduce E in a logical fashion and we thereby understand the historical event as an 
instance of a general law, just as we would understand a natural event.
Hempel admits that the general laws used in historical explanations are often not cited, 
but this is only because we either take them for granted or cannot state them in the 
precise manner required for a scientific explanation. Nevertheless, the relations of 
dependence between the various historical events that the historian should be studying 
are related in a lawlike fashion. Nagel similarly admits that though certain social 
sciences cannot develop the degree of systematisation of the natural sciences, their 
explanatory objective is the same and the establishment of these relations of 
dependence between events is the mark of a scientific enterprise.
Returning now to Maimonides, the claim is that his approach to the commandments 
remains scientific if we construe his historical explanations in this way. This is not to 
say that Maimonides had a fully worked out Hempelian theory of historical explanation. 
Certainly Maimonides is no positivist, believing as he does that there are real causal 
mechanisms that the scientific explanations are setting out. However, it seems to me 
that Maimonides’ explanations do naturally lend themselves to such an explication. He 
does give us a set of antecedent conditions together with psychological laws, some
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explicit, others implicit and thus the approach can be seen to remain scientific in the 
Hempelian sense. So though for Maimonides these explanations would not be scientific 
in the strict Aristotelian sense, a modem day theorist who wished to use a Maimonidean 
method could be said to be taking a scientific approach in his use of such explanations. 
If therefore we speak of the Maimonidean method of rationalisation, we can portray it 
as an attempt to explain why the commandments should be as they are or could have 
been predicted to be so by appeal to scientific explanations in the most general sense. 
The Maimonidean method of rationalisation is an attempt to give us a scientific
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writes of explanation that is causal in a ‘broad sense’.
It consists, more specifically, in the subsumption of individual cases under hypothetically 
assumed general laws of nature, including human nature.32
6. Critique of The Maimonidean Method (1): The Genetic Attitude
The Maimonidean approach to rationalising the commandments raises a number of 
issues and for the remainder of the chapter we will be focusing briefly on some of the 
most salient points that arise out of the criticisms that have been levelled at it. Most 
significantly, Soloveitchik has written that the Maimonidean rationalisation is ‘entirely 
valueless for the religious interests we have most at heart.’ (HM, 92). Soloveitchik 
seems to believe that the Maimonidean approach is not relevant for the religious 
philosopher who should rather approach religious phenomena descriptively.
The ‘how’ question, the explanatory quest, and the genetic attitude determined 
Maimonides’ doctrine of the commandments. Instead of describing, Maimonides explained, 
instead of reconstructing, he constructed. (HM, 92).53
The religious philosopher, according to Soloveitchik,
is not interested in the genetic approach to the religious act nor does it raise the old 
problem of causality. It by-passes the ‘how’ question and turns it over to explanatory 
psychology. The focal problem is of a descriptive nature: What is the religious act? What is 
its structure, context and meaning? (HM, 86).
If we look at these two quoted passages from Soloveitchik, we see that he mentions 
three related things that are wrong with the Maimonidean approach to religious 
philosophy: the genetic attitude, the concern with causality and the concern with
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explanation. We will structure our discussion therefore around these three interrelated 
issues, beginning with the alleged problem with the genetic attitude.54 
Why is the genetic attitude thought to be irrelevant? The first point to recall is that as 
previously noted Maimonides is interested in the commandments from a ‘normative’ 
standpoint. He wants to know why it would be rational to perform or command the 
commandments rather than why an agent performs or commands a certain action 
(though of course the two can and often do coincide). The problem though, given this 
interest, is that he seems to be open to accusations of committing the genetic fallacy.
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Nietzsche for example pointed out that though the institution of punishment has very 
dubious origins, this is no reason to abandon it; its validity is not affected by these 
origins.55 As Soloveitchik writes
The truth of the matter is that the genetic background of a certain method does not in the 
least affect its cogency and validity. The ‘logos’ as a normative agent is still authoritative 
regardless of its ‘biography.’ Whatever be the psychological history of geometry, 
Pythagoras’ theorem is autonomously valid. (HM, 88).
Effectively Soloveitchik therefore is accusing Maimonides of missing the point by 
arguing for the rationality of a commandment from its evolutionary history when 
historical origins are of no consequence for the rationality of the commandment. 
However, we should not accuse Maimonides of committing this fallacy quite so quickly 
for in fact his genetic explanations are not meant to be relevant to the validity of the 
commandments, at least not on their own. As we have argued, they are a supplementary 
stage in the Maimonidean rationalisation which is, for some commandments at least, a 
two-stage process:
1. A commandment is rational if it is a means to the moral/intellectual perfection of 
man.
2. Certain commandments do not appear to stand in such an instrumental relationship to 
these ends and must therefore be explained genetically in order to show how they fit 
into this teleological structure.
Thus, the genetic explanations are not meant to be free standing. The point of them is to 
show how ritual laws that seem prima facie to be irrelevant to the ends posited as the 
purpose of the commandments do after all lead the people to these ends. This means 
that Maimonides does not commit the genetic fallacy. His causal story is not meant to
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be a free standing rationalisation of the commandments whose validity or rationality is 
still analysed in terms of their teleological relationship to man’s natural (and thereby for 
Maimonides normative) end rather than in terms of their causal origins. The genetic 
explanations are only relevant to the Maimonidean rationalisation given its general 
teleological structure; once we situate the genetic explanations within this teleological 
framework we see that Maimonides is only interested in them as an explanation of how 
certain commandments can be understood to be causal means to man’s natural end. 
However, regardless of the validity of the criticism that Maimonides commits the 
genetic fallacy, there is a further criticism of his use of historical explanations which is 
the charge that they may lead people to heterodox conclusions. The problems here stem 
from his use of idolatrous practices in order to explain the huqqim. Indeed, such 
associations in themselves might be problematic in the eyes of many and lead them to 
doubt the validity of the commandments that have such associations. But the problem 
that has caused the most discussion in the literature is that the historical explanations 
imply that commandments like those connected to sacrifices have outlived their 
usefulness. If the sacrificial laws were understood to be means to the specified end, but 
only due to the historical circumstances, the fact that these circumstances no longer 
apply would appear to make it rational to choose more efficient means to the end, 
means that are more amenable to the modem religious consciousness for example. 
According to Maimonides’ reasoning one could argue that since we are no longer held 
in thrall by idolatry and understand that one can communicate with God in other ways, 
by praying for instance, why not pray rather than sacrifice?56
The problem then is that the historical approach does not furnish us with any sort of 
reason to perform the commandments. Indeed, it gives us reason to change them. 
However, one might answer the charge here by recalling that Maimonides was 
primarily interested in Stem’s commandment question (or Hartman’s intelligibility 
question) rather than in the performance question. It is true that the historical 
explanations cannot give us a reason today to obey the sacrificial laws. Indeed, from a 
performance perspective, according to Stem, recognition of these explanations would 
give me reason not to sacrifice:
[N]ot only is the reason why Israel was originally commanded to offer sacrifices not a 
reason for me at present to perform that commandment; assuming that I recognise the 
idolatrous associations of all sacrifice, even in worship of God, knowledge of these 
historical reasons for the commandment would be reason for me now not to sacrifice.57
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Moreover, the problem here is not simply that the historical explanations do not 
constitute a reason for me at present to perform the commandment. If we understand 
the performance question as Stem does i.e. as requiring an answer ‘that a human agent 
can use to justify his own performance of the commandments’ ,58 then these 
explanations could never furnish an agent with an answer to the performance question. 
For these explanations show how God is in fact attempting to prevent the people from 
sacrificing by some sort of divine ruse. Any agent who was able to understand the
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use it as a reason not to sacrifice. We can understand the mse today, but in order for it to 
have been effective in the first place, the agent to whom the commandment was 
addressed must not understand it. Nevertheless, since, according to Stem, the 
commandment question is Maimonides’ primary concern, his rationalisation is at least a 
limited success for it does make intelligible God’s commanding these laws.
However, I believe that the problem is more pervasive than these approaches allow, for 
I do not think that Stem’s commandment question or for that matter Hartman’s related 
‘intelligibility’ question, is answered satisfactorily by the historical explanations.
The problem for the performance question was the antinomian conclusion that such 
explanations lead to; from a performance perspective, the Maimonidean method would 
seem to allow, if not dictate, the heterodox conclusion that we should change the 
commandments. It seems to me though that the antinomian conclusions are reached 
even with regards to the commandment question. This is because, according to 
Maimonides the commandments are part of an eternal law. Thus Maimonides writes
The Law was not given with a view to things that are rare. For in everything that it wishes 
to bring about. . . , it is directed only toward the things that happen in a majority of cases 
and pays no attention to what happens rarely.. . .  In view of this consideration, it will also 
not be possible that the laws be dependent on changes in the circumstances of the 
individuals and of the times, as is the case with regard to medical treatment which is 
particularised for every individual.. . .  On the contrary, governance of the Law ought to be 
absolute and universal, including everyone, even if it is suitable only for certain individuals 
and not suitable for others. . . . For this reason matters that are primarily intended in the 
Law ought not be dependent on time or place; but the decrees ought to be absolute and 
universal. . .  (GP, 111:35,524-5).
If this is a correct understanding of the law, then Maimonides’ historical explanations 
do not answer Stem’s commandment question since they cannot explain why it was 
rational for God to command the sacrificial cult as part of an eternal law. The historical
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explanations only rationalise the commandments, even from the perspective of the 
commandment question, for a particular time and place. Similarly, they cannot show as 
Hartman wishes that the laws and nature reveal the same God since the rationalisation 
would appear to show that the commandments that He has given, unlike the laws of 
nature, are entirely mutable.
We should note that Maimonides does not draw such heterodox conclusions himself. 
As we see in the quote above, he believes that the law is ‘eternal and absolute’. Our 
argument is simply that this is not a conclusion that he has a right to derive from his
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fault in leading to these heterodox conclusions. If we were to criticise the 
commandments purely in terms of these historical considerations, we would indeed, be 
committing the genetic fallacy of judging the validity of the commandments in terms of 
their causal origins. The real problem is the teleological structure to which these 
historical explanations are subordinated. The reason we believe that the commandments 
are no longer rational is because they no longer serve the ends that Maimonides 
believes once rationalised them. The historical explanations merely serve to make this 
clear, showing that the ritual commandments no longer stand in any instrumental 
relationship to these ends. But it is the teleological structure into which they are then 
inserted that causes the problems of heterodoxy, for the commandments are no longer 
seen to lead to the end posited by Maimonides as the reason for their existence. The 
problem therefore is that the commandments are rationalised by Maimonides in terms 
of a means-end relationship and the historical explanations make it clear that this 
relationship no longer holds. The historical explanations though are only therefore 
relevant to our recognition of the rationality or validity of the commandments. But they 
are not thought to be relevant to the substantive rationality of the commandments 
themselves.60 Thus, whilst the historical part of Maimonides’ rationalisation has 
traditionally come in for the most criticism, it is only when combined with the 
teleological approach that any problems arise and we now turn therefore to consider the 
teleological enterprise itself.61
7. Critique of The Maimonidean Method (2): Teleological Explanations
The question of teleology bring us to the point that Soloveitchik makes under the more 
general heading of ‘causality. For the teleological analysis to work, the commandments
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must be understood as ‘causes’ that bring man’s form from potentiality to actuality, 
though one needn’t necessarily accept all of the Aristotelian metaphysical baggage here 
to appreciate the general point that is being made. The commandments are a causal 
means to an end.
Certainly for Maimonides the rationality of the ethical commandments is 
metaphysically guaranteed by the actual existence of man’s purpose. As we have 
shown, the concept of purpose as used by Maimonides in his rationalisation is not a 
subjective psychological state that varies from person to person but an Aristotelian
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of natural science that appeals to real qualitative essences that underlie real causal 
mechanisms can therefore appeal to man’s natural form to rationalise the 
commandments for all of humankind.
Not surprisingly, as we shall see, Soloveitchik rejects the essentialist Aristotelian 
scientific paradigm. However, once we reject the scientific picture according to which 
man has a given natural essence, we can no longer justify any set of religious or ethical 
norms as universally valid or rational by reference to it. Nonetheless, one might wish to 
justify these norms by appeal to some non-essentialist view of human nature that 
appeals to certain fundamental psychological needs for example.62 Allowing, for the 
sake of argument, that this is possible, it is interesting to note that Soloveitchik seems 
to reject the teleological approach per se, writing
We are not to ask for any generating cause or goals. (HM, 94).
Why though should this be so? The fundamental problem with this causal approach in 
general it seems, is bound up with the fact that it leads to a loss of autonomy in 
Soloveitchik’s eyes.
Whenever the causal question is raised, the philosopher must transcend the boundary line 
of religion in order to find his answer which lies beyond the religious domain. Both 
mechanistic and teleological concepts of causality explain the effect through the existence 
of an alien factor, be it within or without the system. Thus religion must avail itself of 
foreign elements. The net result of Maimonides’ rationalisation is that religion no longer 
operates with unique autonomous norms, but with technical rules, the employment of which 
would culminate in the attainment of some extraneous maximum bonum. In rationalising 
the commandments genetically, Maimonides developed a religious ‘instrumentalism.’ 
Causality reverted to teleology (the Aristotelian concept of causa finalis) and Jewish 
religion was converted into technical wisdom (techne). (HM, 93).
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By explaining the commandments in the way that he does, Soloveitchik seems to 
believe that Maimonides is sacrificing the autonomy of the religious realm. It is this, for 
Soloveitchik, that seems to be the main problem with the Maimonidean approach.
8. Critique of The Maimonidean Method (3): Universalism and Autonomy
The problem of autonomy that arises for Maimonides might be thought simply to be 
that of universalism. That Maimonides believes in universal criteria of rationality rather 
than any ‘unique autonomous norms’ seems relatively uncontroversial. The main task
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in particular the parables that he terms the Account of the Beginning and the Account of 
the Chariot, can be reconciled with an allegiance to the demonstrated truths of reason.63 
In fact Maimonides identifies these two particular parables with natural science and 
divine science (or metaphysics) respectively.
Certainly in the theoretical sciences, therefore, Maimonides was convinced by the 
power of universal reason as it manifested itself in Aristotelian science and philosophy 
writing that ‘in all things whose true reality is known through demonstration there is no 
tug of war and no refusal to accept a thing proven - unless indeed such a refusal comes 
from an ignoramus who offers a resistance that is called resistance to demonstrationf.]’ 
(GP, 1:31, 66). Indeed, in the realm of theoretical speculation, Maimonides believes that 
the litmus test of acceptability of the religious texts themselves was their conformity or 
otherwise to the universal canons of reason. Thus he is able to write
That the Deity is not a body has been demonstrated; from this it follows that everything that 
in its external meaning disagrees with this demonstration must be interpreted figuratively.
(GP, 11:25, 328).
The theoretical truths of Judaism are therefore the objective truths of science and 
metaphysics and by his own admission therefore, Maimonides is not adding anything to 
the purely philosophical arguments on these points ‘for the books composed concerning 
these matters are adequate.’ (GP, 11:2, 253).64 Universalism is therefore a central tenet 
of Maimonides’ system and since his rationalisation of the commandments is based on 
a demonstration from what for him was a universal scientific truth, it appears that such 
universalism is just as operative in the practical sphere. Indeed, Maimonides maintains 
that practice must proceed on the basis of (universal) philosophical knowledge if it is to 
express the philosophical form of religiosity that he takes to be the ultimate aim of
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Judaism. As Hartman says the philosophical categories (that he refers to as Aggadah) 
are of primary importance for practice.
After Sinai, the primacy of practice cannot be denied by any religious Jewish writer who 
addresses a Halakhic audience. . . . Consequently, for a traditional Jew to accept the 
importance of theoretical knowledge for his service of God, he must be convinced that it 
also affects practice.
Maimonides, aware of the problem, proceeded to offer evidence that would point to the 
primacy of Aggadah after Sinai . . . showing how knowledge of Aggadah is, in fact, 
responsible for the different levels of Halakhic practice.65
Now there are a number of problems with such an universalist approach as applied to 
practice. One of the most general would be that it does not seem to be autonomously 
Jewish, which of course is Soloveitchik’s main concern. Thus, Eliezer Berkovits’ has 
claimed that Maimonides (and indeed his predecessor Sa'adia Gaon) ‘accomplished the 
task they set themselves by subordination of religion to the supreme authority of the 
intellect.’66 Specifically with regard to his rationalisation of the commandments, we 
find him subordinating them to certain universal ends. Referring back to Levy’s 
dilemma then, we find that since Maimonides accepts an universalist view of truth and 
subordinates statements of Jewish practice to this universal system, he might be 
accused of not doing ‘Jewish’ philosophy. Soloveitchik*s objection to the Maimonidean 
method -  that it leads to a loss of autonomy might therefore be understood in the spirit 
of the first horn of Levy’s dilemma.
At the same time, it is interesting to note that Maimonides has in fact painted himself 
into a comer here. For, as we have seen, Maimonides in fact refuses to translate the 
heterodox conclusions of his rationalisation into practice and he therefore ends up in 
something of a philosophical bind over this matter. On the one hand he is accused by 
Soloveitchik of not doing ‘Jewish’ philosophy in this practical sphere, according to the 
reasoning of the first horn of Levy’s dilemma. At the same time though, as we have 
seen Maimonides himself stops short of actually adjusting practice to the rational 
constraints of his own model. Thus, even if the reasons that he gives for the 
commandments are not ‘autonomously Jewish’, one might argue that at least he does 
not actually subordinate the practice to those reasons. But in so doing he is thereby 
hoist on his own petard as well as being impaled on the second horn of Levy’s 
dilemma. For now there is a practice that cannot be seen to have general philosophical 
value according to his own philosophical criteria. And as such the problem is no longer 
one of a loss of autonomy. Rather, it is a loss of philosophical cogency.
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The problem of autonomy for the Maimonidean method therefore might be thought to 
stem from his universalism and this is certainly an important factor. However, it is 
interesting that Soloveitchik in fact puts his autonomy objection in rather different 
terms. For the emphasis in the passage quoted seems to be less on universalism and 
more on the explanatory method in general. If we recall the point with which we started 
our critique, Soloveitchik’s main complaint against the Maimonidean approach is its 
use of an explanatory rather than a descriptive method. The latter method, it would 
appear, leads to an understanding of the commandments based on unique autonomous 
norms whereas the former explains the commandments by means of ‘foreign elements’. 
The most basic problem with the Maimonidean method therefore seems to be the use of 
the explanatory method in general. This is the most fundamental problem and it is one 
that underwrites the universalism that we find in Maimonides since it leads to the 
attempt to subsume the commandments under general laws of nature. But the problem, 
it seems, is not therefore with the specific Aristotelian scientific model that 
Maimonides uses but with the use of an explanatory scientific method per se in its most 
general form that requires that Jewish practice be rationalised by subsumption under 
universal explanatory laws. The claim is that the explanatory method leads us to ignore 
the autonomous norms that Judaism itself gives us to guide our understanding of the 
commandments. What the religious philosopher should do is interpret the 
commandments, whether ethical or ritual,67 in terms of specific religious norms of 
rationality. In this way the religious realm retains its autonomy.
However, all that this does is raise a number of questions that we will need to tackle 
since precisely what constitutes an explanatory method, why it is problematic, and the 
advantages of Soloveitchik’s descriptive method all remain to be seen. For even if it 
turns out to be true that the Maimonidean explanatory approach sacrifices autonomy in 
the sense that we have described, would this constitute a genuine philosophical 
objection to it? What is wrong with ‘subordination to the intellect’ or the use of 
universal criteria in order to rationalise the commandments? The Maimonidean 
approach gives us an Archimedean point from which we can rationalise and 
constructively criticise Judaism. The claim that this sacrifices Judaism’s autonomy may 
be seen as no more than a refusal by the religious Jew to listen to reasoned argument. 
Correlatively, the use of so-called autonomous norms might be thought of as
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tantamount to the fideistic type of Ostrich Judaism that we mentioned in the opening 
chapter.
The claim then is that whilst the Maimonidean method in itself is certainly 
philosophical, the question is whether or not it is ‘Jewish.’ The autonomy criticism says 
it is not. However, whilst the mention of an autonomous method by Soloveitchik holds 
out the hope for an autonomous Jewish philosophy, does it do so at the price of not 
being a genuinely philosophical alternative? What we need to discover is whether the 
autonomy criticism of the explanatory method is justified and whether Soloveitchik’s 
descriptive alternative offers us an alternative that can stand up to philosophical 
scrutiny.
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three we will come to some alleged differences that Soloveitchik discusses. For further discussion of the 
Mishneh Torah treatment of the topic see Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), chapter 5, especially pp. 407-447.
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on this particular point, though his general point that science surely does deal with particulars and not 
only laws is still well taken. See Barnes, Aristotle, pp. 35-36.
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sense. For the latter would imply an exclusive concern with the practical legal aspect of the Law without 
regard to its true theoretical purpose. See Guide, Introduction to the First Part, p. 5. Menachem Kellner 
has argued in contrast that it was only with Joseph Albo that the commandments themselves were taken to 
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Medieval Jewish Thought’, Revue Des Etudes Juives, vol. 146 (1987), pp. 265-279. However, I an not 
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interpretation, it is the very relating of the commandments to the truths of physics and metaphysics that 
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is discoverable’ has written that this passage requires ‘special study’. Twersky, Introduction, p. 458, 
footnote 247.
43 Yet again, we note that in the previous chapter he has placed a similar epistemological restriction on 
our knowledge of nature. See Guide, III: 25,506.
44 Twersky, Introduction, p. 402.
45 It is important though to note that Maimonides appears to qualify this thoroughgoing intellectualism 
later in the very same chapter by noting that while there is a reason for all the generalities of the 
commandment, there may not be a reason for all the particulars of them. Thus he does not seem to think 
that there is a reason why a lamb rather than a ram might have been specified for a given sacrifice, though 
there would be a reason for doing the sacrifice. Stem in fact argues that Maimonides does give us reasons 
for these particulars, but wishes to keep them hidden from the multitude. See Stem, ‘The Idea of a Hoq'.
46 One should note that not all the huqqim were accomodatory in this fashion according to Maimonides. 
Some were given that were directly opposed to Sabian practices whilst others simply forbade such 
practices at all. The particular type of hok presumably depended on the psychological needs of the people 
regarding each of the particular Sabian practices that a commandment was addressing.
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remarks about the epistemological restrictions on our knowledge that I believe may be relevant to these 
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p. 97, and Gersonides, The Wars o f the Lord., 3 vols, trans., Seymour Feldman (Philadelphia: Jewish 
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‘Gersonides’ Account of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 10
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Journal o f the History of Philosophy, vol. 21 (1983), pp. 513-36.
49 Thus, we find at Guide HI: 26 that regarding his explanations ‘there can be no doubt and . .  . there can 
be no objection.’ The same point is also made at IH: 37. However, at IH: 49, we find him offering ‘one of 
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50 Carl G. Hempel, ‘The Functions of General Laws in History,’ Reprinted in M. Martin and L. C. 
MacIntyre eds. Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 
43-53.
51 Ibid., p. 43.
52 Georg Henrik Von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1971), p. 4.
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and causal explanation is, obviously, a form of explanation. This means that we could immediately turn to 
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the argument through each of the stages is important if we are to identify precisely what is and what is not 
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55 See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, (1887), trans. W. Kaufman and R.J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 76-79.
56 We should note that Maimonides is well aware of the dangers inherent in his rationalisation. Indeed, 
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interpretation of them as being problematic commandments. They are commandments whose reasons 
would, if revealed, cause problems for the faith of the masses given the idolatrous associations that those 
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commandments. See Stern, ‘The Idea of a Hoq'\ and Twersky, Introduction, pp. 391-397.
57 Stern, ‘The Idea of a Hoq\ p. 113.
58 Ibid., p. 93.
59 Some interesting attempts have been made to rationalise this insulation. See, for example, Hartman 
Maimonides, pp. 176-186; and Oliver Leaman Moses Maimonides, (London: Routledge, 1990), chapter 
9, especially pp. 137-144. We do not have the space to tackle these attempts here. However, I do not 
believe that any of them actually show that the unchanged commandment is rational in itself.
One interesting account is that given by Stem He thinks that though Maimonides cannot give us a 
satisfactory general account of the positive grounds of our obligation to perform these commandments, at 
GP, UI:51-52, Maimonides offers us an alternative rationalisation of the commandments that may allow 
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for it reads: ‘If . . . you perform a commandment merely with your limbs . . . without reflecting either 
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60 Note that even if we interpret the genetic explanations as being genuinely scientific in the Aristotelian 
sense (see above note 50) Maimonides would still not be committing the genetic fallacy, since the 
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61 Hartman, for example, writes that ‘what has been shown about Maimonides’ historical approach to the 
commandments obscures the most important danger it creates for the halakhic Jew.” Hartman, 
Maimonides, p. 176. Oliver Leaman on the other hand explicitly notes our point about the importance of 
the link to the teleological structure: ‘Once we have discovered the purpose of the rules and we
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understand what they are designed to do, can we not exchange them for other rules which we might find 
more efficient to that end, or more pleasant to perform?’ Moses Maimonides p. 137.
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the Limits o f Philosophy, (Cambridge, Fontana Press, 1985) especially chapter 3.
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translation is taken from Pines ‘Philosophical Sources’, pp. lix-lx .
65 Hartman, Maimonides, p. 44.
66 Eliezer Berkovits, God, Man and History (New York: Jonathan David, 1959), pp. 3-4.
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ones. See HM, 69.
62
Chapter three
Rationalising the Commandments II: The Soloveitchikian Method
Having reviewed the Maimonidean approach towards rationalising the commandments, 
we will now look at Soloveitchik’s method. Soloveitchik’s general project was not the 
medieval one of giving substantive reasons for particular commandments. However, as 
Reinier Munk has written with reference to three of Soloveitchik’s most important 
works, Halakhic Man, U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham}  and The Halakhic Mind, his ‘objective 
in these essays is the articulation and justification o f halakhic man’s thought and 
acts.’(My emphasis).2 Similarly, Lawrence Kaplan has shown that Soloveitchik makes 
some very important observations about the formal structure of the rationality of 
halakhah in a number of his works and that out of these discussions we can reconstruct 
a method for rationalising the commandments.3
As Kaplan points out, Soloveitchik, whose doctoral dissertation was written on 
Hermann Cohen’s ontology and logic at the university of Berlin, would have been 
influenced by the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism for whom the physical sciences 
and mathematics represented the highest form of objective knowledge. Soloveitchik 
therefore insists that we take a scientific approach to the study religion. The central 
focus of much of this discussion will again, therefore, be science for as Soloveitchik 
notes in Halakhic Man,
religion should ally itself with the forces of clear, logical cognition, as uniquely 
exemplified in the scientific method, even though at times the two might clash with one 
another . . .  (HMN, 141, note 4)4
The attempt to ‘intuit’ the essence of the religious experience is ‘a frank admission of 
defeat for reason.’(HM, 51).
It is not surprising therefore that Kaplan finds a scientific model for rationalising the 
commandments within Soloveitchik’s reflections on halakhah. Moreover, in The 
Halakhic Mind Soloveitchik presents his general methodological views concerning how 
one ought to do Jewish philosophy that appear to lay the groundwork for Kaplan’s 
model. However, these general scientific motifs in his work and his debt to Hermann 
Cohen in particular have often been stressed with little or no qualification, particularly 
with regard to Halakhic Man. It is generally thought that only later, in the 1960’s, that 
the more humanistic and existentialist strands of his thought begin to show themselves, 
most notably in The Lonely Man of Faith.5
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We will argue that as early as The Halakhic Mind, which was written in the same 
period as Halakhic Man,6 Soloveitchik explicitly qualified both his ‘scientism’ and his 
reliance on Cohen in certain very important respects.7 Specifically, humanistic and 
hermeneutic strands often reminiscent of those found in the later thought of Wilhelm 
Dilthey are very much in evidence in Soloveitchik’s general methodological
o
reflections. Most notably, this leads him in part four of The Halakhic Mind, where he 
does explicitly discuss the issue of Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot, to set out a very different 
model of rationalisation to the one that Kaplan gleans from the other works. Our main 
aim in this chapter therefore will be to try and understand these two models of 
rationalisation and some of the questions they raise.
In what follows then we will begin in sections 1 and 2 with a summary of 
Soloveitchik’s general methodological views as presented in The Halakhic Mind which 
seem initially to provide the basis for Kaplan’s interpretation of Soloveitchik’s model 
of rationalisation. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 will then consider that scientific model of 
rationalisation that Kaplan attributes to Soloveitchik. In sections 7 and 8 we will begin 
to look at the contrasting model of rationalisation found in The Halakhic Mind and 
briefly consider some of the implications of the differences between the two models for 
the second half of the thesis.9
1. The method of reconstruction
As a prelude to our discussion of particular methods of rationalising the 
commandments, we will summarise Soloveitchik’s general methodological views 
concerning Jewish philosophy as set out in The Halakhic Mind, which begins with a
detailed discussion of the methodological gap that had opened up between philosophy
and the natural sciences.10 This gap, according to Soloveitchik, allows the religious
philosopher to stake a claim for an independent approach to reality.
Soloveitchik writes that in the past the philosopher was forced to work within the
confines of the scientifically constructed universe with which the scientist presented 
him, whether that be the ancient’s view of the universe or the mechanistic Galilean- 
Newtonian picture. Effectively, he was restricted to studying the quantitative universe
of the scientist and using the mechanistic methods appropriate to such an object. 
However, Bergson’s awareness of the problems of reconciling the philosopher’s
scientifically induced mechanistic methods with certain biological and psychical
concepts gave the first indication that certain realms resisted this scientific approach.
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Though Bergson’s own observations were, according to Soloveitchik, largely ignored, 
at the beginning of this century science itself in the guise of relativity theory and 
quantum mechanics, presented the classical mechanistic view with similar problems. 
The quantum scientist, for example, discovered certain phenomena that did not 
conform to the existing scientific conceptual framework and required new theories and 
principles for their assimilation. Principles of science that had been taken to be 
axiomatic were thereby called into question and replaced by new principles which 
required a new philosophical framework. However, while scientists were prepared to 
revise their principles in accordance with these discoveries, philosophy found itself 
unable to cope with the new developments.
As a result certain philosophers such as the logical positivists conceded that the 
scientist alone could discover the nature of reality and their task was to analyse those 
scientific ideas and methods. However, a group referred to by Soloveitchik as 
‘insurgent metaphysicians and epistemologists’ {HM, 12-13), parted company with the 
scientist and asserted the right to study the philosopher’s own qualitative universe and 
develop the appropriate methods for doing so. Thus, science was no longer granted the 
exclusive right to call itself rational at the expense of all other approaches to cognition 
leading to the possibility of a pluralistic approach to reality.
While this opens up a window of opportunity for the religious philosopher, at the same 
time as we have seen, it is essential for Soloveitchik that the religious philosopher’s 
independent approach be reined in by scientific or empirical considerations. Indeed, 
Soloveitchik believes that there are two criteria to which any methodology for doing 
religious philosophy must conform. The first criteria is practical and brings up a 
pragmatic strand that we find appearing time after time in his thought.
Regardless of the shortcomings of pragmatism as a solution to our most perplexing 
epistemological problems, it is nevertheless advisable to apply, at times, the pragmatic 
principle to the appraisal of certain philosophical theories. . . . The ethical implications of 
any philosophical theory, as to its beneficence or detriment to the moral advancement of 
man, should many a time decide the worth of the doctrine. {HM, 52).
That being so, Soloveitchik rules out the anti-intellectualistic or anti rational 
approaches to religious philosophy encouraged by the phenomenological school for 
such non-rational approaches have had terrible practical consequences. ‘It is no mere 
coincidence’ writes Soloveitchik ‘that the most celebrated philosophers of the third 
Reich were outstanding disciples of Husserl.’ {HM, 53).
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This brings us directly to the second, theoretical criterion, which is most decisive for 
the actual formation of the methodology and here the scientific focus of Soloveitchik’s 
methodological considerations comes to the fore. The religious philosopher, freed from 
certain scientific constraints must nevertheless not follow the anti rational approaches 
of the modem metaphysicians. Thus, paradoxically, it is the modem scientist’s 
methodological innovations that must be utilised in order to allow the religious 
philosopher to be at once scientific and yet not slavishly adhere to a purely scientific 
picture of reality.
What we seem to find in Soloveitchik here in general is a very Diltheyan approach. For 
though Dilthey was concerned at the way in which positivism had ignored the realm of 
the human spirit or mind, he was equally concerned at the way in which the 
independent philosophical approaches had abandoned any empirical methodology at 
all. Thus whilst criticising positivism on the one hand, Dilthey was equally derisive, in 
Kantian fashion, towards the state that philosophy had got itself into by engaging in 
speculative metaphysics. If we are to study the human spirit whether in philosophy or 
the human studies more generally, we must base our study on the empirical expressions 
of that spirit and not on metaphysical flights of fancy. According to Dilthey, we must 
neither ‘truncate historical reality in order to assimilate it to the concepts and methods 
of science’, nor ‘ sacrifice the justifiable independence of the particular disciplines and 
the fruitful power of their empirical methods to a sentimental mood’.11 
With this Diltheyan picture in mind we can see that though Soloveitchik insists that 
science must provide us with the methodological paradigm for religious philosophy, it 
is a very particular ‘scientific’ approach that he recommends. Specifically, the 
Newtonian, according to Soloveitchik had made a methodological error -  that of using 
an exclusively atomistic method in order to form his quantitative picture of nature. This 
atomistic approach attempts to explain all macrophenomena in terms of the behaviour 
of the individual ‘parts’ that make them up and leads us to a picture of a clockwork 
universe in which the parts are related in simple mechanical ways. According to 
Soloveitchik, it is the quantum physicist who must therefore provide us with a model of 
method. The quantum physicist, it is true, begins according to Soloveitchik by 
constructing his ‘own object by duplicating nature and correlating numerical 
equivalents with intangible qualitative phenomena.’(//M, 60). The quantum physicist 
therefore, like the Newtonian before him, gives us the sort of precise quantified realm 
that was an anathema to the religious philosopher. However, the quantum scientist 
realises the paucity of this method due to the aforementioned discovery of quantum
66
phenomena that could not be understood in terms of the Newtonian principles. The 
quantum scientist realises therefore that he must deal with three orders of reality. He 
begins with a qualitative order (Al), which is our ordinary sensory world that cannot be 
quantified as such. In order to provide himself with a fit object for study, therefore, the 
scientist must construct a parallel objective order (B), which is the abstract 
mathematical equivalent of (Al), constructed according to the atomistic approach. But 
the picture achieved through this atomistic method could not account for the behaviour 
of newly discovered quantum phenomena according to Soloveitchik. A third level, (A2) 
is therefore needed in order to understand the ‘enigmatic behaviour of certain “strings 
of events”.’(HM, 60). A certain philosophical framework is required if we are to 
understand the behaviour of these parts.
What the quantum physicist understood therefore was the need to understand his 
‘objective’ data in terms of a certain ‘subjective’ framework, the need for a structural 
whole in order to make sense of those individual phenomena that could not be 
accounted for by the atomistic method. We must be scientific inasmuch as we must 
base ourselves on objective data. Objectification is necessary both for the precise study 
of nature and for a study of the religious realm that will meet Soloveitchik’s scientific 
standards. However, the quantum physicist simultaneously applies a holistic approach 
to his study of nature and it is the introduction of this qualitative structural whole that 
allows the method of quantum physics to be used as a paradigm for the religious 
philosopher:
As long as physics operated with a single atomistic approach, its method could not benefit 
the humanistic sciences, which can ill afford to ignore the subjective aspect. . . However, 
as soon as the modem physicist had evolved a subjective ‘cosmos-whole’ out of the 
objective summative universe, the humanist found his mentor . . .  (HM, 71)
The religious philosopher is not just interested in an objective quantified realm since 
his subject area is meaningful. Indeed, this is the central difference between the subject 
matter of the human and natural sciences - human behaviour, unlike the ‘behaviour’ of 
a stone has an inner content that makes it meaningful - it has a certain semantic 
dimension. We do not attempt to understand the meaning of a stone falling as it does. 
We simply explain it by reference to a certain causal explanatory framework. However, 
human behaviour is not to be understood as a mere mechanical phenomenon but is 
informed by a set of values and purposes that we must understand in order to 
comprehend the visible manifestations that we observe. Again, it is Dilthey’s 
fundamental insight that the subject matter of the human studies in general is
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distinguished from the causal order of nature by the fact that, in accordance with the 
structure of mental life, it creates objects of value and realises purposes: and this, not 
occasionally, not here and there, but as a result of the mind’s dynamic structure to do this 
once it understands.12
Moreover, it is clear form this passage that this ‘meaningful’ aspect of behaviour is not 
merely incidental to it. It is essential to understanding human action as such, for it is 
precisely this that makes something an action rather than a simple bodily movement. 
Given this distinction, the religious philosopher is interested in the philosophical 
frameworks behind the objective quantified world of the scientist and therefore finds 
value in the quantum physicist’s holistic approach.
Just as important though was the central realisation of the quantum physicist that there 
was no given objective framework in terms of which these parts could be understood. 
The idea of a neutral framework through which the neutral subject views his object 
could no longer be taken for granted. Soloveitchik points out that in the modem world 
‘scientists themselves differ in their employment of categorical apparata.’(//M, 22). 
Within the scientific realm the mathematician and the physicist, for example, use 
different concepts of space for their different purposes. Scientists work with a number 
of different ‘philosophical frames’ and the idea of a neutral framework through which 
the neutral subject views his object could no longer be taken for granted. On account of 
this, the previously noted failure of Newtonian science to account for quantum 
phenomena did not lead the modem scientist to the simple formulation of a new 
uniform framework to replace the old one. Rather, the quantum scientist called into 
question the shared assumption of the Aristotelian and classical physicist -  that there is 
such a given uniform framework to be discovered. Though the classical and modem 
scientist agreed therefore, that the world was to be understood in terms of abstract 
quantitative categories rather than in terms of Aristotelian essences, it was only the 
quantum scientist who realised that this abstract framework did not reflect some 
objectively given reality and thus different disciplines could work with different 
methods and frameworks.
So not only did quantum theorists find phenomena that could not be assimilated into 
the Newtonian philosophical framework. They also discovered that there was no given 
framework within which to work. Centrally for Soloveitchik, this realisation on the part 
of the quantum physicist led to an appreciation of the fact that one’s theoretical 
framework determines to some extent the nature of the object being studied.
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The claim of the natural sciences to absolute objectivity must undergo a thorough revision.
. . . The pristine object, when intercepted by the experimenter, is transformed, chameleon 
like, from transcendent imperviousness to immanent merger with the subject. (HM, 25).
Paradoxically therefore it is the quantum scientist who here provides the impetus for 
the creation by the religious philosopher of an independent non-scientific framework 
for apprehending reality. What Soloveitchik calls epistemological pluralism allows the 
religious philosopher to interpret reality in terms of his own philosophical framework, 
one that is governed by his own goals and objectives. Thus, Soloveitchik writes:
Every system of cognition strives to attain a distinct objective. Systematic knowledge 
means the understanding and grasping of the universe in consonance with a definite te'los .
. . the object reveals itself in manifold ways to the subject, and that a certain telos 
corresponds to each of these ontical manifestations. Subsequently, the philosopher or 
scientist may choose one of the many aspects of reality in compliance with his goal. (HM,
16).
However, of central importance for Soloveitchik here is the fact that such cognition 
nonetheless provides us with genuine knowledge of reality, albeit a reality that is itself 
only revealed by the use of a particular method. Indeed, he writes that the varying 
conceptual schemes that we use to interpret the world yield genuine knowledge and are 
grounded in reality and are not arbitrary inventions of our consciousness.
Teleological heterogeneity, however, does not invalidate the cognitive act, for, in the final 
analysis, pluralism is founded on reality itself. It is important to note that this trend of 
thought has nothing to do with operational pragmatism . . . epistemological pluralism does 
not deny the absolute character of Being. (HM, 16)13
Thus thanks to the quantum physicist, the religious philosopher can legitimately take an 
interest in the ‘structural whole’, the philosophical system behind the parts, and also 
posit his own such philosophical system in order to apprehend that reality.
The most important methodological twist as far as we are concerned though arises 
when we ask how the scientist can apprehend this structural whole. For we have 
already seen that Soloveitchik does not accept that this ‘whole’ can be approached 
directly, as certain ‘insurgent metaphysicians’ would have us believe. According to 
Soloveitchik, therefore, we can only construct, or rather reconstruct (A2) atomistically 
out of the objective parts of (B) that (A2) itself was intended to explain. What we find 
here therefore in more general terms is the insistence that we reconstruct the subjective 
whole out of the objective parts, the theory out of the observation.
It is notable that Soloveitchik parts company with Hermann Cohen on this point. For 
Cohen, the Kantian system in which knowledge has two sources - thought and intuition
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- is replaced by a system in which thought is the Only source of scientific knowledge. 
For Soloveitchik, such a system, which bases all of our empirical knowledge on 
thought alone, granting perception no independent standing as a source of knowledge, 
does not allow us to comprehend reality. Thus, Soloveitchik in his doctoral thesis is 
highly critical of Cohen’s epistemology, especially in relation to the 
Geisteswissenschaften.14 In the religious sphere, to take the most pertinent example, we 
must base our knowledge on empirical realities and not only pure thought.
The structural designs of religion cannot be intuited through any sympathetic fusion with
an eternal essence, but must be reconstructed out of objective religious data and central
realities. (HMt 62).15
Soloveitchik therefore is utterly opposed to an a priori approach to the structural 
whole, whether in the scientific or religious sphere and insists that we use an 
‘empirical’ method that reconstructs it out of the objective data. We should note though 
that this method of reconstructing subjective aspects from objective data does also hail 
from a neo-Kantian source, that of Paul Natorp, who insists on this method.16 
However, the most significant point that Soloveitchik takes from the scientist here is 
the manner in which he has to combine the atomistic and holistic approaches in order to 
reconcile the subjective whole and the objective parts. A purely atomistic 
reconstruction of the whole out of the parts as would appear to be suggested by 
Natorp’s reconstruction would be a return to the Newtonian approach. A purely holistic 
approach on the other hand would be a return to the methods of the metaphysicians of 
whom Soloveitchik is so critical. The quantum physicist appreciates that the parts are 
required in order to form the whole but at the same time the whole is required in order 
to account for the parts. We are led therefore into a circular method whereby we must 
simultaneously attempt to mutually adjust the two so as to arrive at a suitable 
equilibrium between them. The correct method therefore is one that combines the 
atomistic and holistic approaches. Soloveitchik’s description of the methods of the 
scientist who must use the ‘parts’ (observations) to form the ‘whole’ (theory) and yet 
can only understand certain parts in the first place in terms of that whole suggests that 
he is taking the well-known method of reflective equilibrium to theory construction. 
Reflective equilibrium is a nonfoundational process of justification described as 
follows by Nelson Goodman.
The process of justification is the delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules
and accepted inferences; and in the agreement lies the only justification needed for either.17
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The idea is that one constructs and justifies a theory of X by moving back and forth 
between ones considered judgements about X and the theoretical principles that one 
forms by considering them. The idea as applied to Soloveitchik’s scientist would be 
that we construct a theory from our initial observations in order to justify them, but at 
the same time the theory itself can then force us to reinterpret certain observations. 
Moreover, as the theory and observations develop further, we will in all probability 
need to continue to make mutual adjustments to the whole scheme. The important point 
here is that nothing is taken to be an incorrigible foundational starting point. In 
principle anything could be subject to revision and the justification of theory and 
observation lies in the coherence of the package. But, as Soloveitchik notes, the point is 
that this is a package rather than two disparate methods.
The understanding of both nature and spirit is dualistic, both mosaic and structural -  but 
(and this is o f enormous importance) the mosaic and structural approaches are not two 
disparate methodological aspects which may be independently pursued: they form one 
organic whole. {HM, 60, emphasis added).
How though are we to apply this method to the philosophy of Judaism? What is the so- 
called objective basis from which the religious philosopher must begin that corresponds 
to the quantified formulae of the scientist? Again Dilthey’s later thought seems to 
provide a good point of reference here for understanding Soloveitchik’s views on this 
question.
According to Dilthey the subjective mental life of a human being which he terms 
Erlebnis, experience, is the , source of all our action and thought. But the most 
significant fact about this experience is that it has a seemingly natural tendency to force 
itself out into the objective realm. Dilthey’s experience becomes public in what he calls 
‘expressions’, which can include any public manifestation of experience from facial 
expressions to works of art. Many of these expressions are permanently objectified and 
make up the mind constructed world or objective mind which is ‘a covering term for all 
modes of expression of human life as they manifest themselves in the external world.’18 
We find similarly that what Soloveitchik calls ‘spirit’ (rather than ‘experience’) 
naturally exteriorises itself, whether in actions or in the various products of those 
actions be they artworks, buildings or indeed, religious or metaphysical systems. Thus, 
we find Soloveitchik writing in extremely Diltheyan fashion
There is a definite trend towards self-transcendence on the part of the spirit. It strives to 
escape its private inwardness and infiltrate the concrete world encompassed by space and 
pervaded by corporeal forms.(//M, 67)
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These concrete expressions of spirit are the primary sources for those studying the 
humanities: individual and collective subjective experience can only be studied via its 
concrete expressions, the objective mind. It is these that make the mind ‘accessible to 
knowledge’,19 for these expressions, as products of Erlebnis, have meanings that can 
be understood.
Thus, Soloveitchik believed that in order to form a religious philosophy, we must begin 
from the religious equivalents of these expressions, the objective concrete products of 
religious experience. Only in this way can we attain any degree of objectivity. It is here 
that Orthodox Judaism comes into its own for Soloveitchik maintains that in Judaism 
the concrete ethical and ritual norms of the halakhah form just such an objective order 
for study. The norms of the halakhah amount to a quantification of the subjective 
religious experience into something objective and concrete.20
What we have seen so far then is that the Jewish philosopher should utilise the method 
of reflective equilibrium in order to form his world-view and do so by using the norms 
of the halakhah as his ‘objective parts’ or ‘considered judgements’. There remains 
though one further aspect of Soloveitchik’s method that we need to take note of.
2. Descriptive reconstruction
Notwithstanding the fact that Soloveitchik draws on a scientific model in order to 
illustrate his method of reconstruction, he apparently tempers his scientism in an 
important respect. Soloveitchik wishes us to emulate the modem scientist by utilising 
objective data in a method of reflective equilibrium, but he believes that there is an 
important difference in the way we should treat this data stemming from the fact that 
the halakhah is a meaningful structure.
Human actions, which are at the centre of halakhah, are distinguished from mere bodily 
movements as we have noted by reference to the fact that they are undertaken with a 
purpose in mind and are governed by certain rules. Dilthey thought that the various 
products of human experience, his expressions, which include the many ‘mind- 
produced’ systems of philosophy, religion and politics had this semantic dimension.21 
And despite the fact that for Soloveitchik halakhah would be seen as a product of the 
divine mind rather than of the human mind, it would still be such a meaningful 
structure and as such should not in Soloveitchik’s opinion be treated in the same way as 
natural objects.22
The particular methodological differences between the scientist and the religious 
philosopher that stem from this recognition are illustrated by returning to the scientist’s
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three orders of reality.23 The claim is that the scientist is only interested in the causal 
inter-relations between the members of the quantified objective order (B). He wishes to 
explain the members of (B) causally and subject them to necessary laws. However, the 
reconstructed whole (A2) that was necessary in order to understand the behaviour of 
the members of (B) is not an object of scientific study. It is not subject to the causal 
relations that interest the scientist and he is only interested in it insofar as it allows him 
to work with the individual processes within it. The actual ‘whole’ itself for the 
scientist is ‘an empty phrase, not suitable for portraying nature as such .'(HM, 58). 
Soloveitchik’s first point then is that in direct contrast to the scientist, the religious 
philosopher is interested primarily in the reconstructed subjective whole (A2) itself. In 
the realm of meaningful expressions, we are not interested in the causal relations 
between objective expressions. We wish to understand them in terms of the subjective 
order (A2).24
But, this also means that the manner in which this subjective track must be studied is 
not simply causal as it is for the objective order explored in natural science. The 
relationship between the objective order (B) and the reconstructed (A2) is causal 
according to the natural scientist. But the religious philosopher must construe this 
relationship in a non-causal fashion. The causal explanatory method is to be rejected 
and replaced with the method of descriptive hermeneutics, a method that seems to be 
more appropriate to the sphere of religion where we are neither concerned with the 
causal relationship between the different practices of that religion, nor the causal 
relationship between the practices and the theory. We are concerned to discover what 
the various practices ‘mean’ and we need to use a descriptive rather than causal method 
in order to uncover this. Thus we arrive at the method that Soloveitchik calls 
descriptive reconstruction.25
In summary then, the important aspects of the method that the religious philosopher 
needs to emulate are as follows:
1) Jewish philosophy should utilise the method of reflective equilibrium.
2) The Jewish philosopher must emulate the scientist by beginning from objective 
data.
3) We must take a descriptive approach to our reconstruction rather than a causal one.
3. Rationalising the commandments
How can we apply all of this to the idea of rationalising the commandments? The first 
thing to note is that the method of reflective equilibrium seems to be especially relevant
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to rationalising the commandments. Over recent decades the method of reflective 
equilibrium has been a popular method of forming ethical theories for justifying ethical 
practices. The most famous modem exponent of this is John Rawls who uses this 
method to great effect in his Theory of Justice.26 There the idea is that one forms the 
principles of a theory of justice out of our considered judgements about justice, i.e. 
those about which we are most certain.27 At the same time though these principles that 
we form might actually show up some of our considered judgements to be incorrect and 
therefore in need of revision. A theory is therefore only justified when it matches our 
considered judgements in a reflective equilibrium, not simply our initial considered 
judgements.
What has been found particularly attractive about this method in the ethical sphere is its 
nonfoundational nature. As Rawls explicitly states, the method does not rely upon any 
foundational ‘self-evident’ true principles or judgements that are to bear the weight of 
justification. The existence of any such set of self evidently true principles is seen to be 
too contentious to ground a theory. The method therefore does not attempt to justify 
ethical norms from some supposed Archimedean point. In reflective equilibrium, 
rather, the justificatory weight ‘rests upon the entire conception and how it fits with and 
organises our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium.’28 
If we apply this general methodological procedure to rationalising the commandments, 
we seem to have ready-made considered judgements in the commandments themselves 
and thus our theory is to be formed out of considering them. We form the principles of 
our theory of commandments by consideration of the individual halakhot that make up 
our considered judgements, while at the same time using the principles to understand 
those very halakhot and presumably, possibly to revise them. In this way we get a set of 
halakhic principles for rationalising the halakhah rather than some set of principles 
imposed from without. And indeed this sort of model seems to be the one that Kaplan 
takes to be implicit in works such as Halakhic Man and Mah Dodekh Mi-Dod.
Therefore, for R. Soloveitchik, to explain the commandments means first and foremost to 
subsume halakhic rulings under highly general, abstract halakhic concepts and principles, 
concepts and principles of which the specific rulings will be concrete particularizations. In 
this respect, for R. Soloveitchik, the rationality of the halakhah is immanent to it and the 
discovery of that rationality is part of the halakhic enterprise.29
The model that Kaplan is suggesting is one whereby we explain the commandments in 
terms of an abstract halakhic structure. And since we have seen that Soloveitchik does 
not believe that any such philosophical structure can be apprehended a priori, we must
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presume that this halakhic structure that rationalises halakhah, is nonetheless drawn 
from consideration of halakhah itself. What Soloveitchik appears to be saying on this 
reading is that halakhah expresses a logical conceptual structure which, when revealed, 
enables us to understand halakhic norms in a logically perspicuous fashion. Thus ‘the 
halakhist introduces unified logical structures, complexes of abstract concepts in order 
to integrate conglomerations of diverse seemingly unconnected laws.’30 It is this 
structure, formed by the method of reflective equilibrium that exposes the rationality of 
the system.
There are a number of factors that we should note about this model of rationalisation. 
The first is that it is based on the revolution in halakhic study ushered in by his 
grandfather Rabbi Chaim Soloveitchik (R. Chaim Brisker). R. Chaim first developed 
the idea that the halakhah was more than just a set of practical rules to be understood in 
their own qualitative terms. It is rather the actualisation of an abstract rational system of 
concepts and principles. Soloveitchik therefore similarly believes that the halakhah 
does not merely yield practical norms. Indeed, for Soloveitchik it embodies an entire 
philosophical world-view.
If the philosophy of religion asks for example, how the homo religiosus interprets the 
concepts of time, space, causality, substance, ego, etc., then it would have to look into the 
objective series and examine norms, beliefs, articles of faith, religious texts etc. Out of this 
objectified material, the philosopher of religion may glean some hints regarding the 
structure of the most basic religious cognitive concepts. (HM, 99)
Generally, we see that for Soloveitchik, the practice of Judaism, widely conceived, is 
seen to express a meaningful structure that embodies an entire Weltanschauung, a 
Diltheyan ‘expression’ that expresses a certain world-view in the presuppositions that 
its practical rules embody.
The second central point for Soloveitchik is that the method of reflective equilibrium 
that we are using here allows a degree of autonomy to our rationalisation. For such a 
method begins from within the halakhic perspective rather than from some external 
Archimedean point and forms its principles out of the sources of the halakhah itself. 
Rather than having to explain the commandments teleologically in order to live up to a 
universal scientific standard of knowledge as, for example, Maimonides did, halakhic 
categories are explained by subsumption under autonomous halakhic rules and 
principles allowing the halakhah its autonomy whilst retaining its rationality. As 
Aviezer Ravitzky writes
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Halakhic activity is intended to acquire absolute autonomy, to create its ideal world, one 
which precedes any other reality . . . and which transcends any temporal alterations. The 
halakhic system is thus protected from any attempt at reduction to another realm. It is open 
to innovation, to constructive creativity, but these are meant to be conducted by means of 
its own unconditional transtemporal conceptual system.31
Thus, individual commandments must be interpreted in terms of the ‘unique 
autonomous norms’ of the halakhah, rather than in terms imposed from without. By 
using the method of reflective equilibrium, we can rationalise individual 
commandments in this way by the creation of a system of autonomous halakhic 
concepts and principles that serve to organise these individual commandments into a 
coherent system. Thus, the method of reflective equilibrium yields a set of principles, 
but they are not necessarily, and indeed are highly unlikely to be universal.
The final point that we should make is that this method does not appear to yield causal 
explanations of halakhot but rather describes the general principles implicit in the 
halakhot that serve to justify them - the method does indeed seem to be one that we 
could term descriptive reconstruction. Yet the model remains scientific inasmuch as 
according to Soloveitchik the principles and categories of the scientist are not to be 
seen as representations of the way the world is but rather as descriptive constructions 
that classify and unify the data at hand.
Aristotelian physics wished to explain existence, in terms of its qualitative essence. . .
Many generations believed, in all innocence, in the possibility of rational explanation, 
concerning real-qualitative existence. Classical, as well as modem, physics relinquished 
this far reaching and daring claim. It understood the non-rational nature of the universe, 
when it manifests itself in its everyday, primitive image, and abandoned scientific 
understanding thereof. The deeper truth which revealed itself to the practitioners of the 
natural sciences was that man is unable to comprehend the essence of concrete phenomena 
and to know them, but he may make formal-quantitative constructions which parallel the 
concrete phenomena.32
As such, though our model of rationalisation is scientific, it could happily be construed 
as descriptive rather than causal. So we end up with a model of rationalisation that 
utilises the method of reflective equilibrium and yields an autonomous set of 
descriptive principles that serve to show that the halakhic system is a rational one.
4. Reflective Equilibrium
Now that we have the method set out before us, we should turn to the obvious problems 
that arise for it from a philosophical perspective. For while the reflective equilibrium 
approach as we have so far described it allows the halakhah to be seen as an 
independent theoretical structure with its own inherent rationality, it also seems to
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insulate it from the possibility of any external criticism or indeed any objective 
validation. Thus, we see that Soloveitchik’s criticism that the Maimonidean method 
sacrifices autonomy by allowing that the commandments must be subject to validation 
by external norms might be justified when placed next to his own model in which 
Judaism’s autonomous norms are used to validate the commandments. However, it 
seems to achieve this by utilising an entirely circular method that can only allow for a 
justification by the particular logic of the system under study. Indeed, this criticism 
might arise from the very fact that Soloveitchik says that his method is descriptive - 
how can the mere description of the scheme implicit in a set of norms be seen to justify 
them?
This reflects the general criticism levelled at the method of reflective equilibrium, 
which as Norman Daniels points out, makes the problem of justification ‘intractable’.33 
The mere back and forth movement cannot yield an objective justification of a theory 
on its own, for it seems that all we are doing is systematising our own existing 
judgements, even if some of them might be revised subsequent to the formation of the 
principles.34 If we are starting from within a certain perspective, even if we allow that 
judgements within that perspective are open to revision by theory, the fact that the only 
starting point for that theory is the judgements themselves still seems to put them in a 
privileged position of sorts that we cannot justify.
If Soloveitchik is a reflective equilibrium theorist, he has to deal with this very 
problem. For though the conservative insulation that comes as a result of this lack of 
objectivity might be thought to be a virtue of the theory for religious conservatives, it is 
not a virtue if one wishes to assert that we can give a genuine philosophical justification 
of the commandments. For, whilst by starting from within a certain perspective we may 
salvage a degree of autonomy as Soloveitchik wished, we do not appear to have the 
objectivity or indeed capacity for self criticism that would seem to be necessary for a 
justification. Thus, the question that we were left with at the end of chapter two 
regarding whether or not Soloveitchik offers us a genuinely philosophical alternative to 
Maimonides might be thought to hang on this issue.35
It is with this problem in mind therefore, that Daniels introduces the distinction 
between narrow and wide reflective equilibrium. What we have been describing up 
until now is a form of narrow reflective equilibrium whose relata are the principles of a 
theory and a set of considered judgements. However, according to Daniels, Rawls’ use 
of the original position in his reflective equilibrium in A Theory o f Justice acts as an 
intervening step between these relata that adds extra justificatory weight to the theory.
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In A Theory of Justice Rawls attempts to justify a certain conception of justice by 
appeal to a hypothetical contract that is agreed to in the original position. This original 
position though embodies certain philosophical assumptions that are thought to be 
rational so that whichever conception of justice is rationally derived from this position 
will similarly be rational and therefore justified. Now the assumptions of the contract 
are arrived at by philosophical arguments which Daniels believes can be construed as 
inferences from a set of relevant background theories such as a theory of the person and 
the role of morality in society. He therefore argues that Rawls’ method is in fact that of 
wide reflective equilibrium.
A wide reflective equilibrium is a coherent ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a 
particular person, namely, a set of considered moral judgements, (a); a set of moral 
principles, (b); and a set of relevant background theories, (c). 6
According to this approach, the original position itself, which embodies certain (b) 
level principles, is derived from a set of background philosophical theories (c) that 
serve to justify its assumptions. What we have therefore is a philosophical background 
for the original position and thus any principles chosen from that position have extra 
justificatory weight, beyond that which they get from the equilibrium with our 
considered judgements. To mark the distinction between these levels we will speak 
from now on of ‘principles’ when speaking of the principles of level (b) and 
‘background theories’ when referring to these background philosophical theories of 
level (c)
How though, are these background theories supposed to add extra justificatory weight 
to the theory of justice itself? If we are to retain a nonfoundational approach they 
cannot be privileged foundational points. Daniels therefore states that these background 
theories must themselves be justified by the method of reflective equilibrium with our 
considered judgements. And this seems to reflect what Rawls himself says about the 
original position, for he tells us that we are to consider whether or not the assumptions 
embodied in the original position yield principles of justice that match our considered 
judgements about justice. As Rawls points out, if the choice of theory from the original 
position does not match our considered judgements, then we again can either modify 
our initial assumptions in the original position i.e. our background theories, or our 
considered judgements.
We can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can revise our existing 
judgements, for even the judgements we take provisionally as fixed points are liable to 
revision. By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual
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circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgements and conforming them to principle, I 
assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both 
expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered 
judgements duly pruned and adjusted.37
However, the problem now is that the background theories cannot be justified by being 
in reflective equilibrium with our considered judgements, (a), for then we have made 
no progress. Our background theories would themselves be derived from the very 
judgements that we used to form our principles of justice. And if the same (a) 
judgements justify our principles, (b), and our background theories, (c) we have not 
gained any justificatory weight by invoking the background theories. All we have done 
is further developed the very same set of judgements. We can represent this picture as 
follows where arrows signify justificatory relationships
Considered judgements (a)<->Principles of our Theory (b)
u  T
Background theories (c)
Daniels therefore believes that it is important that there be an independence constraint 
on the background theories. This means that the background theories must themselves 
‘not just be formulations of the set of considered moral judgements (a) to which we 
seek to ‘fit’ the principles in (b).’38 The background theories, that is, must derive their 
plausibility from a set of considered judgements disjoint from those that were 
considered in the initial reflective equilibrium which served to match our principles of 
justice to certain considered moral judgements. The preferred picture therefore is:
Considered judgements (a)<-»Principles of our theory (b)
t
Considered judgements (a’) Background theories (c)
Now the first thing to note is that we have already seen that according to Soloveitchik 
the halakhah does contain such philosophical background theories as would make for a 
wide reflective equilibrium. So if the method of wide reflective equilibrium works, 
Soloveitchik would seem to be in a position to rationalise the commandments.
However, through all of this the fact remains that we are still working solely with our 
own considered judgements in order to produce these background theories which do 
not therefore seem to have any independent justification and are no more objective than 
the original theory. Presuming that we can find a set of disjoint considered judgements 
to form our background theories, the fact is that they are still the considered judgements 
of the very same world-view. All we have achieved is a further articulation of the same
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world-view. But we have still not managed to further its objective grounding. Daniels’ 
claim that since we can reach a greater measure of agreement on such background 
theories they can be used to justify our ethical (or in our case religious) theories just 
seems contrary to the fact of the deep disputes that abound concerning them.39 Thus, 
the problems remain for the reflective equilibrium theorist. However, it is possible that 
Soloveitchik has alternative resources at hand for dealing with this problem of 
objectivity.
5. Reflective Equilibrium and Halakhic Objectivity
The resource that Soloveitchik may be able to use to bolster the objectivity of his 
rationalisation is his belief in the objectivity of halakhah. Since the halakhah itself is in 
some sense objective for Soloveitchik, and our theory of justification arises out of it, 
this may in turn yield a more objective theory of justification. In what though does this 
halakhic objectivity consist?
On the one hand, we can say that halakhic norms are objective in the simple sense of 
having been externalised as concrete practices from the religious consciousness in order 
to become a public shared point of departure for study. This objectification is again 
given its typically Soloveitchikian scientific analogy, being compared to the way that 
physical scientists take their subjective common sense perceptions and quantify them 
into objective mathematical formulae.
The halakhah which was given to us from Sinai, is the objectification of religion in clear 
and determinate forms, in precise and authoritative laws, and in definite principles. It 
translates subjectivity into objectivity. . . .  To what may the matter be compared? To the 
physicist who transforms light and sound and all of the contents of our qualitative 
perceptions into quantitative relationships, mathematical functions, and objective fields of 
force. (HMN, 59)
However, this comparison to the scientist is also used to bring out a more important 
sense in which the halakhah might be seen as objective.
In Halakhic Man, a well known parallel is drawn between the way that the scientist and 
halakhist approach reality. Both of them use the a priori ideal concepts and categories 
of their respective systems in order to cognise the world.
Halakhah has a fixed a priori relationship to the whole of reality. . . . Halakhic man orients 
himself to the entire cosmos and tries to understand it by utilising an ideal world which he 
bears in his halakhic consciousness. All halakhic concepts are a priori and it is through 
them that halakhic man looks at the world. . . . His world view is similar to that of the 
mathematician: a priori and ideal. Both the mathematician and the halakhist gaze at the 
concrete world from an ideal a priori standpoint and use a priori categories and concepts
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which determine from the outset their relationship to the qualitative phenomena they 
encounter. (HMN, 23)
Significant questions have been raised regarding the sense in which these halakhic 
categories are genuinely ideal and a priori.40 However, the fundamental point seems to 
be that both the scientist and the halakhist view the world from a certain theoretical 
perspective determined by their particular conceptual scheme. They both have what 
Kaplan later terms ‘a fundamental mode of orienting oneself to reality’41. We have 
different conceptual orientations to reality which dictate the way that we cognise it. 
More significantly for our purposes though is his interpretation of halakhah’s ideal 
nature. The central idea that Soloveitchik is trying to get across here is that the 
halakhah reflects an ideal a priori realm of ideas in that ‘it does not require, as far as its 
validity and truth are concerned, precise parallelism with the correlative realm of 
concrete, qualitative phenomena.’(//MAT, 19). It is akin to a Platonic realm of ideas that 
the halakhist discovers and that has some form of ontological status that is entirely 
independent of the sensible world making halakhah objective in the strongest of 
senses 42 The discovery of this abstract theoretical system is, for Soloveitchik, halakhic 
man’s goal.
[Halakhic Man’s] deepest desire is not the realisation of the Halakhah but rather the ideal 
construction which was given to him from Sinai. . . . The theoretical Halakhah, not the 
practical decision, the ideal creation, not the empirical one, represent the longing of 
halakhic man. (HMN 23-24).
As Kaplan points out, the halakhah that Soloveitchik appears to be referring to here is 
the revealed corpus of law given to Moses at Mount Sinai. The revealed nature of this 
law means that it is objective in the sense that it is independent of man, as is the natural 
world. Thus in the same way that science has been seen to be objective in the sense that 
its truths are independent of man’s concerns, the law as given at Sinai is seen to be a 
similarly independent objective realm, one that is ideal in the sense noted and used to 
orient ourselves to reality.
Admittedly, the idea of such an ideal realm with some independent ontological status 
seems very difficult to understand. However, allowing for the moment that this 
‘Platonic’ conception of the halakhah is correct, the problem now is that though we 
have objectivity, we no longer seem to have a method of reflective equilibrium. If 
halakhah is taken to be objective in this way, we seem to have severely limited, if not 
nullified, the extent to which any mutual adjustment between principles and individual 
halakhot can take place and as such we cannot be reflective equilibrium theorists at all.
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It seems as if the halakhist can construct a theoretical system out of the commandments 
that he has been given. But they are an objective given that are discovered and cannot 
be adjusted and if this is the case any method of rationalisation would seem to return to 
the atomism of the Newtonian scientist that Soloveitchik had previously attacked. He 
now appears to be building up a philosophical system out of the halakhic parts without 
regard to any kind of two way process.
It seems then than that objectivity has been regained for the reflective equilibrium 
approach by privileging the considered judgements. Such privileging gives the halakhic 
component of the equilibrium the type of foundational role required for an objective 
justification. However, this means that Soloveitchik cannot use the method of reflective 
equilibrium. We have a seeming conflict therefore, between his view of the ‘given’ 
nature of the halakhah that seems to be beyond revision and his methodological 
remarks commending the method of reflective equilibrium according to which ‘nothing 
is sacred’ as far as revision goes.
6. Halakhic creativity
So far we have seen one level of conflict in Soloveitchik’s thought regarding how we 
should go about rationalising the commandments. But this is not the only level of 
conflict that we find for this model. For Soloveitchik draws a second science-halakhah 
analogy in Mah Dodech Mi-Dod in which he stresses a further factor that causes him 
problems - creativity.
Up until now we have been looking at the parallel Soloveitchik draws between the way 
that the scientist and halakhist approach reality itself. We can see that this analogy 
actually breaks down at a highly significant point. For our halakhic structure on this 
picture supposedly comes to us ready-made from God and we passively receive it. The 
scientist, or at least the modem scientist who is the paradigm of rationality for 
Soloveitchik, creates his own scientific structure. As we have noted previously, 
Soloveitchik shifts from the classical and Aristotelian paradigms of science to that of 
quantum physics. The modem scientist constructs abstract a priori mathematical 
models that parallel the qualitative world that he encounters. He himself constructs an 
abstract conceptual system and is not merely copying an objectively given reality, 
which is the way that God’s revelation is represented in the above discussion.
In the second analogy made primarily in Mah Dodekh Mi-Dod, the above problem is 
remedied in the parallel drawn between the scientist’s relation to the world and the 
halakhist’s relation to the halakhah itself (rather than his relationship to the world
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which was the concern in the first analogy). The halakhist, we are told, is confronted 
with innumerable texts that provide him with various problems and contradictions. 
What the halakhist has to do therefore is organise this data by imposing a logical 
conceptual structure upon it. And as Soloveitchik stresses both here and elsewhere, this 
activity is highly creative.43
Freedom of inquiry and speculation in the field of halakhah is exceedingly great and broad.
The sage is obligated to engage in original, creative interpretation (hiddush) to construct 
new, original concepts, and carefully delineated methods, and to plot distinct realms of 
thought. Profound and probing reflection and the discovery of new, enchanting cognitive 
horizons constitute the very essence of halakhah.44
The central idea here is that in same way that the scientist creates a certain conceptual 
structure in order to understand the sense data that he is presented with, the halakhist 
creates an analogous system in order to understand the halakhic data that he is 
presented with. This structure does not fall off the page ready-made. It is constructed 
by the halakhist himself just as the scientist’s system is constructed by the scientist. 
Though the halakhist does not create the halakhic system itself, he must create the 
conceptual structure by which to understand it, just as the scientist does not create 
nature but does create the system by which to understand it. The point being made here 
about the halakhah is that as it stands it is not simply a given natural artefact that we 
can explain in terms of some objective causal system. The Halakhah is rather a 
meaningful cognitive structure that requires creative interpretation.
Thus, on the one hand we have seen Soloveitchik insist that the Halakhah must be 
understood as objective inasmuch as it is a revelatory ‘given’ and this is very much the 
traditional conception of the halakhah. On this model we can use the halakhah as an 
objective foundation for our rationalisation but must give up on the method of 
reflective equilibrium. However, Soloveitchik also departs from the traditional 
conception in stressing that the halakhist himself creates the conceptual scheme, by 
which he understands the halakhic norms, an idea that undermines the previous thought 
that the halakhah is a given and that the halakhist is simply revealing some pre-existent 
ideal Platonic realm of concepts or laws.
On this understanding, the concepts that on the Platonic model were said to be a priori 
in the sense of determining our orientation to reality turn out to be a priori in the more 
strictly Kantian sense of being a contribution of our own minds to reality, albeit a 
consciously created one rather than one that is a necessary condition for the possibility 
of experience. Thus, Soloveitchik seems to be caught between the traditional belief that
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the halakhic norms are there to be discovered, being given and objective in some strong 
Platonic sense and his belief in the creativity of the halakhist according to which the 
system is a human creation sanctioned by God. And the problem with this latter point is 
that it undermines the objectivity of the halakhah, or at least the objectivity of any 
philosophical rationalisation of it. For once we allow for such creative interpretation, 
the question of competing interpretations is bound to arise. The problem is especially 
stark if one combines the notion of halakhic creativity with Soloveitchik’s observation 
that the philosophical frameworks we create determine to some extent one’s 
interpretation of the ‘objective’ data. Given this there seems to be no ‘given’ objective 
data to which we can appeal in order to justify one interpretation over another.
This implicit questioning of the idea of objectivity of course lends itself to a 
nonfoundational reflective equilibrium approach to justification again. Indeed, in Mah 
Dodekh Mi-Dod Soloveitchik himself explicitly links his emphasis on creativity to the 
parity between principles and particular judgements regarding revision that is 
characteristic of that very approach.
The doctrine of the creation of pure constructions does not distinguish between that which 
is primary and that which is peripheral, between the general principle and the particular 
instance. Everything, from top to bottom, is important. Even if the scholar is convinced of 
the truth of his line of thinking . . .  he will not rest if even a slight detail does not fit into 
his general conceptional complex.45
At the same time though, Soloveitchik does insist that the halakhist cannot play as 
freely with his ‘halakhic postulates’ as the scientist generally can with his. For given 
his insistence on the traditional conception of the halakhah as a revealed corpus of law, 
whilst the scientist as described by Soloveitchik seemed free to manipulate the data of 
the natural world, Soloveitchik’s orthodox conception of the Halakhah yields the 
following qualification on the creativity of the halakhist.
Naturally the freedom of halakhic inquiry is bounded by categorical limits. The halakhah 
cannot free itself from its subjection to the complex of a priori postulates. . . .  It need not 
be said that halakhic thought which is set firm in a revelational foundation cannot, unlike 
scientific thought, dominate its postulational complexes. It must accept them as they are 46
Thus, on the one hand Soloveitchik commends the modem scientist for his creativity 
and recommends that the religious philosopher emulate the scientist in this regard. 
Moreover, this emphasis would appear to encourage the sort of nonfoundational 
reflective equilibrium approach that Soloveitchik appears to favour when rationalising 
the commandments. However, at the same time he seems unwilling to allow that the
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theory that is created from the considered judgements can be subsequently used to 
revise those judgements which are taken as given which returns us to a purely atomistic 
method that he had previously thought inadequate and that privileges the considered 
judgements, insulating them from any rational criticism.
It is possible that Soloveitchik’s more conservative remarks concerning creativity here 
are specifically meant to guard against the sort of reductionism that subordinates 
halakhic norms to external forms of rationality. Soloveitchik is not unaware of the 
possibility of innovation within the practical halakhic realm. But the point is that this 
innovation must nroceed in accordance with halakhic orincioles rather than in
j .  i  i
accordance with principles derived from some external source. However, the fact is that 
if we are working with the method of reflective equilibrium then the principles that we 
form, since they are formed out of the halakhah itself, will presumably be autonomous 
halakhic principles. As such, any revision of the actual practical halakhah that they 
dictate will be in accordance with halakhic logic which means that the limit that 
Soloveitchik seems to put on halakhic innovation is built into the method of reflective 
equilibrium from the start. In using that method, any innovation forced by principles 
can only be forced by halakhic principles.
It is impossible to say whether Soloveitchik simply did not recognise this and therefore 
put a strong restriction on the creativity of the halakhist, or that he did and the 
offending passages are supposed to merely make the point that one cannot revise the 
halakhah in accordance with external norms. Whatever the truth of the matter though, 
this very saving grace of the method of reflective equilibrium from the perspective of 
Orthodox Judaism simply returns us to our original concerns with that method from a 
philosophical perspective as a genuine method of justification. The theories we form 
cannot yield an objective justification of the practice. The method is essentially 
conservative.
In the final analysis then, Soloveitchik is caught in a dilemma. His preferred method of 
rationalisation appears to be that of reflective equilibrium. However, such a method 
leaves everything open to revision so Soloveitchik tries to insulate the considered 
judgements from theoretical revision by appeal to the objectivity of halakhah. At the 
same time his emphasis on creativity seems to undermine this objectivity and push us 
back towards the more flexible reflective equilibrium approach, an approach that is 
itself criticised for its inherent conservatism.
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7. Description Revisited
We have seen that tensions in Soloveitchik’s thought create problems for his use of the 
reflective equilibrium approach. What is more notable though is that in part four of The 
Halakhic Mind, where he explicitly discusses the matter of Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot in terms 
of the model of descriptive reconstruction, he seems to be after a very particular type of 
descriptive meaning that would undermine any use of the reflective equilibrium method 
at all.
Soloveitchik here is looking for the meaning of the commandments and he appears to 
deal with two particular accounts of meaning - the intentionalist and hermeneutic 
accounts. According to the intentionalist account, the meaning of a text or text analogue 
is what the author had in mind when creating it. In order, therefore to find this meaning 
we have to reconstruct this initial authorial intention. Such an intentionalist account of 
ordinary linguistic meaning has been put forward most notably by Paul Grice,47 but our 
concern is mainly with experiential meaning in the human sciences. With reference to 
this, Collingwood proposes that the meaning of an act is to be identified with the inner 
psychological experiences that occurred in the author’s mind, which we have to re­
enact.
The historian of philosophy, reading Plato, is trying to know what Plato thought when he 
expressed himself in certain words. The only way in which he can do this is by thinking it 
for himself. This, in fact, is what we mean when we speak of understanding the words. . . .
The history of thought, and therefore all of history, is the re-enactment of past thought in 
the historian’s own mind.48
Such overtly psychologistic theories have since been called into question and more 
modem intentionalist theories focus instead on what the agent in question was doing by 
acting a certain way rather than on the actual re-enactment of his mental processes. 
Thus we can distinguish between the intention to do something and the intention in 
doing something. Whilst the former is concerned with reconstructing the agent’s 
psychological processes, the latter sees the understanding of the intentionality of an act 
as involving its interpretation within the intentional context that lays bare the reasons 
behind these acts. This is an explicatory rather than psychological exercise couched in 
terms of the aims and purposes of the agent rather than in terms of the re-enactment of 
the conditions of its actual psychological generation.49 However, for all intentionalist 
accounts, the meaning of an expression is a function of the intentions of the agent who 
has produced it, however one goes on to interpret that meaning.
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The rival theory to intentionalism is the hermeneutic theory, most fully developed by 
Hans Georg Gadamer in recent times, though again found in its embryonic form in the 
later work of Dilthey.50 For Dilthey ‘investigating the human studies is more like 
finding the meaning of a poem than like researching in physics or chemistry.’51 Taking 
up this theme, Gadamer believes that rather than looking for the generating conditions 
of meaningful expressions, the meaning that we should be interested in is the type of 
substantive meaning that one is referring to when one says that one has understood the 
meaning of a painting or a book. The important point for Gadamer is that before we can 
explain why someone produces an expression, we must understand what that 
expression is. We require an interpretative understanding of the individual content of 
the expression and such an interpretation must be prior to any form of explanation. As 
Peter Winch points out
Unless there is a form of understanding that is not the result of explanation, no such thing
as explanation would be possible.52
This type of understanding is the understanding of truth content or die sache as 
Gadamer refers to it and it is the meaning that corresponds to this type of understanding 
that we are after in the social sciences. We want the ‘what’ rather than the ‘why’ of the 
expressions.
According to this Gadamerian account, such meaning is found in the relation between a 
text and its interpreter. For an intentionalist, meaning is produced by an agent, but once 
it is produced the meaning exists independently and does not itself depend on an 
interpreting subject for its existence. For Gadamer though, meaning only comes about 
when the subject confronts the expression in question. Thus unlike in intentionalism 
where the meaning is found in the intentions of the author where it lies complete and 
ready to be discovered, for Gadamer meaning is not found in the expression alone, but 
is created in the confrontation between the expression and the interpreter. Meaning 
therefore does not exist independently of the interpreting subject as it does for the 
intentionalists but comes about as the result of the dyadic relation between text and 
interpreter.
Moreover, any interpreter arrives with a certain perspective or ‘horizon’ which 
influences the way he interprets the expression. It forms a certain given scheme within 
which he performs his act of interpretation. In that case though, meaning cannot be 
simply identified with the intentions of the author and cannot be seen as something 
objectively ‘out there’ awaiting discovery. Rather, meaning becomes multivalent.
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Different interpreters with their different horizons will find different meanings in a 
certain expression. Such an account of meaning would appear to be highly relativistic 
and the spectre of relativism is one with which Gadamer has to grapple.
For our purposes it is highly significant that Soloveitchik appears to take this latter 
Gadamerian approach to meaning rather than the intentionalist one and many of his 
criticisms of Maimonides’ approach are based on the fact that it is quasi- 
intentionalist.53
Maimonides is looking in his rationalisation, for the reasons why the commandments 
were given. Therefore, in order to understand the commandments, we have to 
reconstruct God’s intentions in giving them. Now it is true that Maimonides would not 
wish to talk of God’s intentions for such anthropomorphism was an anathema to 
Maimonides, so in order to circumvent this problem he builds God’s intentions into the 
natural world. But, according to Maimonides, in order to understand the 
commandments, we have to answer the question ‘Why did God command them?’ and 
the answer is given in terms of the goals that they naturally lead to. What Maimonides 
is in effect doing therefore, is reconstructing God’s intentions in a non-psychologistic 
fashion, as they are made manifest in the lawlike structure of nature and the 
reconstruction of this natural order gives us the meaning of the commandments. Such a 
view is quasi-intentionalist since
1) To understand a commandment is either to understand the antecedent conditions 
that lead up to it or the purpose that it serves and this explains why one ought to 
perform the commandment.
2) It implies that the meaning is out there crystallised in an objective causal structure 
awaiting discovery.
Now we would expect Soloveitchik to give a similar type of intentionalist account of 
meaning given his talk of investigating the ‘subjective track’ behind the objective 
commandment. However, Soloveitchik is quite explicit in his rejection of such 
approaches in favour of the more Gadamerian concern with substantive meaning.54
[Modern philosophy of religion] is not interested in the genetic approach to the religious 
act, nor does it raise the old problem of causality. It bypasses the how question and turns it 
over to explanatory psychology. The focal problem is of a descriptive nature; What is the 
religious act? What is its structure, context and meaning? (HM, 86)55
Moreover, it is not just the psychological approach that he is rejecting here. 
Soloveitchik goes further than this in rejecting any approach that attempts ‘the 
explanation of religious norms by antecedence’.(HM, 86). The ‘why’ question is not his
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concern. It is the ‘what’ of the commandments that the religious philosopher must 
attempt to discover. Any attempt to retrace the causal antecedence of the 
commandments, whether in terms of psychological re-enactment or in terms of aims 
and goals miss out the most important aspect of the commandments.
[T]he causalistic method invariably leads to circumrotary explanation and never to
penetrative description. The enumeration of causes.. .  discloses the ‘what has gone before’
but never the ‘is’ of the subject matter. (HM, 98).
We are not to look for any generating cause or goals. (HM, 94).
Thus we see Soloveitchik saying quite explicitly that we should not take any kind of 
intentionalist approach to the commandments but should rather take a more 
Gadamerian approach that undertakes to reveal their substantive meaning.56 
Soloveitchik’s pronouncements on meaning therefore seem to square with the 
hermeneutic account of meaning rather than with the intentionalist one. However, in 
the form that Gadamer presents it, the hermeneutic theory of meaning seems to lead to 
relativism. If the meaning of anything depends to such an extent on the horizons of the 
interpreting subject, then surely different subjects with different horizons will find 
different meanings in phenomena. What this means though is that with reference to 
interpreting practices, how do we judge whether we have justified our practice? We can 
only appeal to the interpretation that makes sense of the originally obscure 
commandments. But how are we to convince someone of the sense of this 
interpretation? We can only show this imaginary interlocutor how the meaning that we 
have given to a commandment coheres with the system of meanings of which it is a 
part. We can therefore take him on an interpretative journey through the system, 
showing him how it all fits together. But if he is not a party to the system in which all 
the various meanings are implicated, then no appeal to the other parts of the system is 
going to convince him. We cannot get beyond our own hermeneutic circle and 
convince our interlocutor if he is unwilling to enter its circumference. Thus, we 
immediately allow for a pluralistic universe of meanings corresponding to all the 
various different systems. The approach implies that there is no way to break out of our 
own interpretative circles in order to test the objective validity of our interpretations. 
Maimonides of course does not have this particular problem. For Maimonides Judaism 
is a particular form of a universal rational structure. The commandments are not treated 
as meaningful expressions for interpretation, but as quasi-scientific objects that play a 
causal role in taking us from our potentially rational state to an actualised such state.
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Their meaning or rationality is exhausted by this instrumental role that they play in the 
causal structure. There is no question of competing circular interpretations, only the 
question of whether the commandments can be subsumed under a universally 
applicable causal structure. This also of course links up with the quasi-intentionalist 
account of meaning that the Maimonidean approach works with. If the meaning of the 
commandments is given by God’s intentions naturalistically construed, we can break 
out of any interpretative circle by locating the commandments in this objective causal 
structure.
This objectivity though is attained at the price of autonomy according to Soloveitchik. 
Maimonides is ignoring the central hermeneutic aspect of the commandments and is 
thereby misinterpreting Judaism altogether by imposing his universalistic approach. 
However, if we accept Soloveitchik’s model for understanding the commandments, we 
attain autonomy but at the price of losing objectivity. Once we divorce the 
understanding of the commandments from God’s intentions and turn instead to the 
meanings they have for interpreters, we have no objective starting point for our 
understanding, especially given Soloveitchik’s belief that the halakhah is a meaningful 
structure containing an entire conceptual scheme that we must create. It might be 
thought therefore that Soloveitchik would be led into the type of relativistic tangle that 
we mentioned was a corollary of the Gadamerian account of meaning that he chose to 
accept. This thought is reinforced by the fact that Soloveitchik does accept a form of 
pluralism in The Halakhic Mind as we have noted earlier in this chapter, which again 
would allow for the sorts of plural interpretations that would cause this problem.
At the same time, we noted that Soloveitchik was keen to avoid relativism and 
therefore combined his pluralism with a form of realism. As Jonathan Sacks points out 
though, Soloveitchik’s realistic stance here appears to be a little ad hoc. Once we have 
established that reality can be interpreted in many ways and that reality corresponds to 
each of them, is it significant to say that it corresponds to any?
The fear of course is that if we cannot find an objective grounding for our 
interpretation, we are left with a completely relativistic epistemology according to 
which all interpretations of the world are legitimate. Soloveitchik insists that the Jewish 
philosophy that he is advocating though is a cognitive matter and is resistant to such 
relativism. That there may be as Soloveitchik puts it, different keys to the ontological 
kingdom, does not automatically mean that any key will fit. How we are supposed to 
judge which keys do and do not fit though is not clear, especially once Soloveitchik
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accepts the quantum physicist’s points that one’s theoretical framework is both formed 
from and partly determines the nature of the object being studied.
Thus, we return again to the central tension in Soloveitchik’s thought concerning the 
rationality of halakhah. On the one hand we have a method of rationalisation that 
utilises a hermeneutic theory of meaning. This theory seems to allow for various 
different interpretations of halakhah without giving any objective grounding to any one 
of them. Moreover, Soloveitchik himself propounds a form of pluralism that would 
seem to agree with this. At the same time though he attempts to bring a realistic stance 
to the theory in order to safeguard some form of objectivity. But these two strands do 
not seem able to accommodate each other comfortably. More significantly though, this 
more hermeneutic stance seems to lead Soloveitchik to a rather different model of 
rationalisation to that discussed earlier.
8. Soloveitchik’s Two Models
The first model of rationalisation that Kaplan gleans from the pages of Halakhic Man 
and Mah Dodekh Mi-Dod is scientific. The model is supposed to rationalise particular 
halakhic decisions by subsuming them within a theory that contains general halakhic 
concepts and principles discovered by the method of reflective equilibrium. Indeed, 
Sagi even writes that Soloveitchik sees this theoretical construction as a deductive 
system like that of the mathematical scientist on which it is modelled.
The Halakhah is like a deductive system whose first principles are the Sinaitic laws and 
whose rules are the a priori legal framework also given at Sinai. The system proceeds from 
its premises on the basis of these rules themselves and not on the basis of external 
influences.58
Thus, despite our earlier assertion that the method could be seen to be descriptive rather 
than explanatory, Kaplan writes that in fact the approach is explanatory and it is simply 
that Soloveitchik’s conception of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation of the 
commandments differs from that of Maimonides. Maimonides’ explanation is in terms 
of final causes to be found in nature. For Soloveitchik explanation is achieved by 
understanding a phenomenon as falling under an abstract halakhic principle. Such a 
method could certainly be seen to be descriptive rather than causal, appealing to 
general norms that do not explain the causes for the commandments, whether historical 
or teleological, but that rather ‘[impose] categories and groupings upon otherwise 
disorganised data.’59 However, significantly it remains a subsumptive theory and can be 
seen as explanatory in the sense just mentioned.
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It is true that Soloveitchik’s reflective equilibrium approach, even if explanatory, leads 
to a theory of the commandments that appeals to particular laws of the halakhah rather 
than to more general psychological or scientific laws. He thereby avoids the criticism 
that the explanatory approach sacrifices the autonomy of religion by imposing alien 
concepts upon the halakhic system. However, he retains the general structure of the 
scientific explanatory approach in his use of the reflective equilibrium approach. 
Individual halakhot must be rationalised by being seen as instances of a set of general, 
albeit sui generis, halakhic principles with which they are in reflective equilibrium.
The question though that arises from the model of The Halakhic Mind is whether 
meaningful structures such as the halakhah are to be explained by subsumption under a 
set of laws at all. For Soloveitchik’s hermeneutic approach in that work seems to bear 
little relation to the sort of appeal to subsumptive principles characteristic of the 
reflective equilibrium approach. Thus, the type of rationalisations that he gives in The 
Halakhic Mind couldn’t be further from the subsumptive model that we have been 
discussing. Thus take for example his rationalisation of the commandment to sound the 
Shofar (ram’s horn) on the Jewish New Year. Referring to Maimonides’ interpretation 
of this commandment in his Mishneh Torah he writes
His view that the shofar alludes to repentance and self-examination is not a classical causal 
interpretation based upon a two valued logic which entails necessity. The mechanistic 
relation between A and B is unique and necessary. However, there is no relational 
necessity between the sounding of the shofar and conversion. . . . The call to repent could 
have been realised in many ways and there is no necessary reason why the Torah selected 
the means of the sounding of the shofar. . . . The reconstruction method does not operate 
with the principle of necessity. . . .  It merely points at the stationary trail left behind the 
religious “logos” and indicates parallel tendencies in the both the subjective and objective 
orders. (HM, 95).
Whether or not this sort of description yields a genuine justification of the 
commandments is a question that we will have to address, along with the fact that this 
hermeneutic model is being applied to the commandments in general rather than to 
particular judicial decisions as was Kaplan’s scientific model.
However, there is little doubt that to characterise the above example of a rationalisation 
in terms of the sort of subsumptive model that Kaplan discusses would be to utterly 
misrepresent it. It seems to me therefore that at this point the more humanistic strands 
of Soloveitchik’s thought point him in a more radically hermeneutic direction 
altogether and one that is totally at odds with the former more scientific approach. The 
sort of description that he seems to be concerned with here is a thick singular 
description of the meaning of the commandment, what he terms ‘penetrative
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description’, rather than the weaker sense of description that we find in Kaplan’s 
model.60
Indeed, it seems to me that there is a general trend running through The Halakhic Mind 
that implies a certain scepticism regarding our ability to give a principled justification 
of Jewish practice at all. It is with this in mind that Soloveitchik therefore, describes the 
following important distinction between the methods of the natural and human 
sciences.
Knowledge for science is not concerned with content but form, not with the ‘what’ but 
with the ‘whv’ and ‘how.’ Tt does not invest! pate A and R_ hut attempts to determine theJ      - .....................  * ' • '
interdependencies of these relata.. . . The methodologist of the humanistic sciences is not 
interested in the genetic or historical problem of the ‘why’ and ‘how’ but in the functional 
problem of the ‘what.’ The psychologist and historian penetrate the ‘thickness’ of their 
object rather than survey its relational surface. . . . Object and subject fuse and become 
one. The meaningful content and structure of A and B and not their relational character is 
the outstanding problem of the humanist. (HM, 31-34).
What Soloveitchik is pointing out here is that the explanatory methods of the natural 
sciences are inappropriate for the human sciences and the main reason for this stems 
from the intentional content of the subject matter of the human sciences. In order to 
understand actions we have to understand this content, or in other words understand the 
meaning of the action. The human sciences are more interested in what the phenomena 
being studied mean and this means that methods other than those of the natural sciences 
are needed in this field.
This issue of whether or not we should apply such broadly scientific approaches to the 
practical realm is a direct corollary of the debate in the philosophy of social science 
between naturalists and antinaturalists. Whilst naturalists believe the methods of the 
natural sciences to be appropriate to the social sciences, antinaturalists believe that the 
social sciences cannot be understood in this way. They believe that social phenomena 
cannot and should not be studied by using the natural scientific paradigm because of 
the previously noted differences between the respective subject matters of the natural 
and human sciences. The difference in methods that this calls for is often described in 
terms of a difference between explanation and interpretation. The explanatory objective 
of the natural sciences is well summarised by Ernest Nagel in his work The Structure o f 
Science where he writes that
the sciences seek to discover and to formulate in general terms the conditions under which 
events of various sorts occur, the statements of such determining conditions being the 
explanations of the corresponding happenings.61
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Nagel continues by writing that this is achieved by finding ‘repeatable patterns of 
dependence’62 between the properties that we are interested in. Thus, in order to gain 
scientific knowledge, we explain the phenomena by subsuming the individual 
phenomena under universal laws and it is the general laws and the interdependencies 
between the phenomena that they draw our attention to rather than the concrete 
phenomena themselves. Explanation in the natural sciences aim at subsuming particular 
events under general laws in order to explain past occurrences or predict and control 
future ones. According to naturalists it is precisely this method that we must apply to 
the human sciences. Our use of Hempel to illuminate the Maimonidean approach in the 
previous chapter would be an example of just such an approach.
Basically the natural sciences are concerned with why something has occurred. The 
human sciences in contrast are more interested in what the phenomena being studied 
mean and for Dilthey the attempt to subsume meaning bearers such as human action 
under universal laws and concepts such as those provided in scientific explanations is 
misguided. The subject matter of the human studies ‘refer to special kinds of limited 
contexts’ and require a different approach -  that of interpretation.63 
We need not for our current purposes enter into a detailed exposition of the precise 
method of interpretation. However, for the modem hermeneutic theorist Hans Georg 
Gadamer the distinction between explanation and interpretation is particularly well 
brought out by looking at historical research for historical events are not instances of 
general laws that are repeated or that could be manufactured so as to be so repeated. 
The type of knowledge by subsumption that is applicable in the natural sciences is not 
applicable to the historian. Thus Gadamer writes that the aim of historical research is 
not ‘to achieve knowledge of a law, for example, how men, people, states in general 
develop themselves but instead how this man, this people, this state is what it has 
become - how it can have happened that this is so.’64 The same idea is then applied to 
the study of the social sciences in general.
one has not rightly grasped their nature if one measures them by the yardstick of a 
progressive knowledge of regularity. The experience of the sociohistorical world cannot be 
raised to a science by the inductive procedures of the natural sciences. . . The individual 
case does not serve only to confirm a law from which practical predictions can be made.
Its ideal is rather to understand the phenomenon itself in its unique and historical 
concreteness.65 oUnderstanding rather than causal explanation thp focus of the social sciences according 
to the antinaturalist and for this the explanatory method is unsuited. What we must do 
in this sphere is use the cognitive process of understanding in order to interpret the
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meaning of expressions. This understanding, for Dilthey, is the common everyday 
process by which we understand things rather than some form of technical 
specialisation, though there are certainly techniques of interpretation that may need to 
be used to gain this understanding.66 However, the central claim is that there is a form 
of interpretative understanding that is central to the social sciences that cannot be 
captured by the use of natural scientific methods^for)which involve subsumption under 
universal laws. As Soloveitchik writes:
A scientific law is universal and refers to the genus as a whole. The mathematical sciences 
operate with uni vers a!s and not particulars. . . . The humanist is concerned not only with 
the conceptual and universal, but with the concrete particular and individual. Mental reality 
is characterised by uniqueness and otherness. By reducing spiritual reality to common 
denominators we eo ipso empty it of its content. (HM, 32-35)
Though Soloveitchik in the scientific model that we have been attributing to him does 
not appeal to universal laws or meanings, he does seem to nonetheless appeal to 
common denominators in order to understand the commandments. Though he does not 
look for an explanation in terms of generating conditions or general goals for the 
commandments, he is looking for Nagel’s ‘repeatable patterns of dependence’. He is 
looking for general abstract principles that would serve to justify halakhic decisions by 
showing how they can be subsumed under these principles. Yet at the same time we see 
him saying that the search for such common denominators empties a religion of its 
content. Now, it is possible that he is simply unhappy with the universality of 
Maimonidean explanations and would not reject an explanatory approach that uses 
descriptive categories for halakhic laws that are only general within the particular 
circumference of Judaism. Thus, through the method of reflective equilibrium he would 
be giving us a particular set of descriptions that apply generally within Judaism. As 
such, the method would remain explanatory in a sense though it would also have a 
higher degree of autonomy than that of Maimonides. At the same time though, 
Soloveitchik himself has said above that the structures of spiritual reality ‘elude 
conceptual abstraction’ (HM, 35). It almost seems here as if Soloveitchik does not want 
to capture the rationality of the commandments in a set of abstract subsumptive laws at 
all but wishes us to focus entirely on the particular.
In conclusion then, it appears then that we have found two models of rationalisation in 
Soloveitchik’s work. And it is interesting to note in relation to this the following quote 
cited by Kaplan from Professor Jacob Taubes.
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R. Soloveitchik’s use of the model of mathematics or mathematical physics for explaining 
how the halakhist understands halakhah is unacceptable. For the fundamental task of the 
halakhist is to read and interpret texts and there are no two greater opposites than the 
hermeneutic required for textual interpretation and the construction of mathematical 
systems. Unfortunately, R. Soloveitchik when he studied in Berlin went “barking up the 
wrong tree.” He came under the dominant influence of Hermann Cohen when he should 
have followed the path of Heidegger and later on of Gadamer and Ricouer.67
Taubes is arguing here that in looking to portray the halakhist’s understanding of the 
halakhah, Soloveitchik mistakenly opted for a scientific model when he should have 
gone for a hermeneutic one. Whilst our first model of rationalisation appears to bear 
this out, I have argued, contra Taubes, that Soloveitchik did in fact recognise the need 
for an interpretative approach as well. Moreover, it seems that Soloveitchik’s central 
insight into the nature of the commandments as meaningful expressions requiring 
creative interpretation actually ends up undermining any attempt of his to justify them. 
However, where Taubes is correct is in his assertion that these two approaches are 
utterly at odds with each other. One takes a subsumptive scientific/naturalist approach 
towards rationalisation and the other^tha^ appears very generally to be an antinaturalist 
approach. Our analysis of Soloveitchik’s approach then leaves us with a question and a 
problem, both of which we will state here but which we will only address when we 
begin to develop our own model rationalisation in the remainder of the thesis.
The question is why we have two different approaches at all. One might say that this is 
an instance of the sort of productive dialectical tensions that constantly appear in 
Soloveitchik’s thought. This is not a solution that appeals to me. The issue of 
contradictions in Soloveitchik’s thought is a thorny one that requires more than the 
passing comment that I can make here. However, I believe that while it is possible to 
accept that people have to deal with conflicting tendencies at an experiential level of 
the sort that Soloveitchik describes in The Lonely Man of Faith’, it is far more 
problematic to simultaneously hold two contradictory statements of a theory of 
rationalisation. With regard to this Marvin Fox has written
We must distinguish clearly between the contradictory phenomena that a thinker discerns 
in the world which he describes and explicates, and the actual presence of contradictions in 
his own thought.68
I believe that our contradiction would be an instance of the latter rather than the former,
which is not to say that there could not be such a contradiction in Soloveitchik’s
thought. However, I do not think that that is the explanation for what is going on in this
instance. It seems to me rather that Soloveitchik in The Halakhic Mind and indeed in
the tensions that are present even in his scientific model might well be expressing
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doubts as to the efficacy of a subsumptive scientific approach to the justification of 
practices.
So much for the question. ‘The problem’ is that both approaches suffer from similar 
problems that are concerned with a lack of objectivity. The autonomy that both the 
naturalist reflective equilibrium method and the antinaturalist hermeneutic method may 
afford us, both undermine the objectivity of any rationalisation produced by their 
methods. An autonomous alternative to the Maimonidean approach that stands up to 
philosophical scrutiny is yet to be found; if Soloveitchik’s model is to be that 
alternative, we will need to deal with this problem.
With that then we complete the expository half of our thesis. We have before us three 
models of rationalisation -  Maimonides’ naturalist approach, Soloveitchik’s naturalist 
approach, and Soloveitchik’s somewhat underdeveloped antinaturalist approach that we 
find in The Halakhic Mind. In what follows we will further discuss the fundamental 
assumption that causes problems for the two naturalist models and will then attempt to 
show that these problems might be avoided by the development of our third 
antinaturalist model.
1 ‘U-Vikkashtem Mi-Sham’, in Ish ha-Halakhah Galuy ve-Nistar (Jerusalem: World Zionist 
Organisation, 1979), pp. 115-235. [All page references to ‘U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham’ refer to this 
volume].
2 Reinier Munk, The Rationale o f Halakhic Man: Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Conception of Jewish Thought 
(Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1996).
3 Lawrence Kaplan, ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Philosophy of Halakhah,’ The Jewish Law Annual, 
Vol. 7, (1988), pp. 139-197. Whether or not Soloveitchik intended the method that Kaplan reconstructs 
as a method of justifying the commandments is not our central concern, though we will be treating it as 
such. However, we are more concerned with the fact that the method, as we will see, parallels a method 
that could be and indeed, has been used to justify practices.
4 The term ‘science’ when unqualified is used in what follows to signify natural science.
5 ‘The Lonely Man of Faith,’ Tradition, Vol. 7 no. 2, (1965), pp. 5-67. Notably, these existentialist 
themes do also appear at the beginning of Halakhic Man. However, Soloveitchik ignores these themes in 
the main body of the work, as it seems do many of his interpreters. See David Singer and Moshe Sokol, 
‘Joseph Soloveitchik: Lonely Man of Faith,’ Modem Judaism, Vol. 2, (1982), pp.227-272, for a 
discussion of the significance of this fact.
6 The Halakhic Mind, though only published in 1986, was written in 1944, the year in which Halakhic 
Man made its first appearance in print.
7 Steven Schwarzschild in his review of The Halakhic Mind has noted the anti-Marburg tendencies 
contained in the work. See Steven S. Schwarzschild, ‘The Halakhic Mind - An Essay on Jewish 
Tradition and Modem Thought’, Sh’ma, vol. 16, no. 316 (September 1986), pp. 127-8.
8 We will be stressing the conceptual links between their ideas rather than speculating on the extent to 
which Dilthey’s work directly influenced Soloveitchik. However, Dilthey does merit explicit mention a 
number of times in Soloveitchik’s writings. In The Halakhic Mind, for example, he is cited as a pioneer 
of the methodological independence of the human sciences, a topic that is central to Soloveitchik’s 
argument in that work and Munk notes how Halakhic Man reflects the influence of Dilthey (Munk, The 
Rationale o f Halakhic Man, p. 128). Indeed, although Soloveitchik explicitly cites Eduard Spranger as a 
source for his use of a typological approach in that work, it was Dilthey’s use of this method that 
influenced Spranger. See H. Rickman, Dilthey: Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1976), p. 1. Moreover, the fact that Soloveitchik was a philosophy student at the university of
97
Berlin from 1925 until 1931 and that Dilthey occupied the chair in philosophy at the same institution 
from 1882-1905 makes it inconceivable that Soloveitchik would not have been familiar with his ideas.
9 Note that the primary intention in much of this chapter is to get clear on Soloveitchik’s methodological 
views and the manner in which they contrast to those of Maimonides. Most of the critical reflection on 
the themes discussed will follow in the latter half of the thesis.
10 For an excellent summary of this work, that I have drawn from in this section, see William Kolbrener, 
‘Towards a Genuine Jewish Philosophy: Halakhic Mind’s New Philosophy of Religion’, reprinted in 
Marc D. Angel ed. Exploring the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, (Hoboken, NJ.: Ktav, 1997), 
pp. 179-206.
Wilhelm Dilthey, An Introduction to the Human Studies (1883). Selections translated in H. Rickman, 
Dilthey Selected Writings. Quotations from p. 161. Subsequent references to Dilthey’s writings will refer 
to this volume.
12 Idem., The Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies (1910) in Rickman, Dilthey
R e le n te d  W r itin  o c  n n  1 Qfi-7  0_, r r . ----
It is interesting therefore to note that Soloveitchik seems to make a distinction between the natural 
sciences and what would probably be called the Geisteswissenschaften in terms of both approach and 
subject matter. While the former was the main basis of the distinction for Windelband and Rickert, the 
latter was the main basis for the distinction in the early writings of Dilthey. See Theodore Plantinga 
Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1980), Chapter 2.
14 For further discussion of Soloveitchik’s criticism’s of Cohen see Munk, The Rationale o f Halakhic 
Man, Chapter 2.
15 Munk also mentions this difference, but seems to me to minimise its centrality in a way that is quite 
unwarranted. See ibid., pp. 67-68.
16 Soloveitchik notes his debt to Natorp at HM, p. 126 note 75 and p. 128 note 83.
17 Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 64. Again, 
though Soloveitchik himself appropriates this method from the quantum physicist, it appears to be none 
other than the method of the hermeneutic circle, which was again a central theme in the work of Dilthey, 
though he believed it to have been first used by Schleiermacher. See Dse N. Bulhof, Wilhelm Dilthey: A 
Hermeneutic Approach to the Study o f History and Culture (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), p. 69; 
and Rickman, Dilthey: Selected Writings, pp. 10-11.
18 Rudolph Makreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of The Human Studies, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1992), p. 308.
19 Dilthey, The Construction of the Historical World, p. 194.
20 It is this use of halakhah as the objective basis for the ‘Natorpian’ reconstruction, a fact noted by 
Kolbrener (‘Towards a Genuine Jewish Philosophy’, p. 193) that is particularly Diltheyan, though this (at 
least) conceptual link between Dilthey and Soloveitchik has never been noted to my knowledge.
21 For a detailed discussion of how we can extend the linguistic concept of meaning to non-linguistic 
expressions see Charles Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,’ in Michael Martin and Lee C. 
McIntyre eds. Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 
181-211.
22 Strictly speaking, therefore, many would wish to separate off religion as a realm of divine rather than 
human science. However for the purposes of the thesis religion is to be included within this rubric to 
reflect the fact that it must be treated the same methodologically as the human sciences. The important 
differences that arise as a result of the divine origin of religion will not be ignored though when they are 
significant.
23 See HM, pp. 63-4.
24 Soloveitchik gives an example here of the causal relation that we speak of as existing between 
Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas. We believe that there is some similarity between the Guide o f the 
Perplexed and the Summa Theologica. But obviously, Soloveitchik writes there can be no literal causal 
nexus between two books, or indeed between the systems contained within them. So in order to find this 
relation we need to explore ‘the subjective track’. See HM, 73-4.
25 We will, for the moment, leave the term ‘descriptive’ deliberately vague and rely on the intuitive 
difference between describing and explaining. We will be returning though to what Soloveitchik means 
by description in some detail later.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
27 A more detailed account of the nature of these considered judgements can be found in John Rawls, 
‘Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics’, Philosophical Review, vol. 60 (1951), pp. 177-197; and 
more recently in A Theory of Justice pp. 46-53.
28 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 579.
29 Kaplan, ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Philosophy of Halakhah,’ pp. 171-2.
98
30 Ibid., p. 164.
31 Aviezer Ravitzky, ‘Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge: Between Neo-Kantian and 
Maimonidean Philosophy.’ Modem Judaism, vol. 6, no. 1 (1986), pp. 158-9.
32 ‘Mah Dodekh Mi-Dod’, in P. H. Peli, ed., Be-sod ha-Yahid ve-ha-Yahud (Jerusalem: Orot, 1976), pp. 
189-254. Quotation from p. 221. [All page references to ‘Mah Dodech Mi-Dod’ refer to this volume]. 
Translation taken from Ravitzky, ‘Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge’, p. 166.
33 Norman Daniels, ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’, Journal Of 
Philosophy, vol. 76, (1979), pp. 256-282.
34 For a more detailed account of this problem see Kai Neilsen, ‘Our Considered Judgements’, Ratio, vol. 
19, (1977), pp. 39-46.
35 One could of course privilege either the considered judgements or the principles of the theory as being 
self-evident. Such privileging would, it is assumed, give one or other of the two components the type of 
foundational role required for an objective justification. However, it would also mean that the method of 
reflective equilibrium was no longer a nonfoundationai method.
36 Norman Daniels, ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points’ Canadian Journal Of Philosophy, 
vol. 10, No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 83-103. Quotation from pp. 85-6.
37 Rawls, A Theory of Justice., p. 20.
38 Daniels, ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points’, p. 87.
39 Norman Daniels ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,’ p. 262. This 
problem is further exacerbated for Soloveitchik given the pluralism that is sanctioned in such areas in 
Judaism, a subject to which we will be returning. See Jonathan Sacks, One People, (London: Littman 
Library of Jewish Civilisation, 1993), pp.92-98.
40 For more detailed discussions of this issue see Rachel Shihor, ‘On the Problem of Halacha’s Status in 
Judaism: A Study of the Attitude of Rabbi Josef Dov Halevi Soloveitchik,’ Forum, vols. 30-31, (1978), 
pp. 149-153; and Kaplan ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Philosophy of Halakhah,’ pp. 151-163.
Kaplan ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Philosophy of Halakhah’, pp. 160-161
42 The Platonic Nature of Soloveitchik’s enterprise is noted in Michael L. Morgan ‘Soloveitchik’s 
Halakhic Platonism’, Journal o f Religion, vol. 66 (1986), pp. 194-198; and Avi Sagi, ‘Rav Soloveitchik 
and Professor Leibowitz as Theoreticians of the Halakhah’, Daat, vol. 29, no.l, (1992), pp. 131-148 
(Hebrew).
43 Indeed, the idea of creativity is central to Soloveitchik’s philosophy of man in general. See Walter 
Wurzburger, ‘The Centrality of Creativity in the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik,’ reprinted in 
Angel, ed., Exploring the Thought o f Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, pp. 277-289.
44 ‘U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham’, p. 205. Translation taken from Kaplan, ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s 
Philosophy of Halakhah,’ p. 176. This emphasis on creative interpretation of the halakhah further 
reinforces the analogy between the methods of the modem physicist and that of the religious philosopher. 
For we see that just as the scientist has to construct his objective order (B) out of the original qualitative 
realm (Al), the religious philosopher has a large degree of input into the construction of his objective 
realm out of the original texts.
45 ‘Mah Dodekh mi-Dod’, p. 232. Translation taken from Kaplan, ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s 
Philosophy of Halakhah’, p. 179.
46 Ibid., pp. 205-6. Translation taken from Kaplan, ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Philosophy of 
Halakhah,’, pp. 177-8.
47 Paul Grice, ‘Meaning’ Philosophical Review, vol. 66, (1957) pp. 377-88.
48 R. G. Collingwood, ‘Human Nature and Human History,’ in Martin and McIntyre eds. Readings in the 
Philosophy of Social Science, pp. 163-171. Quotation from p. 169.
49 For a fuller, though still introductory account of these issues see Brian Fay, Contemporary Philosophy 
of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 138-141.
50 In his earlier work the more psychologistic model prevailed. See Plantinga Historical Understanding 
in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey, especially Chapter 3.
51 Rickman, Dilthey: Selected Writings, p. 10.
52 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, second edition, (London: 
Routledge, 1990), p. x.
53 Obviously Maimonides himself is not an avowed intentionalist. Apart from the obvious anachronism 
of attributing such a theory to Maimonides, when it comes to the rationalisation of the commandments, 
theories of meaning were not uppermost in his mind. However, I feel that it is not unfair to see 
Maimonides’ rationalisation as embodying a quasi intentionalist approach.
54 Again, we are not saying that Soloveitchik had a fully worked out Gadamerian theory of meaning, 
which apart from anything else would be an anachronism. However, the views that he does express seem 
to reflect the type of approach that Gadamer subsequently developed in a more rigorous fashion.
99
55 Indeed, despite Soloveitchik’s generally negative attitude to Maimonides’ negative theology, he does 
seem to agree that in this sphere we cannot look to uncover God’s ‘intentions’. See Abraham R. Besdin, 
‘May we Interpret Hukkim?’ in Man of Faith in the Modem World, Reflections of the Rav Volume Two, 
(Hoboken, NJ.: Ktav, 1989), pp. 91-99. See especially p. 93. It is interesting to note again here the move 
away from the Marburg approach. Indeed, Soloveitchik’s words here seem to reflect an approach more 
akin to that of the Southwest German school of neo-Kantianism based on the work of Wilhelm 
Windelband.
56 It is worth mentioning that one could argue, as Brian Fay has done, that these two accounts of meaning 
should not be seen to be mutually exclusive but rather complementary. They answer questions about 
different senses of meaning that relate to intentions and significance respectively. Moreover, any 
Gadamerian account of meaning must take some account of authorial intention for such intentions play a 
large part in allowing us to understand what an act’s significance is. Thus he writes that Caesar’s act of 
crossing the Rubicon is the kind of act that it is i.e. a deliberate strategic move by a Roman commander, 
because of Caesar’s intentions; “This was not an accidental manoeuvre, or the deed of a sleepwalker or 
someone drugged or otherwise unaware that he was indeed crossing a river with deep political 
significance. . . this intentionality itself is vital in fixing the identity of the act about which later 
historians may inquire as to its significance either for Roman politics or its meaning for us today.” Fay, 
Contemporary Philosophy o f Social Science., p. 150. The acceptance of this qualification though would 
do little to damage Soloveitchik’s central point. We can readily admit that God giving the 
commandments fixes their identity as religious ordinances rather than as aesthetic ones say. But this 
minimal concession still leaves us with the need to interpret the precise significance of each of those 
ordinances and that must be done it seems in hermeneutic terms.
57 See Jonathan Sacks, ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Early Epistemology.’ Tradition in an 
Untraditional Age (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1990), pp. 287-301.
58 Sagi, ‘Rav Soloveitchik and Professor Leibowitz’, p. 136. The translation is my own.
59 Besdin, ‘May we Interpret Hukkim?’, p. 92.
60 It is worth noting that this argument for a methodological distinction between the natural and social 
sciences is based on the meaningful nature of the subject matter of the social sciences alone. This means 
that one could accept the distinction without having to resort to the more thoroughgoing constructivism 
with respect to the natural sciences that we find in Soloveitchik’s initial espousal of epistemological 
pluralism as the basis for this distinction.
1 Ernest Nagel, The Structure o f Science (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1979), p. 4.
62 Ibid.
63 Dilthey, The Construction o f the Historical World, p. 113.
64 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (1960), ed. J. Cumming, trans. G. Barden and W. Glen- 
Doepel (1975), revised by J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall. (London: Sheed & Ward, 1989), p. 6.
65 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
66 See Dilthey ‘The Construction of the Historical World’, pp. 218ff. For discussion of the methods see 
Makreel, Dilthey: Philosopher of The Human Studies, Part Three; Plantinga, Historical Understanding in 
the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey, Chapter 6; and H. P. Rickman, Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human 
Studies (London: University of California Press, 1979), Chapter 10.
67 Kaplan, ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Philosophy of Halakhah,’ pp. 172-3.
68 Marvin Fox, ‘The Unity and Structure of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Thought’, in Marc D. Angel 
ed. Exploring the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, pp. 25-53.
100
Chapter four
The Priority of Theory 
In the previous two chapters we set out the methods of rationalisation of Maimonides 
and Soloveitchik together with some of the possible criticisms of each of them. In 
essence, the problem with the Maimonidean model was that it subordinated the practice 
of Judaism to an explanatory method that utilised an external set of supposedly 
universal values and principles thereby robbing it of its autonomy. Whilst this criticism 
may originally have been seen to be a dogmatic assertion of the claims of an 
authoritarian tradition against Maimonides’ attempts to reconcile reason and revelation, 
we have seen in the previous chapter that this may not in fact be so.
For, according to our second model of rationalisation, the central fact about the 
commandments is that they are meaningful and we cannot thereby treat them simply as 
‘scientific’ objects amenable to universal causal explanations. We must rather attempt 
to set out the meaning of these commandments and must do so by appeal to the 
halakhic system itself from which they derive their meaning. We do this by using the 
method of reflective equilibrium in order to formulate a set of descriptive halakhic 
principles that enable us to understand the commandments. However, that approach, 
seems to leave us without any way of justifying any such set of principles as being 
objectively correct. Thus, whilst there may be legitimate philosophical reasons based 
on the meaningful nature of the commandments for asserting the autonomy of a 
practice from a supposedly universal theoretical structure, the price we pay for 
autonomy appears to be loss of objectivity. We can no longer objectively justify our 
practice. We are left then with a tension between autonomy on the one hand and 
objectivity on the other with each model asserting one at the expense of the other. How 
are we to address this dilemma?
I believe that at the basis of this problem are certain related assumptions about the 
nature of rationality and the relationship that subsequently holds between a theory and a 
practice that both Maimonides’ and Soloveitchik’s naturalist models, despite their
differences, share. It is only by transcending these fundamental assumptions, something
*
that Soloveitchik begins to do in his second antinaturalist model, that we can escape 
this dilemma. In this chapter therefore, we will attempt to identify the approach that 
Maimonides and Soloveitchik for all their differences, nonetheless share.
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1. The Priority of Theory.
Though we have been focusing on the differences between the Maimonidean and 
Soloveitchikian models of rationalisation, both share a certain view of the relationship 
between theory and practice that we will term the priority of theory (PoT from now on). 
Important differences remain between their respective PoT approaches, but at a 
fundamental level, it is Soloveitchik’s inability to extricate himself entirely from this 
approach that means he only takes the first step towards forming a method for doing 
autonomous Jewish philosophy.
What though does PoT signify? There are in fact a variety of different ways of being a 
PoT theorist, some of which are logically distinct from others. Our first task therefore 
will be to discuss these various PoT theories and their interconnections.
One sense in which one might hold the priority of theory over practice that we can deal 
with quite briefly is related to one’s evaluation of the relative values of theoretical and 
practical activity. Thus, one can be a PoT theorist in the sense in which Aristotle writes 
in the tenth book of the Nichomachean Ethics that ‘contemplation is . . . the highest 
form of activity (since the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects that it 
apprehends are the highest things that can be known),’ (NE, X, 7, 328). This relegates 
the exercise of the practical moral virtues to a secondary activity that is to serve the 
ultimate contemplative goal. Thus, for Aristotle the life devoted to theoria is superior to 
the life of praxis which though necessary if we are to be able to lead the contemplative 
life, is not sufficient for Eudaimonia.
It is, as we have previously mentioned, a subject of great debate as to whether or not 
Maimonides subscribed to the priority of theory in this sense, though he certainly 
asserts it unequivocally, at the exoteric level, in a number of passages in the Guide as 
we saw in chapter two. Soloveitchik is more openly ambivalent on this question, at 
times appearing to subscribe to such a view in his discussion of the halakhah and at 
other times asserting the priority of practice. Thus in the former mode we find:
[Halakhic Man’s] deepest desire is not the realisation of the Halakhah but rather the ideal 
construction which was given to him from Sinai. . . . The theoretical Halakhah, not the 
practical decision, the ideal creation, not the empirical one, represent the longing of 
halakhic man. (HMN 23-24).
Yet in the very same work we find:
Halakhic man cognises the world in order to subordinate it to religious performances. . . . 
Cognition is for the purpose of doing. (HMN, 63).1
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This aside, the basic stance of this type of PoT theorist is that theoretical activity is in 
some sense more important as a way of life than practical activity. However, what we 
are assigning priority to here is the activity of theorising rather than the products of 
such activity - the theories themselves. The term ‘theory’ here designates a process 
rather than a product. We can speak here therefore of being a PoT theorist in the 
process sense. In contrast, the forms of PoT theory that will interest us assign priority to 
theories as products. It is these PoT theories, that will be our main concern and what we 
need to find is the sense in which they hold that theories are prior to practices.
2. Theory and practice.
Before going on, we should attempt some definition of what we mean by the terms 
theory and practice. Let us begin with the following very general definitions of theory 
and practice taken from Kant:
An aggregation of rules, even of practical rules, is called a theory as long as these rules are 
thought of as principles possessing a certain generality and, consequently, as being 
abstracted from a multitude of conditions that nonetheless necessarily influence their 
application. Conversely, not every undertaking is a practice; rather, only such ends as are 
thought of as being brought about in consequence of certain generally conceived principles 
of procedure are designated practices.2
Note that Kant makes the following significant points:
1) Theories are made up of rules or principles ‘possessing a certain generality’.
2) Practices are undertakings ‘brought about in consequence’ of those principles.
Firstly, then, theories are sets of principles that are in some yet to be specified sense 
general. Now one would imagine that they have to be more than this for they cannot 
just be any set of general principles. For example, one may think that they need to 
conform to certain canons of theoretical rationality such as consistency, or be ordered 
in some way so as to allow us to deal with any clashes, an issue that we will be 
returning to. Moreover, given that we are interested in rationalising practices, they 
obviously also need to be relevant to those practices in some way.
This brings us to his second important point: that the practice must somehow be a 
consequence of the theory. We are to imagine a set of principles in virtue of which 
practices are ‘brought about’. This would seem to imply some loose sense in which the 
theory is prior to the practice. But how are we to construe this sense of priority more
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precisely? What does it mean to say that the practice is brought about ‘in consequence 
o f the principles? There are, it seems to me, a number of ways of understanding this 
that each yield a different type of PoT theory.
However, before we look at these, we should note that Kant does not seem to mean 
exactly what Maimonides and Soloveitchik mean when speaking of theory and 
practice. Firstly Kant sees the term theory as applying even to ‘practical rules’ which I 
take to be such directly practical principles as ‘all acts of kindness are right,’ in which 
we actually mention the action types of which real life applications are tokens. 
Maimonides and Soloveitchik on the other hand seem to take the directly practical rules 
that Kant includes under the rubric of theory as practices. The practical rules of the 
halakhah, for example, are for them the general norms that constitute the practice and it 
is rationalising practices in this sense, i.e. rationalising their constitutive norms, that 
interests them.
But if this is what they mean by practice, what do they mean by theory and what kinds 
of principles do their theories contain? They are, it seems, working at a higher level of 
abstraction and looking for the ‘higher’ principles that lead us to the directly ‘practical 
rules’ or ethical principles.
Initially it will suffice for us to understand this distinction between these ‘higher’ 
principles and those that we have termed directly practical principles in the following 
intuitive way.3 Taking ethics as an example, we can on the one hand speak of ‘high’ 
theory, examples of which would be ethical theories such as utilitarianism or Rawls’ 
theory of Justice. These theories do not contain the direct practical principles that Kant 
mentions but operate at a higher level of abstraction. Thus the higher principle of 
classical utilitarianism, for example, is some variation on the idea that right action is 
that which produces that greatest happiness for the greatest number.
The idea then, for a PoT theorist would be that the directly ethical principles that 
recommend specific action types are in some sense a consequence of this more general 
and abstract ‘high’ theory. The directly ethical principles can then be spoken of as 
‘low’ theory and they constitute the theory of particular moral problems, or applied 
ethics. This low theory would include the actual explicit practical norms of the 
practice.4 Finally, we should also mention that there is the actual application of these 
theories to the world (applying applied ethics), which is practice in the actual concrete 
sense of action.
We see from all of this that Kant’s use of the terms ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ do not 
exactly match that of Maimonides and Soloveitchik. While Kant includes under theory
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the directly ethical principles that relate to our actual token acts (or practices), 
Maimonides and Soloveitchik are exclusively concerned with the more abstract 
principles of ‘high’ theory and take the low theory principles to be part of the practice 
that needs rationalising. But despite this slight shift in terminology, Kant’s general 
points are of the utmost importance for our discussion. The principles of the high 
theory must still be general (in the sense yet to be specified) with respect to the 
principles of the low theory, or our practices, and these practices themselves must still 
somehow be seen as a consequence of the high theory. What is crucial now is for us to 
understand this ‘consequential’ relationship between the principles and the practices in 
order to see in what senses the principles can be prior to the practices.5
3. Varieties of PoT theory.
To say that something is prior to something else according to the Oxford Dictionary 
means that it is ‘existing or coming before something in time, order, or importance’6. 
So, the first sense in which a theory might be prior to a practice could be a literal 
temporal sense. The idea here would be that in order to work out which practices are 
the correct ones, we must first apprehend the principles of a theory and then actually 
derive from this theory a practice that conforms to it.7 Thus, the practice could be said 
to have literally come about as a consequence of the theory and the theory is prior to 
the practice.
There are in fact two aspects of this view that we can distinguish. For the empirical 
claim that we actually derive our practices from a set of principles requires one to take 
up a corresponding epistemological position whereby we apprehend the principles of 
the theory ‘first’; in order to be able to say that the practice is actually derived from the 
principles, it seems that one would need to hold that we arrive at our knowledge of 
these principles independently of the practice. The idea might be that we have some 
form of direct a priori knowledge of the principles, a view that Jonathan Dancy calls 
generalist epistemology.8 We therefore can distinguish the following positions:
Epistemological PoT - We apprehend principles directly and independently of 
practices.
Derivational PoT - We derive our practices from such principles (and not conversely).
So we have two related ways in which theories can be said to be prior to practices -  
they can be known directly and prior to our having any knowledge of the practices and
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they provide the ‘premises’ from which our practice, including the judgements we 
continually make within it, is actually derived. However, these are not the senses of 
PoT that we are interested in for these are not the senses in which Maimonides and 
Soloveitchik are PoT theorists. Firstly, Maimonides is not a Derivational PoT theorist. 
As we have seen in our discussion of Maimonides, he does not believe that we have 
sufficient knowledge to actually derive all of our practices from his principles. Though 
it is true that in principle we could derive all the various practices from our knowledge 
of the relevant principles together with the relevant historical and psychological 
knowledge, as a matter of empirical fact we lack too much of this additional empirical 
knowledge and cannot therefore actually derive the practices in this way. One might 
ask how, in that case, we arrive at the practices. This, of course, is not a problem for 
Maimonides since the practices do not need to be ‘derived’. They have been given to us 
through revelation.
What of his epistemological position? Maimonides does not believe that God directly 
imparts the theoretical rationalisation of the commandments to us in the way that He 
imparts the commandments themselves so it appears that this is knowledge that we 
must derive by ourselves. However, our grasp of the principles involved in this 
rationalisation, for example that stating the form of man, are apprehended in particular 
examples through the faculty of nous and are not therefore known a priori. The laws of 
nature for Aristotle, though necessary, are a posteriori. Thus it appears as if 
Maimonides is not an Epistemological PoT theorist either.
Similarly, Soloveitchik is neither an Epistemological nor a Derivational PoT theorist. 
Indeed, he rejects all of these PoT approaches in favour of the priority of practice 
(PoP). The PoP theorist would reject the idea that we can directly apprehend principles 
and then derive our practices from them in favour of the idea that we can only derive 
the principles from the practices. This approach again gives us a derivational sense in 
which practices are prior to theories, and an epistemological one. On the one hand the 
theories are actually derived from the practices (though we are using ‘derived’ here in a 
loose and non-technical sense -  it might be that the principles are perceived in the 
practices so to speak rather than derived from them in an inferential manner):
Derivational PoP theorist -  We derive our principles from our practices (and not 
conversely)
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As we have seen in the previous chapter this seems to be the approach that Soloveitchik 
takes. We need not derive our practices from a set of principles in order to know what 
to do and indeed cannot do so for according to Soloveitchik any theory of the 
commandments must be found in the practices and cannot be immediately intuited in 
some a priori fashion. But this also means that Soloveitchik is not willing to 
contemplate the sort of generalist epistemology of the PoT theorist that has us in direct 
intuitive contact with these principles. We must begin with the objective products of 
any theory i.e. the practical norms it yields, in order to reconstruct the theory. Thus, 
Soloveitchik is neither a Derivational PoT theorist nor an Epistemological PoT theorist. 
Again, if this is the case, the question of how we come to know the correct practices 
arises. If it is true that in order to know the principles we must have some prior grasp of 
the correct practices, this would seem to require that we know of the correct practices 
independently of the principles, yielding an epistemological sense in which practices 
are prior to theories.
Epistemological PoP theorist -  We know which are the correct practices directly and 
independently of principles.
Such a stance would appear to be problematic for rationalising the commandments. For 
though it might seem plausible to say that we can directly apprehend ethical principles 
such as that ‘wanton cruelty is wrong’, is it really plausible to think that we can 
similarly directly intuit all the various religious principles that constitute the practice of 
Judaism?
We needn’t though think that Soloveitchik believes that we can directly intuit the 
correct practices for on his view our prior knowledge of the practices is not intuited. It 
has, as for Maimonides, been given to us through revelation. It is important therefore to 
note that a Derivational PoP theorist such as Soloveitchik, need not be committed to 
some strange faculty of intuition that allows him to read God’s mind and directly intuit 
the correct practices. He is though committed to some way of coming to know the 
practices independently of the principles and in the case of Soloveitchik this is of 
course through the no less problematic concept of revelation. Nonetheless we see that a 
Derivational PoP theorist who holds that the principles are derived from the practices, 
does not necessarily need to take up the epistemological position that the practices are 
directly apprehended by us, if he thinks that God can inform us of them.9
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But if our knowledge of the practices is de facto prior to that of the principles as it is for 
both Soloveitchik and Maimonides, there is no question of having to derive our 
practices from a set of theories. And if neither of them therefore are actually PoT 
theorists in the derivational sense, in what sense do they hold that practices are prior to, 
or a consequence of theories?
One possibility here would be that a theory must be formulated in order for us to 
understand a practice. This seems to be the sense in which Rawls thinks that theories 
are important. Indeed he explicitly states in A Theory o f Justice that we need a set of 
principles in order to understand the judgements that we make and which constitute our 
sense of justice:
We do not understand our sense of justice until we know in some systematic way covering
a wide range of cases what these principles are.10
Thus, principles perform the epistemological function of enabling us to understand 
practices.
However, there are different sets of principles that correspond to different forms of 
understanding, and our PoT theorist is concerned only with a specific form of 
understanding. Let us take as an example the attempt to understand the halakhic 
prohibition against eating certain foodstuffs. How could one understand this 
prohibition? One could try to form an explanatory theory that enabled one to 
understand why a certain person would not eat such food by imputing certain beliefs to 
that person. These might include his beliefs that God exists, that the prohibition is a 
Divine imperative and that he ought to obey such imperatives. This theory would allow 
us to explain why he would not eat the food in question. In this case we would say that 
the theory has explanatory priority over the practice. This is because we are faced with 
a piece of behaviour that as it stands cannot be understood. The only way to understand 
it is to form some explanatory theory for it and it is only once we have certain 
principles that explain this person’s behaviour that we can be said to have understood 
it. The point here is that the practice requires a theory for its explanation. The practice 
is the explanandum, the theory the explanans. In our terminology therefore the theory is 
prior to the practice from an explanatory point of view for the practice cannot be 
explained and therefore understood without it. We have an Explanatory PoT approach 
here according to which theories are prior to practices in the sense that they are 
required in order for us to explain and understand the practice which is not in any sense 
self-explanatory.
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However, the central point here is again that such an explanation would not amount to 
the type of rationalisation that Maimonides and Soloveitchik are after. The whole point 
of a rationalisation for them was that we understand why each particular commandment 
is rational. We are not looking for a psychological or indeed historical explanation of 
why someone carried out a certain action. For one might understand an action in terms 
of some explanatory scheme and yet believe that the action itself is not rational. The 
idea of priority that we are interested in is normative rather than explanatory and is an 
attempt to show that the practices themselves are rational. We are after justification, not 
explanation. Thus we are led to another sense in which theories might be taken to be 
prior to practices. We can now talk of the Normative PoT theorist who believes, to put 
the point very basically before we start to refine it in subsequent sections, that if a 
practice is rational there must be some theory that justifies it.
Thus, we have another two versions of PoT theory:
Explanatory PoT theory -  Principles enable us to explain practices and understand why 
certain actions are performed.
Normative PoT theory -  Principles enable us to justify practices and understand why 
certain actions are rational.11
Note that this Normative PoT theory is not dependent on the derivational version 
discussed earlier. It is not that we must actually apply the principles of our theory in 
order to form our practices or make our judgements as the Derivational PoT theorist 
believes. Rather we must be able to reconstruct a theory, if only after the fact as with 
Maimonides and Soloveitchik, if we are to show that it is justified. This distinction can 
be illustrated by analogy to the use made of the idea of the social contract in political 
philosophy. Many contract theorists are less concerned about whether or not societies 
actually made these contracts and more concerned with the question of whether or not 
society can be thought of hypothetically as having been brought about in this way. If it 
can, then it can be seen to be rationally justified. In the same way, maybe the 
significant point is that practices, as Kant says in our original passage, can be ‘thought 
of’ as having been brought about in consequence of a set of principles. If, after the fact, 
we can think of the practice as having been brought about as a consequence of these 
principles, it can be seen to be rationally justified. But this justification does not depend 
on whether or not we actually derived our practice from the principles, as our 
Derivational PoT theorist believes.
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It is this granting of normative priority to theory that for all their differences, 
Maimonides and Soloveitchik seem to share and it is in this sense that I speak of the
priority of theory over practice; practices require theories if they are to be rationally
1 0justified and this task cannot be achieved without the theory. From now on then, 
when we speak of PoT theory it is this normative version that we will be referring to 
and we will only explicitly distinguish the various types of PoT theory when it is 
required.13
4. Strong Foundationalism, Weak Foundationalism and the PoT approach.
We now need to be a little more specific about what a PoT theorist holds. So far we 
have established that Maimonides and Soloveitchik are PoT theorists inasmuch as they 
are both looking for principles of a high theory that would serve to justify the low 
theory and the actual actions that make up the practice of Judaism. However, there are 
in fact varying strengths of PoT theory and we must therefore distinguish those aspects 
that are and are not essential to the position.
If we begin with the stronger Maimonidean PoT theory, we find that Maimonides tries 
to reveal the deep underlying rationality of the commandments by identifying a single 
scientific principle that tells us the purpose of man and showing how the 
commandments lead to the fulfilment of that purpose. What is significant about this is 
that he believes therefore that he is appealing to a universal scientific truth that can be 
used as the ultimate foundation for the rational assessment of any practice. The form is 
the ultimate explanatory concept in Aristotelian science, the definition from which our 
scientific demonstrations can start that is not itself capable of demonstration. In this 
case the statement about the form of man is a truth that is not capable of further 
analysis and is one that is self evidently true.
Maimonides’ approach therefore is universal and foundational. It is universeil since it 
holds for all people in all contexts and is formed independently of any particular 
practice or set of practices. And it is foundational since it gives us is a set of privileged 
truths that are the ultimate basis for the rational assessment of any practice and that we 
are compelled to believe, insofar as we are rational. This rational structure stands in 
judgement over the practice and allows it to be seen to be rational. Maimonides 
believes that he has uncovered certain privileged self-evident principles that all rational 
thinkers will agree on that serve to assess our individual practices. There are therefore 
four central aspects of Maimonides’ PoT theory:
1) It uses a single principle.
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2) The principle is universal.
3) The principle cannot be further analysed.
4) The principle serves as the basis for the rational assessment of all practices.
We will call the combination of these four assumptions strong foundationalism, which 
is summarised as (FI).
(FI): There is a single universal principle that cannot be further analysed and that 
serves as the basis for the rational assessment of all ethical and religious practices.14
What is important is that only the fourth factor is in fact crucial to what we are calling 
the PoT approach. We will look at each of these aspects in turn as they appear in the 
methods of Maimonides and Soloveitchik in order to explain this.
The first point concerns the number of principles a theory posits. The number of 
principles that one holds is not in itself relevant to whether or not one is a PoT theorist. 
For Maimonides the self-evident truth that provides us with our foundational theoretical 
structure is the truth that the human good is to achieve the contemplative perfection of 
man. This allows us to justify any commandment that is a means to this natural 
contemplative end and Maimonides attempts, therefore, to reduce all reasons for the 
commandments to a single reason. The reason for performing the commandments (or 
the justification for them) is that they lead to our contemplative end; they can all be 
subsumed within this theoretical structure. However, as Williams points out such a 
thoroughgoing reductionism that masquerades as the neutral notion of simplicity, itself 
needs to be justified and cannot be merely taken as a self evident requirement of a 
theory.15 Indeed, one of the motivations that he mentions for it is the assumption that 
the rational assessment of principles requires that they can be compared on some 
common scale, which the reduction to a single principle allows. But this of course is 
just the reductive view reasserting itself at a higher level and is therefore no 
justification of it.
Soloveitchik’s approach is far more pluralistic and this pluralism is based on a 
fundamental assumption about human nature: ‘Man is a dialectical being; an inner 
schism runs through his personality at every level.’16 Moreover, this dialectic is 
irreconcilable:
Judaic dialectic, unlike the Hegelian, is irreconcilable and hence indeterminable. Judaism 
accepted a dialectic, consisting only of thesis and antithesis. The third Hegelian stage, that 
of reconciliation, is missing. The conflict is final, almost absolute.17
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Judaism, according to Soloveitchik allows for the expression of this dialectic by itself 
positing a halakhah that allows for the expression of this conflict by making conflicting 
demands upon us. The halakhah therefore may well contain conflicting norms that do 
not admit of any higher reconciliation. Thus with respect to Jewish ethics in particular 
he writes:
It is obvious that dialectical man cannot be committed to a uniform, homogenous morality.
If man is dialectical, so is his moral gesture. Judaism has indeed formulated such a
dialectical morality.18
So Maimonides approach is monistic in the sense of appealing to a single privileged 
principle whereas Soloveitchik’s approach is pluralistic. But this is not in itself relevant 
to whether or not they are PoT theorists, for both of them are still appealing to 
principles to justify the practices. The number is irrelevant.
Concerning the second aspect of strong foundationalism, universalism, we have seen in 
the previous chapter that Soloveitchik rejects Maimonides’ universalism and therefore 
the claim that the principles of his theory need be self evident to any rational human 
being. A combination of pluralism and the idea that Judaism is a meaningful practice 
that must be understood from within allows for the possibility, indeed likelihood of 
there being practices that cannot be understood by those outside of the practice. The 
concepts and principles used in the theory are formulated out of the practice itself 
rather than from some abstract universal theory and need not be self-evident to any 
rational being. The principles therefore are only common to the particular group whose 
practice is in question, not to all of humanity. We can say that they are general but not 
universal.
Finally, with respect to the requirement that our principles be incapable of further 
analysis, if Soloveitchik’s approach is one of reflective equilibrium, surely it cannot 
appeal to such a set of final principles. The whole point of the method of reflective 
equilibrium is that it accepts the necessity of taking lived experience into account and 
does not unthinkingly impose theoretical principles on our practices unless such an 
imposition accords with the considered judgements made from within that practice. 
And since new judgements can always conceivably lead us to revise our principles, it 
seems as if the possibility of further analysis is always in principle left open.
What though of the fourth condition of strong foundationalism? The basic idea is 
simply that principles are the basis for the rational assessment of practices. Our
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judgements have to be capable of systematisation in a set of principles if they are to be 
seen as rational or justified. Thus, Susan Brison writes
It is now commonplace to acknowledge that practice requires a theoretical foundation . . . 
to justify the practice [and] to accurately construe the nature of the practice itself. 19 
(Emphasis added).
Similarly, Rawls begins his Theory o f Justice with this very point, implicit in the 
assumption that it is the principles that justify choosing one set of arrangements over 
other possibilities:
To this end it is necessary to work out a theory of justice in the light of which these 
assertions can be interpreted and analysed. . . .  A set of principles is required for choosing 
among the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and 
for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares.20
Reference to principles is required therefore in order to underwrite the rationality of our 
choosing one set of judgements over another. The possibility of setting out principles 
that account for the practices is apparently seen to be a necessary condition of their 
rationality. Thus, the PoT theorist holds:
(Cl): It is a necessary condition of the rationality of any practice that it be capable of 
being articulated in a set of principles to which it must therefore conform in order to be 
rational.
This is where the fourth condition of strong foundationalism seems to lead us. There 
must be some set of principles that serve as the basis for the assessment of any practice 
and this certainly seems to be a central component of Soloveitchik’s method. Indeed it 
is this point, and this point alone, that is essential to being a PoT theorist.
What else does this PoT approach entail? The PoT approach assumes that the 
rationality of a practice is something that must be capable of being set out in principles. 
As such it is equating the rationality of a practice with discursive rationality. The 
central idea is that the practices must contain certain principles implicitly if they are to 
be rational. Uncovering the rationality of the practice is equated with uncovering this 
set of discursive principles. Thus, in a most significant statement we find Rawls writing 
in his description of the method of reflective equilibrium, that it is the appeal to and 
articulation of the principles that counts as the reflective part of the method.
It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgements coincide; and it is 
reflective since we know to what principles our judgements conform and the premises of 
their derivation. (Emphasis added) 21
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The implication here is that it is the formation of a set of principles to which our 
judgements conform that constitutes the reflective part of our thinking about our 
practical judgements. The central point then for the Normative PoT theorist is that 
practices are never self sufficient when it comes to understanding them, if 
understanding them is construed here as accounting for their rationality. Practices 
cannot be rational in themselves. Their rationality is only granted if it can be articulated 
in a set of principles.
This in turn would seem to mean that all the judgements that make up the practice in its 
entirety must be justified by the principles of the theory if the practice is to be judged 
rational. Indeed Rawls makes this explicit when he writes that a theory must be 
comprehensive.
[A]n explication, to be completely successful, must be comprehensive; that is it must 
explicate . . .  all considered judgements; and it is expected to do this with the greatest 
possible simplicity and elegance.22
At the very least, if the theory is not actually comprehensive, it should be potentially 
so. Robert Nozick makes this position very clear in his example of a judge applying a 
principle based on precedents to decide which judgement is correct in a particular case. 
The general position is
Any correct judgement is yielded by some true acceptable general principle, that particular 
judgements are consequences of general principles applied to specific situations. Failure to 
uncover an acceptable general principle that yields some judgement in particular may 
mean that there is no such acceptable principle, in which case that particular judgement is 
mistaken and should be abandoned. Or perhaps you have not been astute enough to 
formulate the correct principle.23
The point, according to Nozick is that we must be capable of coming up with a 
principle that would subsume each practice. Each individual practice must fall under 
one of the general principles in order to be rational, even if it has not yet been explicitly 
formulated. This is a very strong position for though he does not mention the possibility 
here, it does seem possible that certain parts of the practice might not be understood in 
terms of principles and yet nevertheless be kept in the practice as long as they do not 
contradict the conception of rationality embodied in the theory. At the very least then 
one must say that no individual practice must instantiate principles that contradict those 
set out in the theory. If they do so, they are open to criticism and the principles get to 
assert what we will call their revisability rights over the practice. For a theory to have 
revisability rights over a Practice means that if any individual practice contradicts our 
theoretical structure, it is, by definition, not rational and should therefore be revised in
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order to bring it into line with the principles of the theory. The other alternative of 
course is to admit the irrationality of the practice and reject it. The fundamental point is 
that the judgements must be abandoned if they contradict some principle. In this way 
the principles not only help us to understand and justify the practice. They also allow us 
to critically appraise it and adjust it.
Nonetheless, the extent to which such discursive justifications can justify our practices 
varies between different types of PoT theorist. The most extreme PoT theorist might, as 
discussed earlier, hold that something is only ideally rational if it reduces to an instance 
of a single reason-giving principle as with Maimonides. Other PoT theorists would, as 
we see with Soloveitchik, allow for a plurality of such principles. However, this 
pluralistic approach raises the possibility of conflicts between the first order practical 
principles. Now we can distinguish two different reactions to such conflicts. On the one 
hand we find Rawls who believes that we must have some kind of further ordering 
principle in order to adjudicate rationally between such conflicts. Indeed, his criticism 
of intuitionism rests on its lack of any priority principles that would allow us to 
adjudicate such conflicts. Rawls does admit that it is possible that we will be unable to 
find these priority principles for all cases and in such a case an appeal to intuition 
would not be irrational. However, he explicitly states that this lacuna nonetheless is one 
that limits the rationality of the practice.
If we cannot explain how these weights are to be determined by reasonable ethical criteria,
the means o f rational discussion have come to an end.24 (Emphasis added).
The idea seems to be that to retain rationality for the practice ‘all the way down’ would 
require that in addition to the principles that justify the practices, we have some further 
principles for resolving conflicts that may arise between these first order principles. 
Soloveitchik’s pluralistic approach on the other hand allows for such conflicts to 
remain unresolved and does not seem to require ordering principles. Now we may call 
such a theorist a PoT theorist, and say that the essential point for a PoT theorist is 
simply that he takes the initial step of subsuming all particular practices under 
principles and holds that this and this alone shows them to be rational. However, as a 
PoT theorist, for whom stateable principles constitute rationality, the lack of any 
principles for adjudicating between conflicting first order principles must nonetheless 
be seen as a limit to the rationality of the theory and indeed the corresponding practice. 
One can certainly therefore hold that there are no such principles for deciding on 
conflicts and remain a PoT theorist at the first order level. The theory would simply
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state a set of first order principles without ordering them, or at least without ordering all 
of them. But limiting our principles to this level is still seen as a limit on the rationality 
of the practice in question.
We see therefore that there can be different strengths of PoT theory. One can be a 
monist who believes that one principle justifies all of the practices or a pluralist who 
believes that there are a number of such principles. Moreover, within the pluralist camp 
one may or may not make the further assumption that one needs ordering principles to 
adjudicate between conflicts. One who does make this assumption is a thoroughgoing 
PoT theorist and this seems to be the ideal Rawlsian line; one who does not is only 
what we can call a first order PoT theorist for whom irresolvable conflict may exist. 
However, the conflict is based on the fact that each of the practices makes its own 
claim to rationality based upon a certain principle. Thus it is still the principles that 
constitute the rationality of the practices that are in conflict and therefore we still have a 
first order PoT theory.
To reiterate then, the Normative PoT approach only grants rationality to a practice (or 
indeed to anything else) if it can be justified by a stateable set of principles. And our 
understanding of a practice would require the ability to set out this discursive set of 
principles.25 There is no sense in which practices are self-sufficiently rational 
independently of their ability to be articulated as a set of principles. We must appeal to 
a theory to do the all-important justificatory work that the practices cannot do for 
themselves. The theory therefore is prior to the practice in the sense of being the 
discursive tribunal to which the practice must conform in order to be understood as 
rational.
If, therefore, we bracket out those features of our definition of strong foundationalism 
(FI) that are not relevant to Soloveitchik, we are left with the following position that 
we will call weak foundationalism:
(F2): There is a set of general principles that can always in principle be further analysed 
that serve as the basis for the rational assessment of all ethical and religious practices.
The only crucial PoT assumption then is that the rationality of the Practice is ultimately 
assessed in terms of the principles of the theory and cannot be seen to be rational 
otherwise. It is then, the holding of (Cl) rather than (FI) that is essential to being a PoT 
theorist.
116
5. Is the Method of Reflective Equilibrium a PoT approach?
We must now raise a crucial question about the PoT approach. For we are claiming that 
Soloveitchik, a reflective equilibrium theorist, is a PoT theorist. And yet if the 
reflective equilibrium approach requires not only that the practices or considered 
judgements conform to the principles, but that the principles also conform to the 
judgements, is it really a PoT approach at all? Since no party to the equilibrium is 
privileged as foundational in the sense of being the ultimate basis for the overall 
assessment of the practice, in what sense is the theory prior to the practice in terms of 
the justificatory burden? Indeed according to Rawls the considered judgements serve to 
justify the principles and can lead to their being revised:
[T]here is only one way of showing an explication to be unsatisfactory, and that is to show 
that there exist considered judgements of competent judges on specifiable cases for which 
it either fails to yield any judgements at all or leads one to make judgements inconsistent 
with them. Conversely, the only way to show that an explication is satisfactory is to 
evidence that its explicit and conscious application can be, or could be, a cause of the 
judgements in its range.26
This seems to imply that the judgements in a reflective equilibrium serve to justify the 
principles as much as the principles do the judgements. For if the principles do not 
conform to the considered judgements, they can be revised in accordance with the 
judgements. The judgements themselves, it seems, justify the principles of the theory. 
We can make this problem clearer by looking at the idea of revisability rights as it 
appears in Maimonides’ more straightforward form of PoT theory. We have seen how 
his approach takes a certain rational theory that allows for critical reflection on the 
practices. The sacrificial cult, for example, appeared anomalous from the perspective of 
the principles set out as the requirements of rationality for the practice. Indeed it 
seemed to contradict the principles of Maimonides’ theory inasmuch as it apparently 
inhibited the achievement of the rational ends posited as the purpose of the 
commandments. Maimonides therefore attempted (unsuccessfully) to force the 
sacrificial cult into his theoretical straitjacket. The logic of Maimonides’ position 
therefore, though not Maimonides himself, tells us that if the practice does not conform 
to the theory, it is not rational and must be revised. Moreover, there is no question here 
of revising the theory to conform to the practice. The theory is self-evidently rational 
and anything that contradicts it is not.
Since the practice is a divine command and therefore must be rational according to 
Maimonides, he in fact assumes that the practice must somehow fall under the terms of 
the theory. It is simply accepted therefore that the theory will never need to assert its
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revisability rights and change the practice. The practice is bound to be covered by the 
rational principles. The important point though is that to retain the rationality of the 
sacrificial cult, it must be forced into this theoretical structure which dictates what 
practical rationality is for Maimonides. So his position leads to Cl -  that it is a 
necessary condition of the rationality of the commandments that they conform to the 
theory. Basically, if the theory genuinely has normative priority over the practice, this 
would grant exclusive revisability rights to the theory over the practice. The theory, 
being rational, could revise any recalcitrant judgement.
But with the reflective equilibrium approach it seems as if the theory does not have 
exclusive revisability rights over the practice and is not therefore the only ground of 
rationality. The considered judgements that make up the practice can lead us to revise 
the theory, implying that they have some independent rational standing that does not 
itself rely upon that theory. This of course would mean that Cl was being violated for 
here we would have a practice that did not conform to a set of principles but this, rather 
than leading to its rejection, leads us to assert its rationality at the expense of the 
principles. We have the idea then that a recalcitrant judgement which by definition does 
not conform to the principles, can lead to their revision. Articulation in terms of 
principles would not seem to be a necessary condition of the rationality of such 
practices. But by allowing this, we seem to be allowing the practices some form of self- 
sufficient rationality that vitiates the priority of the principles - the practices come to 
justify the principles as much as the principles do the practices.27 
If this is so there is no sense in which theory is prior to practice in our normative sense 
for the reflective equilibrium theorist (and therefore for Soloveitchik). However, I 
would like to argue that whilst this method does accord importance to our considered 
judgements and utilises them in the formation of a theory, it does not thereby grant the 
practice revisability rights in itself or any form of self-sufficient rationality. The 
rationality that is granted to the practices in such an approach will be seen to be a 
methodological postulate rather than a substantive form of rationality and in the final 
analysis we will see that the rationality of the practices is still entirely dependent on the 
articulation of principles. They have no independent rationality that cannot in principle 
be given such an articulation.
6. Why the Method of Reflective Equilibrium is a PoT approach.
What we need to show is that the reflective equilibrium theorist, despite appearances to 
the contrary, upholds Cl and does not allow the practices any other substantive form of
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rationality that justifies the principles. Effectively we need to establish the kind of one 
way relationship that we find in Kant whereby ‘ the worth of practice rests entirely on 
its appropriateness to its underlying theory.’28
I believe that we can show that this is indeed the picture of justification that the 
reflective equilibrium theorist uses. We can do this if we consider why a practice might 
be granted revisability rights over a theory. It seems to me that there are two options 
here:
a) Implicit in the practices are certain principles which show that our original 
principles were mistaken.
b) The practices embody some independent form of rationality that is not dependent 
on principles that show our original principles were mistaken.
I shall argue that option a) seems to be the route taken by reflective equilibrium 
theorists on revisability and commits one to a form of the PoT approach. Option b) on 
the other hand allows one to avoid the PoT approach but means that one cannot remain 
a reflective equilibrium theorist. Therefore, any reflective equilibrium approach 
deserving of the title is a PoT approach.29 Let us look at each of these options in turn in 
order to explain these points.
Option A.- Firstly we must recall that according to the reflective equilibrium theorist, 
any theory must be comprehensive. The rationality of any practice is only granted if it 
falls under a principle. But this in turn leads to the conclusion that any recalcitrant case 
that is rational and leads us to revise our principles must itself embody certain rational 
principles since only principles can be constitutive of the rationality of the recalcitrant 
case. This in turn means that any cases that lead us to reject our current principles can 
only do so if we are able to formulate a new set of principles that cover both the old 
judgements and this new recalcitrant case.30 Thus, in the final analysis, any recalcitrant 
judgement that leads us to reject our former principles can only do so if it can itself be 
subsumed under a reformulated principle or set of principles. And it is the principle that 
is latent in that particular recalcitrant judgement that therefore justifies any revision of 
the principles as being a rational revision. What this means though is that even the 
reflective equilibrium theorist is giving normative priority to the principles for he is 
holding that practices are only rational if they can somehow be seen to satisfy a 
discursive set of principles which are always the bottom line as far as rationality is 
concerned. And this means that the judgements themselves are not actually being 
granted any self-sufficient form of rationality -  C l stands.
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Thus, despite our saying that in reflective equilibrium the principles must conform to 
the practices which thereby justify the principles, all that we are really doing is simply 
rejecting our principles in favour of other principles latent in the practices. The 
practices do not pull any independent justificatory weight in the equilibrium 
independently of the principles. It is just the discovery of the principles rather than their 
justification that relies on the considered judgements and it is the discovery of different 
principles latent in the recalcitrant judgements that lead us to see whether or not our 
original principles were correct.
It is true that Rawls says that these considered judgements must be formed in specific 
ways by competent judges and that they must be intuitive and ‘not be determined by a 
systematic and conscious use of ethical principles’.31 It might be thought that this can 
be seen to constitute some independent form of rationality for them. But it seems that 
these factors are simply taken to be good indicators that these practices are rational and 
can therefore be given a principled explication. The rationality of the judgements 
though is not guaranteed by these indicators and cannot be defined by recourse to them. 
For such judgements might well appear to satisfy the aforementioned requirements and 
yet, if they are found not to conform to our principles, they will be rejected. Indeed, in 
A Theory of Justice Rawls seems to grant that principled rationality takes precedence in 
justifying practices over any of the marks that usually accompany these considered 
judgements:
In describing our sense of justice, an allowance must be made for the likelihood that 
considered judgements are no doubt subject to certain irregularities and distortions 
despite the fact that they are rendered under favorable circumstances. When a person is 
presented with an intuitively appealing account of his sense of justice . . .  he may well 
revise his judgements to conform to its principles even though the theory does not fit his 
existing judgements exactly.32 (Emphasis added).
It seems therefore as if the features of considered judgements that make them a 
reasonable starting point for our enquiry are just symptoms of the rationality that we 
lay out in a set of principles. They often accompany it and therefore they are a good 
indicator of which judgements are likely to implicitly contain the principles that will 
constitute the theory. But any initial plausibility that is granted to our considered 
judgements and that allows them to revise our principles is seen as a promissory note to 
be cashed out at some point in terms of further theoretical principles. The plausibility of 
the judgement is in effect seen as a ‘place holder’, which has to be filled in by a 
principle if the judgement is to be truly rational. They are therefore granted rationality 
as a methodological postulate, but this has to be made good by articulation in principles
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at some stage and it is the implicit theory that is ultimately responsible for any revision 
of principles. Despite Rawls’ protestations, it just does not seem to me as if the 
practices or judgements play any independent justificatory role in the equilibrium. The 
judgements are simply used as a route to the principles and this only because they are 
presumed to be repositories of this principled form of rationality in the first place. 
Thus, it is not that the practices justify the principles; the theory is still doing the 
substantive justificatory work.33
Indeed, Rawls himself writes, what we have here is a ‘heuristic device’34 for finding the 
correct principles. The bottom line though is that what makes the principles rational is 
simply the fact that they are principles that have been arrived at in a suitably self- 
critical, but ultimately theory driven fashion to account for the considered judgements 
in which they were always supposed to be latent.35
Thus when Rawls says, ‘the fact that the principles constitute a comprehensive 
explication of the considered judgements of competent judges is a reason for accepting 
them’,36 it seems that the only ‘reason’ that the judgements might give us for accepting 
the principles is purely subjective, to do with the fact that we have ‘certitude’ 
concerning them. But in the final analysis, the only way that the judgements can be 
substantively rational is if they can be explicated by principles and they therefore give 
us no independent reason to accept the principles. The principles are not justified by 
any independent form of rationality contained in the practices.
What we in fact have here, it seems to me, is Rawls asserting an Epistemological PoP 
theory whereby we intuitively know of the correct moral judgements that then require 
explication in terms of principles. The principles are therefore derived (in the loose 
sense) from these judgements (Derivational PoP theory) though these principles 
themselves can then be used in turn to revise actual judgements (Derivational PoT 
theory). It is here that we find a form of back and forth movement characteristic of 
reflective equilibrium. But it is the principles alone, however derived, that account for 
the rationality or otherwise of these considered judgements (Normative PoT theory) 
which do not themselves justify the principles in the same way.
Option B -  What would the reflective equilibrium theorist need to assert in order to 
avoid the charge of being a PoT theorist?
The basic idea is that one could avoid the PoT approach if one were to say that the 
practices have some independent form of rationality that does not depend on the 
principles. From the reflective equilibrium theorist’s perspective, this would require the
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possibility of there being a genuine recalcitrant case. Effectively, what we have seen so 
far is that any recalcitrant case only remains a recalcitrant case until it has itself been 
subsumed under a revised theory. If it cannot be so subsumed, it is rejected as a 
mistaken judgement. In effect, therefore, there can be no genuinely recalcitrant 
judgements that remain stubbornly recalcitrants However, if we allow the possibility of 
there being a genuine recalcitrant case that could not be subsumed under any principle 
and that despite not being capable of assimilation to any such theoretical structure is 
not rejected, we would be able to say that practices are genuinely rational 
independently of the principles of any theory and can pull some independent 
justificatory weight. Here, the independent rationality of the practice (and not some 
principle latent within it) would cause us to question the principles. If we take 
Maimonides’ problematic sacrificial cult again as an example and imagine that we 
cannot find any principle that will allow us to account for it, the idea here would be that 
if practices have some form of independent rationality, why should we not simply 
accept the practice at the expense of the principles rather than reject it (or, as 
Maimonides does, force it into a theoretical scheme in which it has no place)?
This would allow for the self-sufficient rationality of the practice and would take away 
the normative priority of the principles in the sense that we are interested in it. The 
practice would be rational in itself, violating Cl, and could lead us to reject the 
principles without needing to then conform to some expanded set of principles. But if 
we do allow for this possibility, the method of reflective equilibrium seems to become 
very difficult to carry out for reflective equilibrium requires that we be able to subsume 
particular cases under principles and thus we must be able to ‘translate’ all practices 
into discursive terms. If though, we introduce a recalcitrant judgement with a form of 
substantive practical rationality that cannot be so reduced to principles we would not be 
able, or indeed need to form this revised set. By definition there is no way of forming 
such principles for these recalcitrant practices. They cannot be captured by any 
principle and yet they remain rational.
This is the sort of picture that would vitiate the PoT theory, a picture that is admittedly 
extremely vague and begs all sorts of questions, not least one of plausibility. For the 
moment though, we introduce the notion simply to emphasise that the reflective 
equilibrium theorist cannot grant such a form of independent rationality to practices 
and still remain a comprehensive (Rawlsian) reflective equilibrium theorist. For 
according to reflective equilibrium, to be viable the rationality of a practice must in
122
principle be translatable into a set of principles. It cannot be seen as rational in any 
other way.
In conclusion then, PoT theorists hold that the existence of an underlying theory is a 
necessary condition for the rationality of a practice while the practice ultimately plays 
no such role in accounting for the rationality of the principles. It is the holding of (Cl) 
and the exclusion of the possibility of principles relying on the rationality of the 
practices (except inasmuch as those practices themselves embody principles) that 
makes one a PoT theorist. Thus, despite all the genuine differences between those 
traditionally termed foundationalists and reflective equilibrium theorists, both are PoT 
approaches in this sense.
7. How do theories justify practices?
We have so far discovered that according to the PoT theorist, in order for a practice to 
be rational, it must be a practical instantiation of a theoretical structure that can be 
formulated as a set of general principles. This theory is essential for enabling us to 
understand, justify and critically assess or revise the practice. However, we must now 
understand why the PoT theorist believes this - what is the nature of the justificatory 
relation such that principles can arbitrate ‘rationality questions’ in this way? The 
central feature of the principles that differentiates them from the practices is that they 
have what Kant referred to as ‘a certain generality’, and we must now clarify this idea 
and understand how it enables principles to justify practices.
Let us consider an agent A in situation S who decides to perform an action of type P. 
What is it that justifies his doing action P? The claim of the PoT theorist is that a 
particular action, P, is justified if it can be subsumed under a general principle. But how 
does such subsumption serve to justify a particular act or judgement?
Robert Nozick suggests that one of the central intellectual functions of principles is to 
transmit support between particular cases.37 The idea here is that if a principle applies 
to a number of other cases Si, S2,..., and also subsumes our situation S in the same way, 
always yielding the conclusion that we ought to do P, then our decision in this case 
receives extra support from these other cases. Thus, the principles act as transmission 
devices.
Principles are transmission devices for probability or support, which flow from data or
cases, via the principles, to judgements and predictions about new observations or cases
38whose status otherwise is unknown or less certain.
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According to this view then, which Nozick links explicitly to justification,39 the 
function of principles is to transmit support to a particular case, by subsuming it under 
the same principle as a whole group of cases about which we are more certain. This is 
particularly useful in difficult cases in which the principle so to speak rounds up the 
clear cases as support for the difficult case. If that difficult case can be subsumed by the 
principle, then the more evident rationality of the clear cases brings extra conviction to 
bear on our case which is shown to be of the same general type. And it is only because 
the principles are general and cover a variety of cases that they can do this. It is because 
they can subsume different cases that this transmission function can work. Generally, 
principles transmit support between particular cases and can therefore be used in 
difficult cases as ‘devices for reaching correct decisions’40.
Does this justificatory function lead us to the normative priority of theory? It seems to 
me that this simple transmission function taken by itself is not sufficient to yield the 
type of justification that a PoT theorist would wish to appeal to in justifying a practice. 
The problem is that the transmission function seems to be parasitic on the rationality of 
particulars. Rather than the general principle justifying the practice, we seem to have 
the particular practices justifying the practices. We can understand why this is so if we 
look at an analogous idea of Mill’s in his discussion of real inferences. The following 
passage that comes under the heading ‘All inference is from particular to particular’ 
poses the problem.
If from our experience of John, Thomas, etc., who once were living but are now dead, we 
are entitled to conclude that all human beings are mortal, we might surely without any 
logical inconsequence have concluded at once from these instances that the Duke of 
Wellington is mortal. The mortality of John, Thomas, and others, is, after all, the whole 
evidence we have for the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. Not one iota is added to the 
proof by interpolating a general proposition. Since the individual cases are all the evidence 
we can possess, evidence which no logical form into which we throw it can make greater 
than it is; and since that evidence is either sufficient in itself, or if insufficient for the one 
purpose, cannot be sufficient for the other; I am unable to see why we should be forbidden 
to take the shortest cut from these sufficient premises to the conclusion, and constrained to 
travel the ‘high priori’ road, by the arbitrary fiat of logicians.41
His reasoning here as set out in the passage quoted is that since particular instances
constitute our inductive evidence for a general principle, which is therefore based upon
them, inferring a particular premise from a general principle is a logically otiose step.
The general principle itself presupposes the truth of all the particular propositions that it
generalises and as such cannot be used as the basis for an argument to a particular
proposition as a conclusion. We can move directly from particular to particular. What
Mill is doing here is setting out a form of inference that he believes to be at the basis of
both deductive and inductive reasoning. Indeed, he argues that all deductive reasoning
124
is therefore circular - our knowledge of particular propositions is enough to license an 
inference to other particular propositions and we need not go through any general 
proposition as we do in a deductive syllogism.
However, we must note that the principle, according to this account, is merely seen as a 
convenient way of collating all the various particular inferences under a general 
heading. Indeed Mill writes that general principles are ‘merely abridged statements, a 
kind of shorthand, of the particular facts. ,42If this is so, they do indeed assume the 
validity of such particular inferences and cannot be used to validate them on pain of 
circularity. As Mill puts it:
[I]n short, no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove anything, since
from a general principle we cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle
itself assumes as foreknown.43
Now the fact is that even if we were to accept Mill’s view of inference, there would 
still be a number of important functions for principles to fulfil. However, if principles 
are simply classificatory devices, their substantive contribution to the questions of the 
rationality of particular actions would be formal and classificatory, the sort of 
rationality that Horkheimer termed ‘subjective reason’ and that he thought was a 
particularly modem conception of rationality:
[T]he force that ultimately makes reasonable actions possible is the faculty of
classification, inference and deduction, no matter what the specific content. 44
Rationality is identified here with the purely formal aspects of reasoning, and asking 
whether or not a certain practice is rational, is tantamount to asking about the way in 
which it has been organised and classified by humans. But what Mill illustrates is the 
point that the mere subsumption of particulars by principles cannot in itself add 
anything to the rational standing of those particulars.
Returning now to Nozick and the transmission function of principles, our point is that if 
all that the principles do by virtue of their generality is transmit support, then they 
cannot have normative priority over particular practices. Nozick speaks of the 
transmission of support from clear cases to other cases. But if it is genuinely the clear 
cases that support the case in question, then it is not the principle that is doing the 
justificatory work. The principle is simply treated in this instance as collating the cases 
and acting as the conduit through which the particular cases support each other. Our 
conclusion regarding the rationality of our practices is, as Mill puts it when discussing 
the place of general principles in deduction, ‘not an inference drawn from the formula,
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but an inference drawn according to the formula.’45 The principle is merely seen, in 
virtue of its generality, as the medium for transmitting rationality. What it is actually 
transmitting is the rationality of the individual cases for unless the particular practices 
that the principles subsume are themselves rational in some substantive sense there will 
be no possibility of justification of the new case from other individual cases.
Basically, the picture that we are presented with is one whereby we judge that a certain 
practice is rational on the grounds that it can be categorised together with a like practice 
that instantiates the same general principle. But how do we judge the rationality of 
these like practices? Again in terms of the cases that came before and that were 
similarly judged to be rational according to the general principle. The problem though, 
seems to be that unless a certain particular case was inherently rational, then no 
principle can work to transmit support between like cases for there will be nothing to 
transmit.46 Thus the real justificatory relation is that between substantively rational 
particulars. But that of course is no longer a PoT theory. We would now have to say 
that the practices were rational in themselves and the principles do not constitute their 
rationality. Principles are not the justificatory ground for the practice, just as for Mill 
they are not, logically speaking, the inferential ground from which particular 
conclusions are drawn 47 Whether or not particulars can be inherently rational in this 
way is still an open question at this stage. However, the point we are making though is 
that the PoT theorist must appeal to more than the transmission function if he is to say 
that principles have normative priority over practices. If this transmission function is a 
complete account of the role principles, then they do not seem to contribute anything to 
the substantive rationality of the practice but are simply assumed to be classificatory 
devices.
Of course though, all the PoT theorist needs to do is deny that transmission is the sole 
function of the principles. In order to do so it seems as if the PoT theorist must deny 
that principles are simply empirical generalisations from the particular cases since this 
would only allow them to pick up their rationality from the particulars that they 
generalise. He must reject the account of principles that sees their rationality 
exclusively in terms of their ability to organise chunks of experience into groups, as 
modes of categorisation that make no substantive contribution to the rationality of the 
particular cases. The principles themselves need to be substantively rational in their 
own right in order to contribute to the rationalisation of particular practices in a more 
substantive way than the transmission function allows. Their rationality must be, as
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Horkheimer puts it, ‘a principle inherent in reality’ rather than a ‘subjective faculty of 
the mind’.48
Let us return then to the idea of the generality of the principles to see how else it can be 
used to justify practices. So far we have understood this generality as if it were simply a 
matter of the principles being types which subsume the practices as tokens. And whilst 
this is true, it is misleading to leave matters at this macro level. For if we look at the 
features of the principles that enable such subsumption to take place, we find 
something that can play the more substantive justificatory role that the PoT theorist is 
looking for.49
How do the principles subsume instances? The principles are law-like statements that 
pick out only those generally relevant features or properties that give us reasons to act * 
in particular cases. They do not appeal to the particular features of cases that are not 
relevant to the normative decision, such as the names of the people involved or the 
location of the act. The principles thereby cover all those cases that exhibit these 
generally relevant properties. And the idea is that these generally relevant properties are 
doing the substantive justificatory work. Thus, if agent A’s doing P in situation S falls 
under the principle in virtue of having such a property, it is the possession of this 
general property that justifies our doing P. A particular act P is justified if we can 
identify in situation S those general relevant properties mentioned in the principle. The 
general properties do the justificatory work.
The properties are general in the sense that their normative relevance is general -  if a 
property is identified as being normatively relevant in a certain situation, it retains this 
same normative relevance in all situations. The idea now is that our practices are 
justified if they exhibit some such generally relevant property. And one of the main 
reasons that this picture is so plausible is that the identification of such properties 
shows our judgements to be consistent with our previous judgements. Such consistency 
is seen as essential to the rationality of a set of judgements and it is the possession of 
the general properties identified in the principles that allow for this consistency. 
Generality in this sense seems to yield rationality by showing how our judgements are 
the result of consistently applied criteria rather than arbitrary whims.
In summary, what we find here is a link between generality, reason and rationality 
which is formulated as follows by Nozick.
If reasons are, by their nature, general, and if principles capture the notion of acting for 
such general reasons . . .  then to act or think rationally, one must do so in accordance with 
principles.50
127
The generality of the principles that depends on these properties seems to make for 
rationality and we end up with is a very powerful and plausible subsumptive picture of 
rationality that holds that in order to justify a practice or a judgement, we must make 
appeal to general principles that utilise general properties. However, all we have now 
done is shifted focus. What we now have are general properties as the vehicle for 
subsumption by principles and it seems as if these properties will need to have some 
sort of substantive rationality in order to do the justificatory work within the principles 
and not fall prey to the Millian criticism of principles that we have discussed. The 
properties must, it seems, have some form of a priori rationality that is not simply 
picked up from particular cases. Certainly this commitment to some form of a priori 
rationality for the principles seems to be the route that a PoT theorist needs to take if 
the approach is to work. And it is significant therefore that Maimonides’ 
Aristotelianism and Soloveitchik’s repeated discussions of the a priori nature of the 
halakhic system imply that they do take some such view of the rationality of principles. 
What we have therefore are certain properties that in virtue of being general can be 
codified into principles that subsume a variety of like cases. But these general 
properties do not themselves gain their rationality from the particulars. Certainly they 
might only be known through the particulars, but this is an epistemological point rather 
then a metaphysical one.51 If we are asking about the actual nature of their rationality, it 
seems to be an a priori form of rationality. The principles perform their justificatory 
role in virtue of their own inherent rationality that stems from that of the general 
properties that they contain.
This appears to be the manner in which the PoT theorist has to speak if he wishes to 
genuinely hold that the principles have normative priority over the practices. And it is 
worth pointing out that on this view, the transmission function has a very different role 
to play in any justification. For according to our revised PoT view, if a case falls under 
a principle, then that case is rational in virtue of having those general properties 
identified in the principle and the actual accumulation of other cases does not have any 
bearing on the rationality of the case at issue. The transmission function may therefore 
serve some psychological purpose. It may be a way of making us feel more certain 
about a difficult case if we recognise that it relies for its justification on the same 
property as other cases with which we are more comfortable. But at the end of the day, 
what justifies the particular practice is simply the possession of this general, and
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therefore rational, property. Its actual possession by other cases seems to be beside the 
point.52
So to conclude briefly, we have seen that the fundamental assumptions of the PoT 
theorist are:
1) (Cl): It is a necessary condition of the rationality of any practice that it be capable 
of being articulated in a set of principles to which it must therefore conform in 
order to be rational.
2) The principles must identify certain substantively rational general properties.
For a PoT theorist what makes an individual practice rational is some repeatable 
property that has some form of a priori rationality which is captured in a principle. 
What we will attempt to do in the remainder of this thesis is show that this PoT picture 
cannot work for rationalising practices and suggest an alternative approach.
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Chapter five
Problems with principles 
We have seen that according to the PoT approach, rationalising a practice essentially 
involves subsuming its norms under general principles that form a theory which has 
what we have called normative priority over the practice. With regard to rationalising 
the commandments therefore, the job of the Jewish philosopher is to reveal the abstract 
theoretical structure that provides this rationalisation for the commandments. We have 
already seen how two particular applications of this PoT approach, those of 
Maimonides and Soloveitchik, come up against certain specific problems. In this 
chapter though, I intend to argue more generally against the PoT approach by looking at 
what is known as the uncodifiability thesis which questions the central assumption of 
the PoT theorist -  that we can codify a practice in a set of principles. Having argued 
against this central pillar of all PoT theories, in the remainder of the chapter we will 
introduce an alternative approach to thinking about the whole issue of justifying 
practices that we will then put into practice in the remainder of the thesis.
1. Justificatory theories.
Before looking into the objection from uncodifiability, we should make some 
preliminary remarks regarding practical justifications in general. For Rawls issues a 
warning to those who say that the reflective equilibrium approach does not afford us a 
justification, Rawls writes:
To this I should say that we ought to inquire whether the person making the objection is not 
expecting too much. Perhaps he expects a justification procedure to show him how the 
decision is deducible from a synthetic a priori proposition. The answer to a person with 
such hopes is that they are logically impossible to satisfy and that all we should expect is 
that moral decisions and ethical principles are capable of the same sort of justification as 
decisions to believe and inductive criteria.1
Rawls, it seems to me, is making a significant point here. As Kai Neilsen remarks, ‘it is 
plainly more reasonable to believe that moral judgement is justified than to believe the 
general claim . . . that no moral judgement is justified’2. This appears to be an 
intuitively sensible approach to take to a theory of justification since certain considered 
judgements just do seem to tell against such a radically sceptical position. To take 
Neilsen’s example, if a theory leads us to conclude that our judgement that needlessly 
torturing children was wrong is not justified, so much the worse for the theory. Rawls,
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it seems to me, is therefore correct to say that if we expect so much of a justification 
that it makes justifications impossible, we maybe should be a little less stringent about 
what would count as a justification rather than conclude that nothing is justified.3 The 
question though, is how much ground we can concede to the PoT theorist on this. For 
the sake of argument, we will in this section grant them the maximum possible leeway. 
One concession that we have to make here concerns the notion of objectivism. One of 
the most important features of theories is that they are often taken to correspond in 
some manner to reality itself. Dwight Furrow for example writes:
Theories . . .  produce an increasingly accurate representation of reality and, on the basis of
this representation, generate prescriptions for practical action.4
In the normative sphere therefore we might find certain strong objectivists who see the 
ethical realm as a realm of facts existing independently of any inquirer. The idea then is 
that because a particular practical judgement can be subsumed under this general 
theory, it is seen to be objectively rational for it is linked to some independent reality 
through this representational theory.
Such objectivism is generally also going to bring universalism along with it for if the 
ethical sphere contains facts whose nature is independent of any inquirer, it is thought 
that the corresponding ethical beliefs must hold true for all ethical inquirers in all 
contexts, regardless of their own actual beliefs. Thus, for Maimonides the general 
principles of his theory are universal scientific truths concerning the human good and 
the real causal relations between the commandments and that good. These universal 
truths afford us an Archimedean point from which to survey and justify practices. Thus, 
if we can indeed show that our practice conforms to this theoretical model, our 
justification of religious norms will find, it is supposed, a foothold in an external reality 
and in this way we link the rationalisation to notions such as truth and objectivity.
There are though a number of problems with the strong form of objectivism (and 
therefore universalism) in the practical realm. The basic argument from disagreement 
which has been put forward in various forms has led many to the conclusion that there 
is no ‘way things are’ by which to justify our ethical beliefs.5 And Bernard Williams 
has argued in some detail that moral theories cannot secure convergence of moral belief 
by appeal to some absolute conception of the way things are in the way in which 
scientific theories can.6 We need not re-rehearse these arguments here. However, if one 
accepts these criticisms what is important is that the reflective equilibrium approach
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does not purport to begin from any such Archimedean point and as such need not look 
to present an objective universal theory in this sense.7 One could form any number of 
particular theories based on the different considered judgements of different cultures. 
The point is that the reflective equilibrium PoT theorist is not committed by virtue of 
his method to any particular stance on this question.
If the PoT theorist wishes to secure a form of objectivity, he need not appeal to objects 
in some Platonic sense, much as the objectivity of mathematics for example need not
fall back on some Platonic realm of numbers. We can have, as Renford Bambrough has
8 • . . .  ^  ^   ^put it, objectivity without objects. However, the reflective equilibrium PoT theorist it
appears is less concerned with the language of objectivity and more with the attempt to
yield a justification for our practices that shows how it can be subject to rational
constraints and open to rational reflection. It would, I believe, claim to be a cognitive
approach, according to which a practice can be seen to instantiate some theoretical
structure that is not the arbitrary creation of humans and that shows a certain moral
theory to be true.9
Given this loosening of the requirements of objectivity, we could ignore the problems 
regarding objectivity that were raised for Soloveitchik’s reflective equilibrium method. 
One could say that the strong notion of objectivity that we were criticising him for not 
attaining, one corollary of which was universalism, is a chimera anyway. Let us 
concede then that all we need to show is that the practice can be justified in terms of 
principles that show the practic^fnot^ be a non-arbitrary reasoned response to the 
practical issue of how we should live. What we can and indeed must do is systematise 
our practices by exhibiting their rationality in a set of principles, but they needn’t be 
considered universal or objective in the strong sense.
Indeed, for a PoT theorist it must be conceivable that someone could have a thorough 
understanding of the world-view of a given culture that shares its propositional content 
with that of a practitioner and yet not be convinced that he ought to, or could (from a 
practical perspective), participate in it. Moreover, it seems to me that this sort of 
pluralism can be argued for on purely empirical grounds. As Isaiah Berlin put it:
Members of one culture can, by the force of imaginative insight, understand . . .  the values, 
the ideals, the forms of life of another culture or society, even those remote in time or 
space. They may find these values unacceptable, but if they open their minds sufficiently 
they can grasp how one might be a full human being, with whom one could communicate, 
and at the same time live in the light of values widely different from one’s own, but which 
nevertheless one can see to be values, ends of life, by the realisation of which men could be 
fulfilled.10
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In cases such as that described by Berlin a theorist would have the very same theory as 
a practitioner, yet for him, the theory is only explanatory, not normative. Referring back 
to the distinction that we made in chapter four, the Explanatory PoT theorist may be 
able to locate the practice within some explanatory structure but that does not justify it 
for him if the explanation does not yield a confidence in that practice. For the 
Normative PoT theorist though, the same propositional structure would yield a 
confidence in the relevant practice. Thus, we can give explanations for practices that 
might actually be seen as justifications by certain people but not by others.
The reflective equilibrium theorist might therefore allow for such cultural variation. 
Indeed, its accommodation of such pluralism might be thought to be one of its great 
advantages over foundational approaches. But even allowing this, we must admit that 
different cultural groups use different sets of properties as provisional foundational 
points that have what Nozick refers to as ‘face appeal’11. And if, as it seems, we need 
appeal to such properties in order to justify our practices, we should at least attempt 
some account of their rationality and the fact that they can play such a fundamental role 
in our justifications. It seems to be a severe weakness for PoT accounts that they do not 
actually account for the rationality and variation of these ‘face appeal’ principles that is 
so fundamental. If more than one system can indeed be substantively rational, there 
should be some account of how this can be given that some of these systems will have 
clashing principles.
The problem is especially clear if we remember that in the previous chapter we found 
that systematisation alone is not enough to yield the normative priority of theory. What 
has to do the justificatory work for a PoT theorist are the properties that the principles 
make reference to, via their a priori rationality. However, it seems to me that our 
reflective equilibrium PoT theorist will have great difficulty introducing such 
properties.
Let us first note that such PoT theorists it seems to me, must accept that different 
practices appeal to different such properties and principles. The properties that make for 
rational principles for one group may not do so for another. But if this is so, how can 
those properties have some form of a priori rationality? Surely any such a priori 
rationality would be objective and universal. Now it is true that we have already 
expressed the intention to avoid this universalism as a constraint on our justification. 
The question though is whether or not the PoT theorist can give this up and retain the
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idea that the principles genuinely rationalise our practices via some form of a priori 
rationality.
Indeed, it seems that the reflective equilibrium theorist is likely to want to give up the
idea of the a priori rationality of these properties anyway. For invoking such a priori
properties does not sit comfortably with the sort of empiricist methodology being
insisted upon here, which would presumably wish to construe moral properties as
ordinary empirical properties rather than a priori ones. As Rawls states explicitly, his
10theory of justice is set up ‘without invoking a priori considerations’, and while it is 
true that Soloveitchik, for example, is not necessarily concerned to construe the 
properties in such naturalistic fashion, his insistence on an empirical scientific 
methodology, though not formally inconsistent with such a view of properties, does sit 
uneasily with it. The empirical approach to methodology seems undermined somewhat 
by the sudden appeal to these strange properties.13 Thus, what we appear to be left with 
on the reflective equilibrium PoT approach is a set of justificatory principles that 
merely systematise our judgements and that only do so within each practice. All we can 
do is appeal to these principles and their properties in order to make sense of each 
practice from an internal perspective. Conceding the utmost to the PoT theorist, we 
might say that maybe this is all that we can hope to achieve in the practical sphere. We 
can merely appeal to the internal consistency of our practices by appeal to a set of 
quasi-foundational principles that systematise our judgements.
However, returning to Rawls’ point quoted at the beginning of this chapter, it is all very 
well to say that we need to hold onto a theory of justification for our practices that 
should not be too stringent. However, it seems to me that there is a genuine question 
regarding whether this is really enough for a justification. If there were a genuinely 
distinct concept of justification here to speak of, then we could argue about the extent 
to which it had to live up to various strictures. But it seems to me that we have not been 
offered any such concept. We simply have a quasi-scientific concept of explanation 
being applied to practices in order to do something other than explain. And this, it 
seems to me, it cannot do. The problem here is not one of stringency or otherwise, but 
rather one of illegitimately speaking of justification when all we have is explanation.
2. The uncodifiability thesis.
Even if one were to allow that the sorts of explanatory systematisations discussed in the 
previous section could justify our practices, the argument from uncodifiability shows
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that even the minimal conditions for such an explanatory theory cannot be met. The 
simplest statement of the uncodifiability thesis is that given by John McDowell in the 
paper ‘Virtue and Reason’ where he questions the possibility of codifying a moral 
outlook in a set of principles.
[T]o an unprejudiced eye it should seem quite implausible that any reasonably adult moral 
outlook admits of any such codification. As Aristotle consistently says, the best 
generalisations about how one should behave hold only for the most part. If one attempted 
to reduce one’s conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then however, subtle 
and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a 
mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong -  and not necessarily 
because one had changed one’s mind: rather, one’s mind on the matter was not susceptible 
of capture in any universal formula.14
The point that McDowell seems to be making here is that we cannot form a set of 
subsumptive principles that would serve to codify our ethical practice since there will 
always be individual cases that these principles cannot subsume. The PoT approach 
would therefore seem to be in trouble for we would be unable to form the principles 
that supposedly justify our practices. However, we need to look at this thesis far more 
closely if we are to make into a cogent objection to the PoT approach. In order therefore 
to analyse this uncodifiability thesis I would like to address the following three 
questions:
i. What exactly is being said to be uncodifiable?
ii. Why is it thought to be uncodifiable?
iii. How is uncodifiability relevant to PoT theory?
3. What exactly is being said to be uncodifiable?
Before addressing this question directly, we should notice McDowell’s comment that 
the problem of uncodifiability is one of not being able to capture our moral outlook in 
universal formulae - we can only form principles that hold for the most part. The 
problem with such an uncodifiability thesis though, is that while it might be effective 
against the Maimonidean form of PoT theory, according to which rational practices 
must be susceptible of such universal codification, it would leave our more minimal 
PoT approaches untouched. Soloveitchik for example, and indeed any non-universalist 
reflective equilibrium theorist, can accept that his principles are not universally 
applicable and yet still believe that they were what justified the practices of the 
particular moral outlook being studied. What we would need to show, therefore, in 
order to make this objection effective against such a reflective equilibrium theorist is
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that moral outlooks, even those that are only applicable within a certain culture, cannot 
be codified in a set of formulae. The basic idea is that even within cultures, any 
codification will only hold for the most part. No set of principles can finally capture and 
justify the practice. We must therefore see whether we can develop the uncodifiability 
thesis in such a way that it can be made effective against all the varieties of PoT 
theory.15
With this target in view, let us return to our question of exactly what is said to be 
uncodifiable. The term that McDowell uses is our ‘moral outlook. We can narrow down 
what McDowell means by this by looking at what he says about practical syllogisms. If 
we consider the practical reasoning of a virtuous person, it seems that we can 
reconstruct his reasoning by appeal to a major premise specifying a general concern of 
the agent and a minor premise that identifies this situation as one in which this concern 
is relevant and requires acting upon. McDowell’s example is of someone with a general 
concern for his friends who notices on a particular occasion that the friend is depressed 
and therefore misses a party to comfort the friend. Such a syllogism seems to explain 
our actions by appeal to the interaction between those principles that form the major 
premises of such practical syllogisms and our perception of the particular situation. One 
might therefore think that we can, after all, codify our moral outlooks by listing the 
major premises that would feature in the practical reasoning of a virtuous person. 
However, the fact that we may be able to codify such a set of concerns according to 
McDowell only suffices to explain the motivation for an action. What it cannot do is 
explain why it is a virtuous action. In our terms, it does not in itself justify the action. It 
gives us what McDowell terms a ‘core explanation’ for the action which fully explains 
why the person was motivated to act, but would do so whether or not acting in this way 
were correct or not. Effectively, what the core explanation appeals to is a principle that 
may have explanatory priority over the practice, but not normative priority. Thus, in 
order to show that the action is virtuous, it needs be shown how acting on this concern 
in this situation was acting on the right concern and this requires that it mesh with what 
McDowell terms the agents ‘entire conception of how to live’. The appeal to principles 
stating general concerns cannot therefore explain the action as a virtuous action unless 
it is seen against this background, for only that would explain why it was this principle 
rather than any other that was operating here.
The core explanation must at least be seen against the background of the agent’s
conception of how to live; and if the situation is one of those on which any of several
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concerns might impinge, the conception of how to live must be capable of actually entering 
our understanding of the action, explaining why it was this concern rather than any other 
which was drawn into operation.16
McDowell’s point here seems to be that as we have pointed out, if we are to justify our 
practices, we would need principles to do more than simply subsume particular 
situations as instances. We would need a set of principles that identify certain properties 
as rational and this can only be done by invoking our conception of how to live. And 
the central point is that this cannot be codified. We might be able to list a set of 
concerns for the agent and explain his actions. But the conception of how to live that 
explains why we should act on certain concerns in certain situations at the expense of 
others, why certain properties are seen to be salient at certain times, cannot be set out in 
advance in any set of principles according to McDowell.
If the conception of how to live involved a ranking of concerns, or perhaps a set of 
rankings each relativised to some type of situation, the explanation of why one concern was 
operative rather than another would be straightforward. But uncodifiability rules out laying 
down such general rankings in advance of all the predicaments with which life may 
confront one.17
As set out here then, what seems to be uncodifiable is any set of ranking principles that 
would justify the perceived salience of particular properties amongst the competing 
properties or principles that apply to a given situation. This ‘entire conception of how to 
live’ would seem therefore to refer to the set of directly practical concerns of low theory 
ordered according to a set of ranking principles. In the final analysis then, it is the set of 
complex ranking principles held to be necessary for rationalisation by those we termed 
thoroughgoing PoT theorists that is uncodifiable. Moreover, if we cannot form 
principles of low theory it seems implausible to think that we could form principles at 
the level of high theory to justify the rankings of our ethical concerns, especially if 
these high level principles are to be partially derived from low level principles as in the 
reflective equilibrium process. As Dancy writes:
If there is a holism of reasons, as the particularist supposes, the prospects for 
substantial moral principles looks bleak.. .  And this is true, not just for what one might 
think of as ordinary principles such as ‘Do not lie’, but for the sort of principles that 
moral theorists seem especially interested in. Here I have in mind the attempt to 
construct a moral theory by proving true one or many crucial principles such as the 
Principle of Moral Indifference . . .  or the Utilitarian principle. . . There is something 
unrealistic about the whole enterprise.18
What we still need to understand though is exactly why this enterprise cannot be 
realised.
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4. Why is our moral outlook thought to be uncodifiable?
McDowell’s argument so far seems limited to our thoroughgoing PoT theorist. A 
pluralist like Soloveitchik who believes that we cannot have the kinds of ordering 
principles that McDowell thinks uncodifiable, would seem to be unaffected since 
McDowell’s argument does not rule out the possibility of identifying the kinds of 
general properties or concerns that were discussed in the previous chapter. There we 
argued that principles identify morally relevant properties which are rational and that 
can justify our actions across a variety of situations. The principles are then taken to 
justify judgements in particular cases and therefore be action guiding if the same 
morally relevant property referred to by the principle is present. McDowell does not 
appear to have ruled out the possibility of forming such principles, even if he has ruled 
out the possibility of forming more complex exception stating principles.
However, we can extend the uncodifiability thesis so as to question the very idea that 
moral properties have the kind of general relevance that is appealed to by the simplest 
of principles. The point can be made most effectively by appeal to what Dancy calls the 
holism of reasons. The idea of the holism of reasons is simply that the relevance of any 
given property can, and most likely will vary across different situations. Thus, for 
example, Dancy suggests that though the pleasure that a given act produces is generally 
seen to be a positive reason for action, the pleasure that a crowd might take in 
witnessing the public execution of rapists would seem to be a reason against reinstating 
such events. Indeed, it is even possible for a property to be a positive reason for action 
in one case and a reason not to act in another, as Dancy relates in the following personal 
anecdote.
I sent an article to a philosophical journal some years ago, taking it that the fact that I had 
already had two articles published there on the same general area was some reason for them 
to publish the third in the series. The editor persuaded me tactfully that it was a greater 
reason for them not to.19
How are these considerations relevant to uncodifiability in terms of our moral 
principles? The problem at its simplest is just that the principles ignore the competing 
morally relevant properties of actual situations that makes for this holism of reasons. 
What the principles do is identify a single relevant property and state that this property 
makes for the rightness of an action. But in doing this, the principle ignores the details 
of the actual situations to which it is being applied. Now on the one hand this is
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necessary if the principles are to be general and apply to multiple cases. However, the 
basic principle derived from a particular situation or set of situations, states that a 
certain property in isolation makes for rightness in any given situation in which it 
appears. But, in stating that a certain property is morally relevant in the absence of any 
other competing properties, the principle is restricting its application to those situations 
in which there are no such competing properties. And our extended uncodifiability 
thesis argues that almost all situations involve some such complexity, meaning that in 
the vast majority of situations we will need to pay attention to the way in which this 
property interacts with these other features. The problem therefore is that the ‘holistic’ 
interaction of properties in real situations will affect the relevance of the property cited 
in the principles so that we can no longer depend on its general relevance in isolation. 
What the principle states does not apply to the situation at hand. As Furrow puts it
The fact that a property is decisive in the absence of morally relevant competing properties 
does not give me a reason to think that it will decide in the presence of competing 
properties. The principle provides us with no device for attaching weight to a particular 
property, independently of evaluating the significance of that property in the present 
situation. . . 20
Principles therefore are of no use for they pick out properties in this atomistic fashion 
thereby becoming irrelevant to the vast majority of actual situations in which the 
property is not the only one that is relevant. Thus, by ignoring the trade-offs between 
the various relevant properties that constitute the very stuff of our moral reflection, 
principles lose their relevance to those very situations in which we require 
justifications. Indeed, this is precisely the point made in the example of the article 
quoted from Dancy above. In that case one might argue that we wouldn’t expect the 
single principle that, say, ‘if an article in a general area by a particular author has been 
accepted by a journal, another article in the same area will be accepted by the same 
journal’, would be relevant in the various situations that Dancy describes since the 
situations differ. The second article is sent in after one has been previously accepted 
and the third after two have been previously accepted. However, this is to concede the 
very point that the uncodifiability thesis is making. For the point about principles is that 
they are intended to pick out general features of a situation so as to apply to cases that 
differ in certain respects. But real life moral reflection often requires us to pay attention 
to these very respects which may affect the way that moral properties interact. This 
difference in interaction though changes the moral shape of the situation and as in the 
case Dancy cites, the principle therefore becomes irrelevant to this new situation.
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What is being stressed here is that the real question at issue is about the nature of the 
case before us, not other cases that it may or may not resemble. We are mistakenly 
employing what Dancy terms a switching argument, ‘an attempt to determine what to 
say here by appeal to what we say about something else’21. And here the problem is that 
the ‘something else’ does not seem relevant to the case at hand. Indeed, the idea that 
there could really be cases like those described in the principles we supposedly refer to 
is one of the very assumptions that our extended uncodifiability thesis is questioning. In 
real life situations the properties referred to by the principles are highly unlikely to turn 
up on their own and if we want to make a decision in a complex case, the important 
point is how in this case a certain property is behaving, not what the principle 
supposedly tells us: that if no other property made a difference then the one identified in 
the principle would be the only relevant one for our decision.
Now of course, one could argue that the initial principle could be reformulated to take 
these more complex circumstances into account and tell us which properties override 
those contained in our initial principle. Indeed this appears to be exactly what reflective 
equilibrium theorists do when they adjust their principles. However, such a move takes 
us back to the thoroughgoing PoT theorist’s point that in order to justify our practices 
we need to have some form of higher principle that would tell us how to adjudicate 
between competing first order principles. The uncodifiability thesis, therefore, by 
pointing out the inadequacy of our initial first order principles, seems to force us to 
consider the possibility of adjudicating between such principles on the grounds of 
further principles that would give some order of priority to the various properties 
involved in real life situations. This would seem to force PoT theorists like Soloveitchik 
to formulate some sort of priority principles for deciding between first level conflicts if 
they want their theories to be of any interest at all. But the point is that we cannot form 
such ranking principles. The problem for forming such principles is that again, once we 
generalise this more complex situation we simply appeal to a certain property that has 
defeated some other property but again inevitably leave out all the other competing 
properties that will be relevant in other cases. Different circumstances can always 
exhibit a novel mixture of properties and no principle will ever be able to both remain 
general and capture all the morally relevant competing properties that a new situation 
may yield. As such though, it cannot tell us what to do in those very situations in which 
we would want the principles to help us. The principles will still be treating properties 
in a misleadingly atomistic fashion and thus be irrelevant to those real life situations.
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The extended uncodifiability thesis therefore ends up arguing that though we may well 
attempt to form principles, they cannot justify a particular course of action for they are 
inapplicable to those real life situations to which they are being erroneously applied. 
The point of the principles is supposedly to cover a range of cases particularly those 
cases which are novel and require reflection. But in order to do this the principles must 
pick out only one the most general features of the cases in isolation. Thus, any situation 
that calls for any degree of moral reflection cannot be judged by appeal to principles 
alone for the principles will not apply to it.
5. Uncodifiability and complexity.
The uncodifiability thesis seems to be relying on the idea of the complexity of the moral 
situations that we face. It is the idea that moral experience involves so many critical 
variables that can interact in myriad ways that seems to vitiate any attempt at a 
principled codification that speaks of the ‘general’ relevance of a property in the 
manner that is required for a principle. As such, what we seem to have here is the 
general argument against the possibility of formulating general laws for explanation or 
prediction in the social sciences applied to the specific area of the codification of ethical 
judgements. And in this particular case, as in the general case, the problem, as Michael 
Scriven writes, is that
[T]he fundamental experimental element is the human being, or his responses, enormously
complex in structure and function and reared in an enormously complex environment.22
Scriven here makes reference to two central points that make for difficulties in 
formulating any set of general laws for explaining or predicting human behaviour -  the 
complexity of the world itself and the complexity of the human beings that inhabit it. 
One may simply see the former point in terms of the novel and unpredictable situations 
that will continually arise in the world for us to deal with. This systematic 
unpredictability23 stems from the idea that the world will continually throw out new and 
more complex situations for us to deal with that our current best set of principles will 
be unprepared for. It is this sheer unpredictability that causes problems for codification 
in our ethical cases for we never know what new situations will arise given the open 
nature of the system.
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The second point tells us that this systematic unpredictability applies not only to ‘the 
world’ but also to human beings and in particular to their continually evolving 
conceptual schemes, causing further forms of uncodifiability.
The problem here is that conceptual innovation, it is said, is unpredictable since to 
predict it at any sufficient level of complexity would involve familiarity with a whole 
range of concepts that have not yet been thought of. Basically, the idea is that it seems 
implausible that such innovation can take place ‘before its time’ so to speak. As Fay 
writes, for example, the prediction of Marxist theory in the 1600’s would require our 
predictor to be familiar with all sorts of concepts such as exploitation and alienation 
that themselves depend on various philosophical schemes. And surely the prediction of 
all of this is a practical impossibility.24
In fact the two factors that Scriven mentions maybe very closely related if one accepts 
the sort of cognitive pluralism that we saw Soloveitchik advocating in chapter three. 
For the fact that according to him our very own conceptual schemes partially constitute 
the very subject matter that we are studying in the social sciences means that the 
situations that the world presents us with will vary with those very conceptual schemes. 
Brian Fay gives us a good illustration of this in his discussion of the emergence of the 
idea of individual political rights in seventeenth century Western Europe which also 
serves to illustrate the direct relevance of this point to the kinds of ethical questions that 
we are focussing on.
[PJeople gradually came to understand themselves and others as the possessors of 
individual rights. Now, this new self-understanding marks the occurrence of a real 
conceptual innovation that not only changed the way people . . .  talked about their political 
relationships and institutions, it also altered the very nature of these relationships and 
institutions as well. For example, governments had limits placed on their activity which 
they never had before, and they had duties to perform -  such as defending the civil liberties 
of their citizens -  that were essentially new.25
This particular example shows us how certain ‘principles’ that may have been 
considered true under one conceptual scheme, such as the denial of any justifiable 
rebellion for example, could be considered false under a new one in which the violation 
of certain rights might now be seen to justify rebellion in certain circumstances. This 
means that as well as having to limit our principles to certain societies, we also have to 
limit them to certain times within those societies. Thus the complexity of the social 
world is dependent on our interrelationship with the social world. What we find 
therefore is a feedback mechanism of complexity between the world and our conceptual 
schemes which leads to the problem of uncodifiability. Specifically with reference to
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our ethical problem, any set of ethical principles is bound to be confounded either by a 
novel situation or, over time, by a change in the conceptual framework through which 
we view our ethical situation.
However, it has been argued that this complexity can in fact be eliminated. Thus Lee 
McIntyre has appealed to the fact that situations are only complex under descriptions, 
not as such. This of course means that in the social sciences we may be able to 
redescribe the situation so as to eliminate the complexity and formulate a set of laws. 
What McIntyre suggests is simply that we may be able to redescribe the phenomena in 
terms of a new social scientific scheme. The idea here it seems to me is not that the 
social sciences contain Davidson’s heteronomic generalisations - generalisations that 
lead us to believe that a precise law can only be stated in terms of some other 
conceptual scheme. We need not hold that the social phenomena can only be subject to 
law if redescribed in natural scientific terms. Redescription can go on ‘in-house’. Thus, 
in physics itself for example, redescribing complex phenomena that do not seem to fall 
under any current law so as to bring them under a set of different, but nonetheless 
physical, laws has been part and parcel of scientific progress. Were it not, we would 
still all be attempting to explain things in terms of the Aristotelian notions of matter and 
form. But this redescription does not mean that physics is full of heteronomic 
generalisations. What science has done is created new physical concepts in order to 
recategorise the data which may well have been too complex to be captured at one level 
of description, but can now be explained at this new level. Similarly then one might 
hold that the same could hold of the social sciences.
Why think that the subject matter of social science is fixed by a single level of interest, at 
which laws are unavailable? Surely there are more descriptive categorisations than have 
been previously discovered in our social scientific enquiry. Thus the prospect of 
redescription holds out the possibility of social scientific laws.26
However, it seems to me that McIntyre is committing a petitio principii here. The 
argument seems to be that it must be possible to formulate laws for the social sciences 
since the so called obstacle of complexity can be eliminated in the same way that 
recalcitrant phenomena in natural science have been subjected to law - by redescription. 
But why are we to assume that redescription in the social sciences can always eliminate 
the problems of complexity? To say that it can is to assume that the successful method 
of redescription that is used in the natural sciences can be assumed to have similar 
success in social science. But that is precisely the question at issue here. For the
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problem of whether or not we can always redescribe phenomena so as to be able to 
formulate laws in the social sciences is an instance of the general question of whether 
or not the social sciences are amenable to a natural scientific treatment. And surely 
therefore one cannot argue that the social sciences are amenable to natural scientific 
treatment by supposing that we can eliminate complexity in the natural sciences 
through redescription and must therefore be able to in social science. For that is to 
assume that the social sciences must be amenable to natural scientific treatment, which 
is precisely the point at issue.
Thus, it seems that there are indeed different levels of discourse here that we must deal 
with. And even if the two are co-extensive, that one is reducible without remainder to 
another cannot be assumed. Indeed, the level at which complexity exists seems to be the 
one that we are interested to study and we feel that any recategorisation would therefore 
need to retain this complexity in order to be genuinely explanatory of the subject matter 
that we are concerned with. Complexity seems to be constitutive in some way of human 
experience rather than some accidental accretion to be eliminated. With specific 
reference to uncodifiability in the moral case, moral conflicts may be thought to 
illustrate this point. For the elimination of the complexity in such cases would seem to 
deny their very essence as moral conflicts. That is not to say that in some cases we 
might be able to eliminate conflicts by utilising a new conceptual scheme. Indeed, we 
are not saying that redescription cannot take place. But the possibility in principle of 
eliminating all such conflict seems to misrepresent our moral experience.
While McIntyre is therefore correct to say that Scriven is ‘wrong to think that social
inquiry must therefore be carried out only in terms of the particular vocabulary that has
01heretofore framed our interest’ , he is wrong if he thinks that an adequate redescription 
can avoid the problem of uncodifiability. The evidence seems to show that no 
redescription can take into account the problems of complexity and unpredictability 
and formulate principles that will hold for future situations that may call upon entirely 
new conceptual schemes. Indeed, this unpredictability may even help us to explain the 
sense we have that the levels of description (and even of redescription) that we are 
interested in as social scientists will have to retain the complexity that McIntyre wants 
us to remove. For the unpredictability of our conceptual schemes seems to be a function 
of what it is to be reflective human beings who change (or more optimistically 
progress) over time to new standpoints. It is because we are reflective and creative 
beings that we cannot predict the future of our conceptual schemes. And it is the fact
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that we are such creatures that stimulates an interest in social science. Thus the very 
factor that creates the discipline of social science also makes for the problem of 
unpredictability that belies its attempts to form laws. It seems to me therefore that we 
cannot eliminate the problems that make for uncodifiability and at the same time do 
justice to the contribution of human creativity to our practices.
We must concede, as Scriven does, that we can never rule out the possibility that there 
are such principles that we could eventually formulate by some a priori argument. 
Scriven believes that he is giving an argument based on empirical evidence that helps to 
explain why the social sciences have been so unsuccessful in formulating laws. 
However, it seems as if we are being asked to believe that there just are certain 
principles despite that fact that we cannot presently formulate them and have no good 
reason to believe that we ever will be able to. Indeed, all the evidence seems to point us 
in the opposite direction.
Let us then attempt to sum up our uncodifiability thesis. The basic idea is that our moral 
outlook, which, according to McDowell, has to involve some sort of justification of 
those concerns that we act upon rather than a simple statement of what they are, cannot 
be codified in a set of principles that are at once true and applicable to our experience. 
This is because the principles pick out properties atomistically and therefore though 
they might strictly speaking be true, they do not apply to the real life situations that 
concern us. Furthermore, any attempt to fill out the principles so as to make them apply 
to these real life situations can never keep up with the inevitable complexity and 
unpredictability of our moral experience. The sheer unpredictability of the moral 
situations that we are presented with means that any set of principles will inevitably be 
outstripped and falsified by experience. Any set of principles will turn out in the 
fullness of time to treat too specific a set of properties.
This extended uncodifiability thesis therefore ends up as a problem even for our 
minimal PoT theorist. The problem is that any set of principles will be refuted by the 
holistic behaviour of the properties that they appeal to, and this will hold true whether 
these principles are in any way objective and universal or not. The important point that 
the uncodifiability thesis makes is that whatever principles the reflective equilibrium 
theorist holds will always inevitably turn out to be the wrong ones. The principles will 
always be, so to speak, one step behind the judgements for according to the 
uncodifiability thesis the process of forming the correct principles out of our considered 
judgements is going to be never-ending given the continual surprises thrown up by
147
experience. We would never therefore arrive at the correct principles that codify the 
practice for they will always eventually be shown to be inadequate. Any code that 
appeals to a set of principles will be inadequate to the task of subsuming the practice.
6. How is uncodifiability relevant to the PoT Approach?
It is very important now to link up the points regarding uncodifiability to our PoT 
theory directly. For Furrow concludes that what the uncodifiability thesis leads to is the 
idea that moral principles ‘are not action-guiding in any case requiring deliberation... I 
am claiming that moral evaluation is not mediated by principles.’28 Now it seems to me 
that this conclusion can be taken in two ways -  pragmatically or metaphysically. On a 
pragmatic reading, the point would be that as a matter of psychological fact, we do not 
use principles in moral evaluation. Thus they are not action-guiding in the literal sense 
of actually guiding our actions. However, the PoT theorist is less concerned with the 
pragmatic question regarding our use of principles in deliberation and more concerned 
with what we will term the metaphysical question of whether or not the principles are 
true and can therefore justify our judgements. The concern for the PoT theorist is, as 
Richard Hare has written, not ‘to take too utilitarian an attitude towards philosophical 
theses; let it suffice that they are true, and let it be left to the future to determine 
whether any useful results follow from them.’ 29 Let us look then at the pragmatic and 
metaphysical questions in turn in order to distinguish them and work out exactly how 
the uncodifiability thesis is relevant to the PoT theorist.
Beginning with the pragmatic question, according to Furrow, the complexity and 
unpredictability of real life situations means that our principles cannot be action guiding 
in situations requiring deliberation. What though would it mean for them to be action 
guiding? Take the everyday example of going into a shop to buy a chocolate bar. The 
fact that I go in and pay for the bar rather than stealing it might be thought to be guided 
by the principle that stealing is wrong. Now phenomenologically this does not actually 
seem to be what goes on. We seem just intuitively to know what to do and do not need 
to derive it from some principle. Nonetheless, derivation from principles is not a 
possibility that we need rule out on grounds of complexity. For though it might be true 
that we cannot state our principles in such a way as to make them exceptionless, it 
seems undeniable that in such cases we could allow for the possibility of deliberation 
using such false principles. And given this, Furrow should not and seemingly does not 
deny that we could use moral principles in an action guiding fashion in clear cases. We
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could carry out our deliberations in this way. However, Furrow’s conclusion is only that 
principles are not action guiding in cases requiring deliberation, for they do not apply to 
those more complex cases.30 It seems to me though, that we can extend the argument 
that principles may be action guiding even to situations requiring deliberation, contra 
Furrow.
We can illustrate this by analogy to a point made by Nancy Cartwright in her use of a 
form of our extended uncodifiability thesis for physics. Cartwright argues that in 
physics there are no exceptionless laws.31 The universal law of gravitation for example
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between them and directly as the product of their masses. But the law as stated is false 
of the majority of situations in the actual world that we wish to explain, given the 
variety of other factors that affect this relationship in real situations. Implicit in this law 
therefore are a number of ceteris paribus clauses so that the law that is in fact true is a 
ceteris paribus law that ‘other things being equal’ the universal law of gravitation holds 
as stated. The problem of course is that other things rarely are thus equal in the actual 
world and any attempt at an exhaustive statement of these ceteris paribus conditions in 
order to end up with the true law will always fall prey to exceptions and will anyway 
only apply, if at all, to those very few cases in which all these ceteris paribus conditions 
hold, i. e. under laboratory conditions. This just seems to be another example of the 
point that we have been making regarding moral cases. Basically, we state that a certain 
property makes an act right, which as it stands would be a false statement. In the moral 
case therefore we need a ceteris paribus clause that isolates this property from all 
others. But this makes our moral principle true at the expense of making it irrelevant to 
the real life situations in which we do not have these ‘laboratory conditions’ to work 
with. Thus, as in Cartwight’s example, the true principle does not apply to real life 
situations and as such cannot subsume them.
However, Cartwright believes that physics provides us with an example of a discipline 
in which the false laws are used to great pragmatic effect for in physics false laws can 
be used to explain real situations. Indeed, Cartwright believes that most of our 
explanations are of this sort. Thus, for example, she holds that the explanation for her 
camellias dying was that they were planted in hot soil, even though there is no true law 
that states that camellias planted in hot soil will die. Moreover, in this case some of 
the camellias did not die, for the soil was also rich and some camellias flourish in rich 
soil. Thus we have a complex case here in which there are many competing properties.
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Nonetheless we explain by appeal to a false law that only appeals to one of them -  that 
camellias die if planted in hot soil. It seems therefore that these laws have at the very 
least an important pragmatic role to play in explanation in science despite being false.33 
The same, it appears to me, can be said for our ethical principles. The (false) principle 
that stealing is wrong might well serve to guide our action, and it might even do so in a 
case with competing properties. As Dancy concedes, moral principles should be seen as 
‘reminders of the sort of importance that a property can have in suitable 
circumstances’.34 Some properties are morally relevant more often than others and our 
principles remind us of this and therefore can be helpful in our moral deliberations. So 
Furrow is wrong to say that the principles cannot be used in an action guiding fashion 
or cannot mediate our decisions, even in cases involving deliberation. It is just that the 
ones that would do so, if indeed they do, are inevitably false.
Now there are certainly all sorts of important questions that Cartwright’s particular 
application of the uncodifiability thesis to physics raises.35 But allowing for the sake of 
argument that false principles could play a pragmatic role in our deliberations, the 
important point here is that these principles, even when they do guide our action, are 
acknowledged to be false and this leads us back to our metaphysical question. For the 
important point for our PoT theorist is that what we are interested in here is the 
normative priority of principles. And this means that even if we accept that false 
principles may be a useful heuristic device in decision making the fact that they are 
false means that they cannot possibly be the factors that justify our actual practices. 
They may be capable of playing a pragmatic role in my thought processes, but they 
cannot be what actually justifies the action from a normative perspective. The fact 
therefore is that they can play a pragmatic role in our deliberations much as false 
principles play a pragmatic role in scientific explanation according to Cartwright. But in 
our normative situation we are looking to justify our practices which we can only do if 
we have the correct principles to work with. One could not appeal to a principle to 
justify an act as being correct if the principle is false.
The point that the uncodifiability thesis makes therefore is that the ceteris paribus 
principles are either true of cases that we will rarely if ever encounter and thus simply 
not applicable to real cases and at best useful heuristic devices. As false heuristic 
devices, the pragmatic point is all very well, but will not serve any normative purpose 
for the PoT theorist. For surely we cannot use false principles to justify our practices. 
Moreover, even if the principles appear true of certain limited cases, given the problem
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of unpredictability they will inevitably be falsified in due course anyway. The point 
then is that though we might well use principles to guide our actions, they cannot justify 
those actions for the principles that so guide our actions are false. And this it seems to 
me is the real force of the uncodifiability thesis. Thus we turn Hare’s aforementioned 
claim regarding principles on its head. It turns out that maybe we could take a utilitarian 
attitude towards them, but even so, they are not in fact true.
The point that we therefore end up making against the PoT theorist is not that every 
situation presents morally competing properties that render us incapable of making our
mrvrol rlopj ei rvn c W a  anrl A  r \ m ol-o cnr*Vi /lopicf a« o  fJinnrrU fk o ra  to a rroruiina
AA1VAU1 UI^VlUlVllUi f T V VU11 UliU UV 111U1VW JUWI UWVUlV/ilO) tllU U gll UlViV/ U  U gWAAWAXXAW
question about whether or not we do so using principles. The problem rather is that the 
simple principles that we supposedly use to make these decisions are actually false. 
And the specification of the conditions that would make the principles true would 
always remain an endless task.
In conclusion then, what the uncodifiability thesis shows us is that the generality of the 
principles that was thought to be the factor that allowed them to classify various diverse 
actions together turns out to be something of an illusion. The principles do not subsume 
the very cases they were formulated to cover. This of course is something of a 
hindrance to their deliberative and justificatory utility and therefore a significant 
problem for our PoT theorist, since the necessary condition for rationalising a practice 
cannot now be met. We cannot formulate a set of principles that serve as the basis for 
the assessment of our practices for we cannot formulate a set of principles that might 
subsume the practice at all. The PoT theorist seems to have set himself a practically 
impossible task.
7. Uncodifiability and Rationalising the Commandments.
We can now apply our arguments directly to our models of rationalising the 
commandments. If we take the Maimonidean attempt at rationalisation, it just does 
seem implausible, as Dancy said, to think that all the very different practices and 
judgements of Judaism share some common property that always justifies them. At the 
level of individual practices our craving for generality leads us to attempt to reduce 
each particular practice to some common rational essence. But it seems artificial to 
isolate one component that they supposedly all have in common and more importantly 
that this common property, even if it does exist, acts in precisely the same way in each 
particular practice. Each practice differs to such a great extent that it seems implausible
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to think that just because a certain property makes a particular practice rational, it can 
be codified into a principle that can then be used to justify all the various practices 
regardless of their other properties. Particularly when justifying the very different norms 
of low theory, it would seem as if each practice has its own unique features that we are 
abstracting away from in attempting to form general justificatory principles. So looking 
again to our Maimonidean model, though a commandments’ means-end relationship to 
man’s contemplative end would rationally justify it in the absence of any other 
properties, with the sacrificial cult for example, the existence of a whole variety of 
other important factors, be they historical, moral, or whatever, seems to vitiate the so- 
called general relevance of that means-end relationship.
A similar argument holds for Soloveitchik who attempts to understand each halakhic 
decision in terms of a halakhic principle that that serves to systematise a set of such 
decisions. Though he does not appeal to a single foundational principle, the plural 
principles that he does posit will inevitably be outstripped by the unpredictable nature 
of the world to which they are being applied. The halakhic norm cannot be finally 
codified and will need to adapt to the changing world, and any properties or concepts 
that are thought to justify the norm can be expected to turn out not to do so. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note in this regard that one of the problems that Sagi has with 
Soloveitchik’s halakhic philosophy is that the theoretical construct that is 
Soloveitchik’s halakhic system is supposed to justify our actual halakhic decisions. And 
the problem is that in many real cases, the deductive paradigm that Soloveitchik thinks 
applies to the conceptual system in the abstract may not actually work in reality. Indeed, 
Sagi points out that Soloveitchik himself mentions certain areas where the deductive 
paradigm does not hold for real situations that cannot be seen to fall under the halakhic 
concepts that we have formed. In such cases, writes Sagi, an ‘intuitive response’ is 
called for, or at least a response that cannot be deduced as the logical conclusion of a 
deductive argument from a set of abstract principles. Soloveitchik himself therefore 
seems to tacitly recognise the problem of uncodifiability in his philosophy of halakhah
37
Having said that though, in Judaism it appears as if the halakhah itself just is a set of 
principles at least at the level of low theory. We do seem to have a low theory 
codification in the Halakhah, which has been set out in various codes in post-Talmudic 
times. Thus it appears as if Judaism might be an empirical counterexample to the 
uncodifiability thesis. It is interesting therefore to note that a form of the uncodifiability
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thesis seems to exist as an undercurrent within Judaism itself. Nachmanides writing in 
full knowledge of the Maimonidean codification, comments as follows on 
Deuteronomy 6:18:
AND THOU SHALT DO THAT WHICH IS RIGHT AND GOOD IN THE SIGHT OF 
THE ETERNAL. . . .  At first he [Moses] stated that you are to keep His statutes and His 
testimonies which He commanded you and now he is stating that even where He ahs not 
commanded you, give thought, as well, to do what is good and right in His eyes, for He 
loves the good and the right. Now this is a great principle, for it is impossible to mention in 
the Torah all aspects of man’s conduct with his neighbours and friends, and all his various 
transactions and the ordinances of all societies and countries. But since he mentioned many 
of them . . .  he reverted to state in a general way that, in all matters, one should do what is 
good and right including even compromise and, going beyond the requirements of the 
law.38
The point that Nachmanides is making here is that the Torah can cite particular cases 
and give general guidelines but this does not and cannot amount to a definitive 
codification of how to live. All that we can do is say that one should do what is right 
and good which as a general principle is true but trivial as far as guiding action is 
concerned. Similarly, Walter Wurzburger, quoting R. Naftali Tzvi Berlin notes
Jewish morality transcends mere obedience to explicit rules of a legal code. R. Berlin notes 
that, although the Torah contains numerous specific commandments, the Sinaitic covenant 
cannot dispense with the general norm ‘to become a holy people,’ because ever changing 
historic realities make it impossible for any finite set of specific legal ordinances to meet 
the requirements of all possible circumstances.39
Indeed, it has been argued that in a sense attempts at codification are actually an 
anathema to the original intent of Judaism. From the outset Judaism has appreciated the 
problems of applying a written text such as the Torah to the ever-changing lives of its 
adherents. This problem of how to apply the seemingly simplest rules to the ever- 
changing realities of life was solved by Judaism in the form of the Oral Torah or Torah 
she’baal Peh, which is intended to be the interpretation of the written Torah that allows 
for its continuing application to the world. This is what produces the halakhah. As 
Eliezer Berkovits has written:
The essence of the Oral Torah is the Halakhah. As the root of the word indicates (halokh, 
to walk, to go), the Halakhah teaches the way along which the Jew is required to walk in 
accordance with the Torah. Halakhah is the application of the Torah to life. But since there 
is no such thing as life in general, since it is always a certain form of life at a specific time 
of history, in a specific situation, Torah application means application to a specific time in 
a specific situation.40
The idea of the halakhah was supposed to reflect the truth of the uncodifiability thesis 
and allow for the continuing application of the written Torah to the ever-changing
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realities of Jewish existence. What was needed was the continual assessment and 
reassessment of particular situations rather than the mechanical application of a set of 
subsumptive principles that were set down in stone. However, the political upheavals 
endured by the Jewish people led to the felt need to commit this oral tradition to writing 
in various stages and this reaches its apotheosis in the codes of Jewish law that were 
intended to give a comprehensive list of principles for Jews to live by. Yet Berkovits 
insists:
The very idea of codification violates the essence of the Torah she’baal Peh. According to 
one furmulaiion in the Talmud, those who write down haiaknot are like peopie who bum 
the Torah. . . . Codification is contrary to the very nature of Halakhah. It works like 
shackles upon its creative vigour.41
The point here is that the commandments have to be applied to the very same real life 
situations that we apply our ethical ‘principles’ to. But the nature of that experience is 
such that we cannot in fact apply a rigid set of principles in such a way as to dictate 
what to do in each particular situation or justify that decision. The existence of 
exceptional cases means that in fact the simple principles would be false and would not 
in fact be any use in those cases from the justificatory point of view. We can of course 
nonetheless admit that many commandments do seem to be applied unproblematically 
to clear-cut cases despite their inevitable ceteris paribus nature. But again this is a 
pragmatic point rather than one concerned with justification. Indeed, Berkovits 
appreciates the pragmatic necessity of codification at a certain time. He believes that 
codification was an example of ‘dissolving the Torah in order to act for God’ i.e. an 
example of the need in exceptional circumstances to disobey the Torah in order to 
preserve its long-term efficacy. So the initial empirical objection that Judaism has been 
codified should not be taken to imply that it is genuinely codifiable. Codification might 
in fact deform Judaism for the very reasons that the uncodifiability thesis draws our 
attention to.
In conclusion then, we have now seen that we can question the very possibility of 
forming the sorts of systematising principles that the PoT theorist holds to be necessary 
for justification. Where then does this leaves us with regards to practical justifications? 
Does it mean that we are left without the possibility of justifying practices? This, of 
course would only be the case if there were no other options. However, in order to find 
these other options we need to approach the whole issue of practical justification from a 
different angle
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8. A Functional Approach.
Nozick comments that to ‘justify a principle, you specify its function and show that it 
effectively performs that function and does this more effectively than others would 
given the costs, constraints and so forth.’42 What I intend to do in what follows is take a 
just such a functional approach to the analysis of the nature of justification itself. I have 
drawn this approach from Edward Craig who uses it in his Knowledge and the State o f 
Nature43 to analyse our concept of knowledge. Traditional attempts to define 
knowledge hy formulating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
application of the term have failed. Craig therefore suggests a different, practical 
approach to the whole enterprise.
We take some prima facie plausible hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does 
for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role would 
be like, what conditions would govern its application.44
This he terms a ‘practical explication’ of the concept of knowledge and with it he hopes 
to improve our understanding of the concept without falling into the traps to which the 
traditional approach leaves itself open.
Now, we have so far seen that the concept of justification has been applied to a practice 
if and only if it can be subsumed under a set of relevant general principles. This is seen 
as a necessary and sufficient condition of the practice being justified. However, we 
have seen that this ‘traditional analysis’ of justification can be called into question with 
regard to practices. A new approach to the question therefore would seem to be 
worthwhile and given that we are searching for a practical form of rationality, Craig’s 
practical approach to conceptual analysis may well serve our purposes for justification.
45
What though is the function of a justification? It is interesting to note Joseph Raz’s 
comments regarding the method of reflective equilibrium as a justificatory method in 
relation to this.
The method of reflective equilibrium cannot be the method of moral theory unless it 
provides us with grounds for confidence in our views, and not only with an understanding 
of their implications regarding which we were in doubt.46
We cannot, according to Raz, construe the method of reflective equilibrium as a 
justificatory method since it does not give us confidence in our beliefs even if it gives 
us a form of understanding47 Both, it appears, are necessary for us to have a
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justification. We have mentioned now a number of times the difference between 
Explanatory and Normative PoT theories and it seems as if this difference can be 
understood in terms of the presence or absence of such confidence. Let us take it 
therefore, that what we require of a justification is that it yields both understanding and 
confidence.
However, in order for us to speak of a justification the nature of the relationship 
between the understanding and the confidence is central. Confidence, as a 
psychological state, can of course be engendered by any number of factors. The mere 
simultaneous existence of understanding and confidence therefore cannot be a mark of 
a justification. What would be required is that the confidence be related to this 
understanding in some non-accidental fashion. If we accept for the moment a PoT 
rendering of this understanding in terms of discursive beliefs we can probably best put 
this link counterfactually:
If A did not have beliefs Bi -  Bn concerning P then A would not have confidence in P.
It is this reasoned confidence that interests us, one that is grounded in the understanding 
of the practice and that is a result of this understanding. I suspect that stating the precise 
nature of this link in some general indefeasible way will turn out to be a futile exercise 
that will meet the same fate as bygone attempts to delineate necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge. No doubt clever Gettier type counterexamples could be 
found in which the confidence is convolutedly linked to the understanding and yet we 
would balk at the suggestion that we had an example of a justified belief. However, it 
seems to me that we can state generally that the question of the justification of practices 
is a question of how we gain confidence grounded in understanding, leaving discussion 
of when this grounding is in evidence to a case by case analysis. Let us take it therefore 
that the function of a justification is to produce a reasoned confidence in rational 
agents. What would produce this reasoned confidence?
The first thing to note here is that in the theoretical sphere the PoT approach creates 
such reasoned confidence very well. What gives us a reasoned confidence in a 
proposition is the possession of some form of propositional argument. For example, if 
we take a mathematical proposition, the way that we justify it is by appeal to further 
propositions that make up a proof. Mathematical proof consists of a relationship,
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usually deductive, between propositions. This allows us to explain the proposition in 
question and have confidence in it.
Now in this particular example it might seem somewhat strange to separate the notion 
of a proof and our confidence in it. On the one hand, whether or not I have confidence 
in a proof seems irrelevant if the proof meets various requisite logical conditions such 
as soundness and validity. If we are speaking from the perspective of a rational agent, 
then insofar as he is rational, he is (rationally) bound to hold a belief with confidence 
once he is in possession of a proof. The idea of having two things here, a belief and 
confidence in it, strikes us as artificial for there is no gap that needs be bridged by 
confidence for a rational agent once he is in possession of a proof. The very belief in the 
proposition in itself constitutes ones confidence in it. Should one not have this 
confidence in the conclusion, one would assume that it was because of a perceived fault 
in the propositional reasoning and therefore one would not believe the proposition 
either. However, I will hold onto this artificial structure since it may be in order for 
non-deductive propositional arguments and more centrally it is important for drawing 
the contrast that we will be making between justifying propositions and justifying 
actions.
We should also note that this confidence can be gained by being told by an expert on a 
subject that a certain proposition, say, is true. But the reason we have confidence in the 
judgement of the expert is our belief that he or she has the form of understanding that 
we have been appealing to. In the theoretical sphere then let us propose the following 
structure to a justification for a rational agent A in a belief S:
A has a justification for S iff
1) A’s belief that S is a result of accepting a propositional proof P,
Or
A’s belief that S is based on the judgement of an expert who accepts P as a result of 
a propositional proof
2) A has confidence in his belief that S as a result of condition 1.
The main point is that we have to have a reasoned confidence in whatever it is we are 
justifying and in the theoretical sphere, the PoT idea of justifications as propositional 
structures produces this state.
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Let us now turn though to the practical sphere. Here we are interested in justifying an 
action for an agent. We wish here for a reasoned confidence in an action that will lead 
us to the practical equivalent of believing S in the theoretical case, which would be 
being disposed to perform the action in appropriate circumstances as a result of our 
reasoned confidence. But here I do not believe the PoT approach will give us this 
reasoned confidence.
Firstly of course, there are the considerations regarding uncodifiability. These 
considerations, if correct, would mean that we could not construct a general 
propositional argument for the action in the first place. But even conceding for the sake 
of argument that it might be possible to do so, our point is that our confidence in a 
certain action is not ultimately a function of such arguments. For it is, as we have 
mentioned, entirely possible for an agent to have a thorough propositional 
understanding of a certain practice, of all the various conceptual structures within that 
practice and the manner in which they are embodied in action, without actually having 
confidence in it. In the practical sphere, it seems that a propositional structure can only 
account for the understanding in an explanatory sense. I might well have a whole 
network of beliefs regarding a certain practice that are true at a descriptive level and 
that I would accept as such, but I would not have a reasoned confidence in the practice 
at a prescriptive level. Our distinction therefore between having a belief and having 
confidence in it ceases at this point to be artificial.
Of course, one might argue, in the manner of John McDowell, that in this case the 
observer’s conception of the practice is not the same as that of the practitioner for 
whom it is justified.48 We cannot speak of them as having the same understanding if 
there remains such a difference in their practical dispositions. In a sense this is precisely 
the point that the anti-PoT theorist will be making. For he will argue that though we 
share a certain propositional understanding, the fact that we have different 
understandings of those propositions must stem from something extra-propositional. 
Propositional understanding is not the whole of practical understanding and it is this 
further element that is missing from an explanatory PoT theory.
In conclusion therefore, we have encountered a whole variety of problems for the PoT 
approach. We firstly saw that even if we relax the conditions of justification so as to 
allow simple systematisation to count as a justification, the whole enterprise of 
systematic codification seems doomed to failure. Moreover, even if we could codify our 
practices, the principles so formed would not actually justify our practices in terms of
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giving us a reasoned confidence. As Bernard Williams correctly perceives, confidence 
in a practice cannot be seen as a form of propositional knowledge for regardless of the 
considerations regarding uncodifiability, a propositional approach ‘ignores the obvious 
fact that no amount of faith in cognitive certainty will actually bring about ethical 
conviction if we cannot agree on what we are supposed to be certain.’49 The point here 
seems to be that propositional arguments cannot convince if we are beginning from 
different propositions, or indeed if we are beginning from the same propositions but as 
observers rather than practitioners. On the one hand the reflective equilibrium theorist 
seems to appreciate this by insisting that ethical reflection begin from lived experience. 
However, the main emphasis in the subsequent process of justification is on the 
principles, which is problematic not only because of uncodifiability but also because of 
our inability to agree on those principles as certain justificatory foundations. We 
illegitimately assume that as in science the explanatory function of such principles also 
shows that our theory, and by implication therefore our practice, is justified. We have 
argued that this is not the case. But what would give us our reasoned confidence in a 
practice if not these propositional arguments? It is to this question that we finally turn.
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Chapter six
The Priority of Practice 
We have been arguing that according to the PoT theorist, just as naturalistic theories 
explain particular propositions by subsumption under general propositions, justificatory 
theories for practices must be sets of general propositions, in this case practical 
principles at some level of abstraction, that similarly justify particular instances by 
subsumption. However, given the problems that we have seen to be inherent in such an 
approach, the belief that the PoT approach is the exclusive one to justification in all 
realms, be they theoretical or practical appears to me to be an unjustified prejudice.1 In 
this chapter therefore we will be arguing for an alternative approach that we will term 
the Priority of Practice (PoP). It is an approach that I believe has its roots in a Jewish 
world view and the first steps towards it are found in some of the tentative remarks that 
Soloveitchik makes in his second model of rationalisation. Moreover, though never 
explicitly developed as such, it seems to be latent in the approaches of certain 
contemporary philosophers, in particular Charles Taylor.
The failure of the various discursive approaches to justification that we have discussed 
seems to open a gap for the rather different account of the justification of practices that 
we will be offering. Foundationalism, construed in the strong sense as an attempt to 
find an Archimedean point independent of any of our beliefs with which we can 
confront those beliefs has been alleged, not only in the ethical sphere, to be inherently 
absurd. But the retreat to a coherentist picture such as reflective equilibrium leads one 
into circular justifications. In a general discussion of justification that focuses on the 
work of Donald Davidson, Ernest Sosa therefore asks whether such argumentative or 
discursive justification is always required for knowledge.
For if some sort of epistemic authority can come to a belief independently of any justifying 
of it by argument from premises, and if such epistemic authority can help to make a belief 
knowledge even in the absence of any justifying of that belief by argument from premises, 
then we might after all have a source of epistemic authority that is neither ‘confrontational’ 
nor ‘coherential. . . . No argument we have yet seen rules out the possibility of a source of 
justification or authority not constituted by any reasoning or arguing at all, or by any 
testing properly so-called’. 2
It is just this sort of approach that I believe Jewish philosophy can offer as an 
alternative to the various ‘argumentative’ alternatives. For the simple idea that I believe 
we find in classical Judaism is that practice yields the reasoned confidence that we are 
seeking in our practices, giving us the very epistemic authority for those practices that
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Sosa seeks more generally. Practice we will argue, is the non-argumentative foundation 
that would fill the epistemic gap. However, the gap in itself establishes nothing of 
course. In order to argue for the PoP picture, we need to set it out in a positive fashion. 
The PoP hypothesis itself is quite simple to state. The PoP theorist holds that the 
rationality of a practice cannot be reduced to that of a set of discursive principles. The 
practice itself rather than any alleged propositional representation of it, contains its own 
rationality, a non-discursive form of rationality that is irreducibly practical. 
Corresponding to this ‘metaphysical’ claim concerning rationality, the PoP theorist 
makes the epistemological claim that there is such a thing as practical knowledge in a 
substantive sense that cannot be reduced to knowledge of principles and that can only 
be fully understood by participation in the practice itself. To put it in terms of our 
functional approach, practice yields a reasoned confidence in a practice. Actual practice 
rather than abstract theorising is the mode of access to a practical form of rationality 
and as such it becomes indispensable for practical justifications.3 
All of this contrasts to the PoT approach, which only allows that there can be such a 
thing as practical knowledge if it is in fact reducible to some set of propositions. As 
Joel Weinsheimer comments
The human sciences are characterised by a practical knowledge that is itself knowledge, 
rather than merely the subsequent application of knowledge in practice. Technologism, the 
principle that we must first ‘know’ and only afterwards ‘do’ has not faded away.. .4
This PoT prejudice is certainly deeply ingrained and these initial comments regarding 
the PoP approach may therefore seem counterintuitive. Our task therefore will be to 
further elucidate the PoP approach in order to make it more plausible. However, in a 
sense the PoP approach will be pulling itself up by its own bootstraps since inevitably it 
does not justify itself by means of a PoT approach. Then again, the PoT approach could 
not justify itself by means of a PoT approach either on pain of circularity so we are 
simply left with our models of justification and the decision regarding which is more 
compelling must be taken on other less algorithmic grounds. My object will be to 
elucidate this PoP approach by first discussing a classical Jewish view of the 
relationship between theory and practice and then locating it within a more general 
philosophical framework. We will then show how this PoP approach can address a 
number of problems that the PoT approaches left open.
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1. Theory and Practice in Judaism
Generally, a distinction is made in Judaism between two realms of discourse: the 
Aggadic and the Halakhic. The Halakhah as we have already seen is the normative 
legal framework of Judaism, the rules and regulations. Aggadah, on the other hand, was 
the term originally used to denote the non-legal parts of the Talmud involving for 
example, homiletic interpretations of the bible and it was traditionally seen as the 
repository of Jewish philosophy. Thus, for Maimonides, the subject matter of Aggadah 
was in fact the universal subject matter of physics and metaphysics ‘with which 
philosophers consumed a whole lifetime’,5 albeit clothed in a homiletic form so as to be 
amenable to alternative interpretations for those uninitiated into the rigours of such 
disciplines. More recently Jonathan Sacks has used the term Aggadah as the generic 
term for anything that falls outside of the legal Halakhic realm, thereby including, for 
example, all modes of philosophical and mystical discourse.6 According to this 
definition, the commandments themselves and the legal developments of them i. e. the 
practice, would constitute the halakhah, while the theory that serves to rationalise them 
would fall under the rubric of Aggadah.
What is significant from our perspective is that classically Jews and Judaism defined 
themselves primarily in terms of halakhah. Thus a Jew was a Jew in virtue of his 
practice of the halakhic norms of Judaism rather than because of adherence to any 
philosophical theories derived from Aggadic sources. This was famously summed up in 
Sa’adia Gaon’s statement that the Jewish nation was ‘a nation only in virtue of its
<7
laws.’ To define oneself as a Jew meant identification with and practice of a specific 
practical way of life, that is, in terms of Halakhah rather than Aggadah. As Yeshayahu 
Liebowitz points out, the concern with theology was, from a criterial point of view, 
secondary.
Judaism was embodied not in an abstract set of beliefs attained by many who had never 
heard of Abraham or the Mosaic Torah, but in the Torah and the Mitzvot. . . . Articles of 
faith were the subject of violent dispute. The very idea of divine unity was interpreted in 
ways which were almost antithetic. Nevertheless, the unity of the community remained 
unimpaired. What Judaism created was a community that maintained the Torah and 
observed its mitzvot, a community that retained its identity despite extreme differences in 
theological opinion. . . .  It was thus not beliefs or opinions that determined the identity of 
Judaism. Its continuity was that of its religious praxis.8
Thus, whilst Christianity and Islam required assent to a set of dogmas, Judaism was 
more concerned with the actual behavioural expressions of faith set down in the 
practical laws of the Torah. With reference to the distinctions made in chapter four, we
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see that Judaism, classically at least, asserted the priority of practice in the process 
sense.9
The problem though is that this heightened value that Judaism places on practice over 
theory has often been taken to show that it takes an arid legalistic approach to religion. 
It is not simply the lack of theology that is thought to be problematic here but the 
emphasis on a practice that it appears must be accepted on the basis of external 
authority regardless of one’s own rational understanding.10 The lack of both a general 
theology and any more particular philosophical rationalisation of the commandments 
seems indicative of a ‘pre-philosophical’ religion at odds with the rational approach -  
the approval of blind faith in an inchoate conception of God leading to blind faith in a 
non-rational practice. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter two, though Philo engaged in 
rationalisation of the commandments in his work, it is commonly acknowledged that 
his influence on mainstream rabbinic thought and even on the medieval philosophers 
who engaged in the project of Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot was virtually non-existent.11 Judaism 
it seems requires adherence to a practice based not on cognition but on trust. Systematic 
theology in general and rationalisations of the commandments in particular seem at best 
optional.
Thus the Jewish faith was classically defined in terms of its practice and a similarly 
behavioural emphasis is found in discussions of Judaism’s attitude to ‘faith’ as a 
particular type of cognitive state (like belief or knowledge). We can look here to the 
well-known distinction between two types of faith corresponding to the distinction 
between ‘belief-in’ and ‘belief-that’. ‘Belief-that’ is a propositional attitude, involving 
an affirmation of certain propositional claims with truth-values. ‘Belief-in’ on the other 
hand is generally taken to involve an evaluative attitude towards something that as H.H. 
Price has argued consists, at least, in esteem for and trust in the object of that belief.12 
Faith can be modelled on either one of these types of belief. Thus, faith might involve 
the affirmation of certain truths on the ‘belief-that’ model. Indeed, the very term for 
faith in Hebrew, emunah, is related etymologically to the term emet meaning truth.13 
This propositional model of faith is formulated most famously in the twelfth century in 
Maimonides’ thirteen principles of faith. This comprehensive set of principles was set 
down as necessary and sufficient for salvation and identification as a Jew. Nonetheless, 
it has been convincingly argued by Menachem Kellner that this credal formulation of 
the Jewish faith did not reflect the classical Jewish view according to which the 
halakhic way of life was seen to be definitive of Judaism rather than the affirmation of 
any canonical set of theoretical dogmas concerning God or the universe. Classically,
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Kellner argues, Judaism saw faith in terms of a trust relationship on the ‘belief-in’ 
model rather than in terms of the affirmation of certain dogmas.14 
What we find in classical Judaism therefore is a further definition of faith analogous to 
‘belief-in’. However, emunah is not simply an attitude of esteem and trust or a certain 
subjective attitude which is a necessary prerequisite for the performance of the 
commandments. According to Judaism, in order to be true emunah this attitudinal 
component has to be expressed in a behavioural commitment to the commandments. It 
cannot remain purely attitudinal. Emunah involves an objective behavioural counterpart 
to the subjective state in order truly to deserve the appellation, again reflecting 
Judaism’s preoccupation with practice. To say that a person has emunah as a term of 
approbation can only be understood if that emunah manifests itself in a behavioural 
commitment to the commandments.
According to Eliezer Berkovits therefore, ‘the Jewish concept of the law and the deed is 
not to be separated from the Jewish concept of faith.’15 Thus, Berkovits has argued that 
the Pauline criticism of the concept of law as the antithesis of faith reflects the fact that 
Christianity and Judaism have very different concepts of faith rather than any Judaic 
rejection of faith in favour of law. The very concept of faith is seen as a practical matter 
rather than a strictly cognitive one. Practice is seen to be central to its definition.16 
However, does this emphasis on practice in Judaism necessarily reflect a rejectionist 
approach towards philosophy or might it rather express an alternative philosophical 
approach? The latter might be suggested by the fact that in Judaism participation in a 
practice which is identified with faith is thought in itself to have cognitive effects as 
Norman Lamm points out in a discussion about the relationship between cognitive faith 
and what he calls functional faith.
[T]he relationship between the cognitive and the functional does not proceed in only one 
direction, from the cognitive to the functional, or from theory to practice. When a Christian 
theologian states that ‘It cannot be required of the man of today that he first accept 
theological truths. . . . Wherever the church in its message makes this primary demand, it 
does not take seriously the situation of many today,’ he is discovering a truth that Judaism 
proclaimed a long time ago: naaseh comes before nishma, halakhah precedes and remains 
unconditioned by theology. Judaism has always maintained that behaviour influences 
belief, that the cognitive may be fashioned by the functional.
The particular cognitive ideas that Lamm is referring to here are traditional theistic 
beliefs such as that God exists and is a unity. Participation in a practice, he believes, 
reinforces the propositional form of faith, ridding us of cognitive doubts concerning it. 
It is not therefore that practice can teach us these propositions. It is rather that it can 
reinforce them. What we find here then is a type of dialectical attempt to hold onto both
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the traditional centrality of the commandments and the medieval rationalist idea of a 
discrete cognitive state of propositional emunah as the ultimate (propositional) end.17 
There is though the possibility of a different way of understanding the relationship 
between practice and cognition that would retain priority for the account of faith that 
sees it as the confidence in and performance of certain practices. The idea here would 
be that functional faith affects our cognitive stance towards functional faith itself rather 
than towards a set of propositions. It is this possibility that is most significant for the 
PoP theorist.18
2. Aristotle and the Cognitive Effects of Practice
The idea that we are beginning to develop here, that practice has cognitive effects, is 
one that is first emphasised in a philosophical milieu by Aristotle. For Aristotle, 
practice is central to our moral development. As Bumyeat puts it, according to Aristotle
we first learn (come to see) what is noble or just not by experience of or induction from a 
series of instances, nor any intuition (intellectual or perceptual), but by learning to do 
noble and just things, by being habituated to noble and just conduct.19
What is stressed here is the idea that only by virtue of practice itself, not theoretical 
instruction, can we develop the moral (or in our specific case religious) capacity to 
judge situations.
It is interesting that this approach which we are claiming has echoes in Jewish attitudes 
to faith follows from the uncodifiability thesis.20 Given the uncodifiability thesis, we 
cannot possibly teach morality by teaching a set of general rules or principles that will 
cover every eventuality for there are no such principles. But how then are we to teach 
people to be moral? Since we cannot simply check our judgements against some 
principle, what needs developing is an ethical sensibility that allows us to judge any 
new situation that presents itself. Aristotle’s ethics, therefore, which stresses 
uncodifiability has to focus on something other than the teaching of principles and as 
such is virtue based. What we need to do according to Aristotle is enable people to 
judge each novel situation as it comes along and this can only be done by inculcating 
dispositions in people so that they become such as to act virtuously. But it is in 
Aristotle’s opinion, by doing just acts that we become just, by doing generous acts that 
we become generous. The central factor in the acquisition of moral virtue is training 
and habituation rather than formal instruction.21
The question that arises for such an account though is whether such entry into a mode 
of life is at all rational. Certainly the acquisition of virtue by training rather than
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instruction appears to be less than fully rational as a teaching process. Moreover, such a 
form of learning would seem to lead us to a non-rational result, a form of blind 
obedience to a practice that becomes a matter of unthinking rote, as Sarah Broadie 
writes:
[RJeason giving is not only part of the result at which teaching aims, it is essential to the 
method of teaching. But the training of character, as Aristotle understands it, aims to create 
dispositions to act properly. The ability to understand why what is right is right is not an 
essential part of that goal, which will have been achieved if the subject comes to have such 
dispositions whether or not he can explain to himself and others why what is right is right. 
Similarly, such reason giving is not a necessary part of the training process.22
Of course, even if the training process is so to speak, non-rational, this would not mean 
that the virtues themselves once formed, have no rational component. To say that the 
seemingly non-rational genesis necessarily leads to a non rational end would be to 
commit the genetic fallacy. Nonetheless, it is certainly correct to say that Aristotle does 
not think that reasons of an abstract philosophical sort enter either the training itself or 
the results of it.
However, that is not to say that neither the process of moral development nor the 
results of it are rational. Looking at it in terms of our functional approach, the question 
is one of whether or not habituation leads to a reasoned confidence in a practice. To 
begin with, such habituation certainly yields confidence. What we have here initially in 
Aristotle it seems to me is the recognition of a fundamental fact that Bernard Williams 
points to when discussing the place for philosophy in ethical enquiry. Speaking of what 
he calls ethical conviction or what we have called confidence, he writes
It is basically a social phenomenon. . . . The point of bringing in this conception is not that 
philosophy, which could not tell us how to bring about conviction, can tell us how to bring 
about confidence. It is rather that this conception makes it clearer than the other models did 
why philosophy cannot tell us how to bring it about. It is a social and psychological 
question what kinds of institutions, upbringing and public discourse help to foster it. The 
first questions that come to mind are questions of social explanation.23
Williams’ central contention here is that confidence is a social phenomenon fostered by 
participation in practices themselves. Practice explains the confidence that is expressed 
in our behavioural commitment to a practice and it is precisely this point that one gets 
from the Aristotelian emphasis on habituation.
However, though the word ‘habituation’ inclines us to think of a mere repetitive 
mechanical process, Aristotle’s ethismos would seem to be far more complex. Thus, it 
is only through such habituation that true virtue as opposed to natural virtue is gained24
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and this genuine virtue includes a rational component as part of its definition.25 As 
Aristotle writes
So virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by
a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it. (NE, II: 6,
101-102, emphasis added).
Thus, according to Aristotle, in order genuinely to possess the various virtues of 
character, which are formed by ethismos one must possess the intellectual virtue of 
phronesis or practical wisdom.
One may think that while habituation is a necessary component in the formation of the 
character virtues, the intellectual virtue of phronesis that is required if we are to be 
virtuous is acquired in some other way. Certainly, one cannot doubt that Aristotle 
categorises the moral virtues as virtues of character and phronesis as an intellectual 
virtue. One would therefore expect the former to be acquired by habituation and the 
latter by instruction, in accordance with Aristotle’s well known comments at NE n, 1. 
However, for Aristotle it seems that when dealing with phronesis we cannot abstract 
the rational component away from the practical component. Indeed, just as the 
definition of virtue makes essential reference to phronesis, his definition of phronesis 
makes essential reference to the virtues of character. At NE VI, 12 therefore, phronesis 
is contrasted with mere demotes or cleverness. The latter is simply a matter of being 
‘capable of carrying out the actions conducive to our proposed aim,’ (NE, VI, 12, 222- 
223) while the former cannot be attained unless one is virtuous, leading Aristotle to 
conclude ‘that one cannot be prudent (phronimos) without being good .'(Ibid.). The 
intellectual virtue of phronesis and the character virtues cannot it seems be separated in 
reality or indeed definition and as Nancy Sherman states, ‘the artifice of trying to 
discuss moral virtue independently of the excellence of practical reason is not one 
Aristotle can easily abide by’.26 Thus, having genuine moral virtue essentially involves 
having the intellectual virtue of phronesis and being a phronimos essentially involves 
ethical behaviour. The point is that there is a behavioural aspect to phronesis that is 
absolutely central to its possession (as with the concept of emunah in Judaism).
What is true though is that this intellectual virtue is not purely rational in the modem 
Humean sense that is often given to the term. For the intellectual virtue of phronesis 
itself contains prescriptive and appetitive components and is not therefore just a formal 
ability to perform deductions from a set of ‘affective-neutral’ principles. Indeed, in 
Book VI of the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that part of having the 
intellectual virtue of phronesis involves having a reason responsive appetitive part that
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accepts the prescriptions set before it and acts on those prescriptions. Even in his more 
rationalistic moments, as at the end of Book I where the appetitive component is part of 
the non-rational soul, it is still said that it ‘partakes of reason in a sense’ (NE, I, 13, 
89).27
What Aristotle does therefore is cut through Hume’s reason/passion dichotomy that has 
so influenced modem ethical theorists. Part of what it is to be practically rational for 
Aristotle is to feel in the correct way about the actions that one judges to be correct. 
The character that we form for Aristotle is, as John Cooper writes, ‘a function both of 
(developed) desires and (trained) instincts, and of rational judgements.’28 For Aristotle 
the good man is not just the one who acts in accordance with the mean but one who 
also feels in accordance with the mean.29 The point therefore seems to be that according 
to Aristotle habituation gives us the capacity for a reasoned response that we have 
confidence in. What it yields is an ability to deliberate about practical matters and to 
understand them in a substantive, if not altogether discursively clarified manner. This 
again is well expressed by John Cooper.
As the trainee becomes gradually used to acting in certain ways, he comes gradually to 
understand what he is doing and why he is doing it: he comes, to put it vaguely, to see the 
point of moral policies which he is being trained to follow, and does not just follow them 
blindly.30
It seems therefore that according to Aristotle, practical habituation itself allows us to 
see the point of our practices. It does not simply yield the psychological crutch of 
confidence, but it yields the capacity to deliberate about moral problems and act 
accordingly. In our terms, it yields a reasoned confidence in our practices.
To put all of this in terms of our earlier discussion of faith, the fundamental idea here is 
that practice does not lead to blind faith. We need to begin with some form of purely 
functional faith in order to undertake to practise a certain way in the first place, but 
once we so practise, that leads us to a certain rational confidence or cognitive faith in 
the practice itself. But what is important about this picture is the development that we 
find from an initial faith in our teachers to a form of faith in the practice. What we 
actually find is that we initially gain many of our ethical and religious convictions 
through a combination of cultural factors that work within society, through family, 
schools, public institutions etc. It is our confidence in these that leads us to a certain 
form of practice. Once we participate in that practice, we become behaviourally 
committed to the practice through the reasoned confidence that we thereby gain in the 
practice itself. Thus we begin with faithi, which is a minimal form of behavioural
170
commitment that is a result of our confidence in our teachers, and end up with faiths, 
confidence in our practice.
Interestingly it is precisely this sort of process that Soloveitchik describes as leading to 
the highest form of relationship between man and God, that of devekut.
Let us consider the formula of the halakha regarding the command of devequt -  ‘to cleave 
to Him’. As is emphasised in the foregoing, the halakha tells us to cling to those who know 
Him. In other words, those who know Him conjoin with Him, and through joining those 
who know Him, man attains the situation of cleaving to God. However, the question 
remains: how do those who know Him conjoin with God? The obvious answer is through 
their knowledge. It is understood that the halakha does not aim at abstract knowledge that 
is without any relevance. Learning is a great thing for it leads to practice. . . . When 
thought is converted into volition, and volition into concrete deeds which take the form of 
faithful love, justice, and righteousness, the person who thinks, intends and acts achieves 
the status of cleaving to God . . . ‘Those who know Him’ are men of God, endowed with 
insight and yearning, in which reflection and action, the faculties of cognition and volition 
are merged into a homogenous spiritual unity.31
What we find here in Soloveitchik is this very idea that initially it is by ‘cleaving’ to 
people who practise correctly that we are enabled to know God. Moreover, according to 
Soloveitchik this knowledge of God is itself practical and thus the knowledge that we 
arrive at through imitating these mentors is a form of insight into the practice itself that 
blends ‘cognition and volition’.
There are undoubtedly all sorts of interesting psychological questions regarding how 
these dispositions become installed in our brain given that they cannot be set out as a 
group of principles. These are not questions on which Aristotle dwells or upon which 
we can be detained at present. What is important though is that despite the lack of a 
detailed cognitive psychology, as an account of the manner in which we acquire the 
virtues and a capacity to judge situations, it seems highly realistic. It seems that this 
Aristotelian account of how we form the virtues and how we gain what one might call 
our ethical sensitivities is just empirically true as an account of what goes on in our 
moral education. As children we are not simply taught a set of principles to enable us to 
work out what to do. We do not simply learn what to do in classrooms or lecture 
theatres on a blackboard but actually do those things that we are supposed to do. We 
are told what to do with reference to particular situations and over time develop an 
ability to go on doing so on our own. Habituation is not therefore a case of installing a 
blind habit but is rather a method of installing a cognitive process by which we can 
make the correct discriminations in practical cases. What is important is that as a matter 
of empirical fact, we form our capacity for ethical judgement by habituation to a 
practice, which yields virtues that according to Aristotle have a central rational
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component. Habituation or practice itself does seem to create a reasoned confidence in 
our practices.32
However, does this point bear any relevance to the concept of justification? As it stands 
the Aristotelian approach would appear to yield the following practical parallel to our 
earlier definition of justification of belief in chapter five.
A has a justification for a certain action F iff
1) A’s disposition to do F is a result of participation in a practice P that contains the 
action F.
Or
A’s disposition to do F is based on the judgement of an expert who is disposed to 
do F as a result of his participation in P
2) A has confidence in his disposition to do F as a result of condition 1
The problem is that it would seem to be perfectly reasonable to reject such a definition 
of justification on the basis that it is the statement of a social or psychological truth that 
has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not we have a justification. What we want 
remember is a reasoned confidence in our practices. As it stands we could be seen to be 
willingly entering into an illusion that will eventually create confidence in itself. The 
question that arises for this account as it stands is - is the confidence a reasoned 
confidence or a confidence that is engendered by some blind social or psychological 
mechanism?
3. Justification as Description
We have argued that what we are looking for in a justification is a reasoned confidence 
in our practices. As Williams pointed out it seems that as a matter of empirical fact, 
confidence in our practices is best explained sociologically rather than normatively but 
as such our practices can be explained rather than justified. In contrast, the Aristotelian 
picture suggests that this practically engendered confidence is a reasoned confidence 
inasmuch as it leads to a capacity for rational deliberative decisions and discussions 
about the practical realm.
In what sense though is this a reasoned confidence? Aristotle is arguing that the correct 
sort of habituation creates a form of understanding in our practices that leads to actual 
practice. But it is not the form of understanding modelled on scientific understanding of 
the PoT theorist and does not lead us merely to the acquisition of an explanatory
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framework for our practice. To say then, as Broadie does, that reason giving is neither 
part of the process nor the result of habituation does make the valid point that the 
reasons given are not the PoT reasons that are usually honoured with that designation. 
However, Aristotle recognises that we are able to arrive at deliberative conclusions in 
the practical realm that differ to the paradigm of the rational that is scientific 
knowledge and this need not be taken as an argument against the rationality of moral 
judgements. Aristotle’s alternative route here is to speak of practical truth:
We are here speaking of intellect and truth in a practical sense: in the case of 
contemplative (as distinct from practical and productive) intellect, right and wrong are 
truth and falsehood. To arrive at the truth is indeed the function of the intellect in any 
aspect, but the function of practical intellect is to arrive at the truth that corresponds to 
right appetition. (NE, VI, 2,205).
According to Broadie, what Aristotle wants to stress here by using the term ‘truth’ is 
that ‘practice like theory is an exercise of reason, its success a success of reason.’33 The 
question is what sort of reasoning is applicable in this realm.
Within this sort of approach appeal is often made to the sort of descriptive justification 
that we find in Soloveitchik’s second model of rationalisation. According to the 
Aristotelian model, if one has undergone the correct sort of practical training, the result 
should be the ability to judge for ourselves what is right and act on that judgement. And 
this ability to judge itself is a rational capacity but again, it is not the capacity to give a 
PoT reason for one’s action. Indeed, what Aristotle famously stresses is the perceptual 
nature of what we learn.34 We gain an ability to perceive situations under a certain 
description and it is this mode of perception, which we can lay out in descriptive terms, 
that constitutes our reason for acting for many of those who reject the principled 
approach. The justification of our action would appeal to the way we see the situation. 
And this perception would not only utilise certain descriptive categories, but also yield 
a sense of the relative importance in that situation of the various particular properties 
that are relevant to the evaluation of the action. What we find then is that the training 
process yields a perceptual capacity or what Wiggins has termed ‘situational 
appreciation’ . This perception needn’t be immediate but may require one to analyse 
the situation, whether to oneself or in dialogue with others,36 so as to reach a certain 
way of perceiving the situation - deliberation is a central component of phronesis for 
Aristotle. And it is this perception that constitutes our reason for acting in a certain 
way. Thus the phronimos can justify his actions, but his reasons are at best of this 
particular descriptive type.
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However, it is often alleged that if all we are really doing is pointing to the way that we 
see a certain situation this would not constitute a justification of our judgement. For a 
description of how one views a situation or a practice is often seen to be different to 
giving a justification, which is taken to be an argument that delivers a judgement as 
conclusion. However, as Dancy writes
To justify one’s choice is to give the reasons one sees for making it, and to give those 
reasons is just to lay out how one sees the situation, starting on the right place and going 
on to display the various salient features in the right way. . . .  In giving those reasons one is 
not arguing for one’s way of seeing the situation. One is rather appealing to others to see it 
. . .  the way one sees it oneself, and the appeal consists in laying out that way as 
persuasively as possible... Moral justification is therefore not subsumptive in nature, but 
narrative.37
To a large extent this seems to me to be correct. We can give reasons for our practical 
judgements in terms of the way that we see a situation. This need not be some form of 
immediate perception but may come about as the result of descriptions and 
redescriptions of the situation, the point being that this is a reasoned response that is 
neither arbitrary nor some form of strange intuition. The reasons given are not given in 
the form of some general principle that subsumes one’s judgement as an instance but as 
a description of a situation arrived at by means of one’s practical wisdom as do the 
narrative theorists that Dancy refers to.
What we end up with then according to theorists like Dancy is a form of particularism 
that eschews all talk of principles at the level of decision making for particular 
decisions. The particular reasons we give cannot be seen as general principles as in the 
reflective equilibrium approach that would serve to rationalise our practice. One must 
of course use general concepts, as one would obviously have to do in order to form any 
coherent sentence. But that is not to say that one uses general principles involving 
properties that will always contribute in the same way in all situations. Moreover, it 
does not yield principles that subsume that situation and justify it. Rather, a ‘narrative 
theorist’ of the sort that Dancy is referring to, unpacks the rationality of the act into 
descriptive categories that cast the situation as a particular type of situation and a 
certain act as the right thing to do in that situation.
I believe that this sort of account of the giving of reasons is largely correct as far as it 
goes. However, it seems to me that it does not go far enough. It leaves a number of 
questions unanswered because it leaves out the fundamental justificatory foundation of 
practices and it is this that the PoP theorist puts into place.
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4. Justification and Description: A PoP Approach
In this section we will attempt to articulate to the extent that is possible the nature of 
the PoP approach before subsequently explaining some of the reasons why we should 
take such an approach. Let us first state again the basic hypothesis. The central claim of 
the PoP theorist is not simply that in the practical sphere doing temporally precedes 
understanding which could be read as a restatement of the reflective equilibrium view 
according to which we can only reason from within a certain practice. It is that 
embedded within the practice itself is a form of non-discursive practical rationality that 
we gain through practice. This form of practical rationality can only be accessed 
through participation in that practice and it is this that therefore serves as our mode of 
justification, allowing us to experience the practical rationality of the practice. What we 
have therefore are rational practices whose rationality must be experienced rather than 
set out propositionally.
We can put this another way by exploiting the process/product ambiguity that we find 
with the word ‘justification’. As with words such as ‘explanation’ or ‘deduction’, there 
are two senses of the word ‘justification’ -  a process sense and a product sense. On the 
one hand there is the process of justification that individuals actually go through in the 
act of justifying something. But what this generally yields of course is a certain result -  
a product with, in most cases, a certain prepositional content. In effect, our argument 
will be that there are no justificatory products that we can set down propositionally for 
people to use. In the realm of practice the process of justification does not yield a 
discursive product. What it does yield is a reasoned confidence, but this is not itself the 
justification. In effect the process of justification is the only sort of justification 
available for a practice. We can simply participate in a practice in order to gain a 
reasoned confidence in that practice based upon a non-discursive form of practical 
rationality that it contains and that provides the basis for this reasoned confidence.38 
In order to further elucidate the PoP approach we should recall something that 
Soloveitchik writes in his discussion of rationalisation in The Halakhic Mind. As we 
have seen, Soloveitchik seems to appeal to two different methods of rationalisation. On 
the one hand, he sets out a scientific PoT model in order to justify the halakhic 
decisions of the Rabbis. Even at that level his model is problematic since his approach 
there is vulnerable to the uncodifiability thesis. However, leaving that aside, in his 
discussion in The Halakhic Mind in which he returns to the commandments themselves 
rather than to particular halakhic decisions, he appeals to a very different model of 
rationalisation more akin to our particularist descriptive model, though Soloveitchik’s
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descriptions are more symbolic than narrative in nature. At the end of chapter three we 
asked why he should have put forward two theories at all and it seems to me that maybe 
Soloveitchik recognised the need for two different modes or levels of justification. As 
we noted at the time, Soloveitchik’s scientific model is put forward as a model of 
halakhic reasoning and as such he is not really addressing the same issue as 
Maimonides for whom the biblical commandments are the central focus. It appears 
therefore as if Soloveitchik believed that we could portray the post biblical reasoning of 
the halakhist by way of such a model. However, at the basis of this halakhic reasoning 
are the original biblical commandments to which Soloveitchik applies his antinaturalist 
model. Thus, on the one hand we have the basic biblical practices which are 
approached in an antinaturalist fashion and the subsequent applications of these 
principles to new and varied cases which Soloveitchik seems to believe he can justify 
naturalistically on the basis of these initial biblical principles. This, maybe, is the 
reason for the two models and is the first move towards a different approach to 
justifying practices for it is as if he recognised that the ultimate rational foundation of 
our current practice cannot be stated as a set of principles but requires a different 
approach. More importantly though, Soloveitchik is even aware of the limits of the 
descriptive method, writing that ‘we cannot expect to bring the descriptive method to 
full perfection’ (HM, 98), but that it is the only method that we can use ‘despite its 
shortcomings’ (HM, 99). With regard to this therefore it is interesting to note the 
following significant statement that Soloveitchik makes regarding this mode of 
justification
The criterion of evidence and adequacy is not the transcendent source but the
indispensability of certain concepts and their constitutive experience. (HM, 88).
This seems to suggest two aspects of a justification. On the one hand we have the 
indispensability of certain concepts. These would be the descriptive concepts that, as 
discussed, we come to understand through practice itself and that are indispensable for 
deliberation to take place concerning particular cases. Indeed, as we shall see later, 
these descriptive categories may well be indispensable if we are to see the practice as 
rational at all.
At the same time though Soloveitchik speaks of the constitutive experience of those 
concepts as a ‘criterion of evidence and adequacy’. The notion of the constitutive 
experience of a concept seems to make little sense. However, one of the premier 
‘narrative’ theorists, Alasdair MacIntyre, in his use of the notion of an internal good
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helps to make sense of this link between experience and concepts. On the one hand 
there are the goods that are externally linked to a practice. To use MacIntyre’s example, 
I may be a wonderful chess player who makes a living by playing chess exhibitions. 
The money that I receive for these exhibitions is a good external to the chess playing - 
it could be gained by any number of other activities and it is just a matter of contingent 
circumstance that I happen to gain this good in this particular way. However, there are 
on the other hand goods internal to chess playing to do with excelling at chess by 
developing ones combinatorial or strategic powers. What makes these goods internal is 
that ‘we can only specify them in terms of chess . . . and by means of examples from 
such games and they can only be identified and recognised by the experience o f
-IQ
participating in the practice in question.’ (Emphasis added).
The idea here is that there are certain goods, knowledge of which is inextricably bound 
up with the participation in the relevant practice.40 It is only by habituation to a specific 
practice that one can come to understand fully the value of the acts prescribed within 
that practice and gain certain forms of knowledge that are inextricably linked to that 
practice. One comes to appreciate the various particular practices that constitute the 
practice in general only through participation in the practice and only then will one be 
able to give any sort of reason for acting in a certain way. The practice therefore 
actually has a cognitive effect due to the actual experience of practice itself. The idea is 
that this practical knowledge ‘need not be given its substance independently of the 
distinctive values that are instilled in someone who acquires [its] virtues[,]’41 and these 
values and virtues can only be thus acquired by practical habituation.42 
The point for Soloveitchik might therefore be that the descriptive concepts that we are 
speaking about are bound up with the experience that gives rise to them. The point here 
would be that we must appeal to the experience of practice itself if we are to see any 
particular description as part of our ‘criterion of evidence and adequacy’ since the felt 
indispensability of the concepts relies on this experience rather than upon any 
discursive argument. Experience constitutes the criterion of evidence and adequacy for 
the descriptive categories and is what makes them appear convincing.
Central to the PoP theorist therefore is the fact that while descriptions may allow us to 
express certain aspects of our experience, understanding those descriptions themselves 
so as to be persuaded that they are in any sense reasons for action depends on having 
participated in the practice and experienced the practical rationality of the experiences 
that the descriptions are attempting to set out. The descriptions are entirely parasitic 
upon the practice for any justificatory effect they may or may not have. What the PoP
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theorist says therefore is that the ultimate basis for justification of a practice is the 
rational and non-discursive experience of practice itself. The reasoned confidence that 
one gains in the practice as a result of this can then be articulated to some extent in 
descriptive terms. But the perceived effectiveness of these descriptive terms always 
relies upon both the prior and continued practical habituation to the practice, the 
constitutive experience of participating in the practice. Or as Charles Taylor puts it
What you get underlying our representations of the world -  the kinds of things we 
formulate, for instance, in declarative sentences -  is not further representation but rather a 
certain grasp of the world that we have as agents in it.43 (My emphasis).
Taylor’s point is more general than our own which is to apply to practices. But the 
basic idea that the PoP theorist utilises here is that of a certain irreducible practical 
form of understanding of our practices. Our practical knowledge is therefore seen in 
Rortian terms, not as ‘a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of 
acquiring habits of action for coping with reality.’44 And it is because of the non- 
discursive rationality of practices themselves that our practical knowledge is of this 
type. Indeed, the practice, it seems, forms what Taylor calls ‘the background’, the 
conditions for the intelligibility of our experience.
The background is what makes certain experiences intelligible to us. It makes us capable 
of grasping them, makes them understandable. So it can be represented as ' a form of 
explicit understanding, or pre-understanding in Heidegger’s term. To bring it to articulacy 
is to take (some of) this and make it explicit. But the reason for the two words in 
parentheses in my preceding sentence is that the idea of making the background 
completely explicit, of undoing its status as background, is incoherent in principle.45
The PoP theorist argues that it is precisely the practice itself that forms this background 
to the various ‘justifications’ that we attempt to articulate. We might be able to describe 
what we take specific practices to symbolise as Soloveitchik does. But these 
descriptions are not constitutive of the rationality of the practice. Narrative is not the 
foundation for the justification but is merely an ex post facto articulation.46 
Thus, it is only practice itself that can validate the sorts of descriptive theories that we 
have been discussing. Any social theory helps us to articulate the nature of the practice, 
to make it explicit. Moreover, their use, according to Taylor, is not limited to this self­
defining aspect, for they can be used as a constructive and critical tool and it is 
important to emphasise this use even on the PoP approach. For despite the non- 
discursive nature of their rationality, according to the previously discussed Aristotelian 
picture practice does yield a capacity to discuss and make reasoned decisions on 
practical issues, and this is central to the PoP picture. For if we admit that we have no
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Archimedean point to allow for the ‘objective’ grounding of a practice and furthermore 
emphasise the priority of practice as opposed to theory, it may appear that we have no 
vantage point from which to reflect critically on the practice and thus can easily fall 
prey to conservatism and ideological distortion. The PoP theorist therefore recognises 
the importance of a discursive level of analysis that will allow for reasoned debate and 
the solving of problems that may arise within the practice. Thus Dancy’s emphasis on 
description is indeed central if we are to recognise the rationality of a practice and it is 
notable that Judaism, which we have argued exemplifies the PoP approach, places great 
value on interpretive debate within the halakhic sphere.
The methodology of halakhic pesak -  even halakhic pesak involving questions of 
hashkafah -  with its citation and analysis of sources, use of argumentation, and all the rest, 
acknowledges the possibility and, more important, the legitimacy of different viewpoints, 
based upon differing modes of argumentation, analysis and interpretation. Halakhic pesak 
allows for, nay, encourages, halakhic debate and halakhic pluralism. . . . Halakhic pesak 
allows for, indeed encourages, reasoned debate and disagreement -  within of course the 
framework of the halakhic system.47
However, this sort of justificatory enterprise is not the same as the ultimate 
philosophical justification of the very practice within which such debate is taking place. 
For an outsider will not necessarily understand such debate as advocating practically 
rational conclusions that he could accept as such. The foundation for the rationality of 
the practice is itself practical and the discursive debate may only be understood by 
those who have the requisite practical understanding. However, evidently the ability to 
argue reasonably within the system is essential if the system is not to stagnate. Systems 
require various guidelines and mechanisms to accommodate critical discussion and the 
possibility of development and change. This it seems is a practical requirement and it 
would therefore be practically irrational to refuse to engage in such discussion 
altogether.
However, it is also extremely important to note that despite our abstract talk of discrete
practices, no practice is an island. Practices share many discrete practices and affect
each other in numerous ways.48 It is though essential therefore to recognise that there
will be many issues on which we can have constructive inter-practice dialogue to
facilitate further critical reflection on our practices 49 Thus, the constant attempt to
articulate one’s position has an essential part to play if there is to be evidence of the
non-discursive form of rationality of a practice. While the ability to set out one’s view
in discursive terms does depend ultimately on practice, the very ability to set out one’s
views discursively to a certain degree is essential if the practice is to show evidence of
its rationality. Indeed, this discursive debate may well lead to changes in the practice
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and therefore in the non-discursive rational basis. However, the practical validity of 
such change will ultimately always, as mentioned previously, be subject to practical 
verification according to Taylor
Put tersely, our social theories can be validated because they can be tested in practice. If
theory can transform practice, then it can be tested in the quality of the practice it informs.
What makes a theory right is that it brings practice out in the clear; that its adoption makes
possible what is in some sense a more effective practice.50
What validates the theory is its leading to a more effective practice. However, when 
speaking of what constitutes a more effective practice, Taylor retreats into metaphors of 
‘stumbling’ versus ‘clairvoyant’ practices.J1 Indeed, the fact is that we cannot analyse 
this idea of an effective practice in sharp conceptual terms. If we could set certain 
criteria for what constitutes an effective practice, we would be able to return to a PoT 
approach. We might say that the description of a practice is justified pragmatically in 
terms of whether the practice works as a mode of successfully negotiating our way in 
the world. However, the manner in which we measure this success is again not 
according to theoretical criteria but is rather practical. What is central here is that 
however one attempts to cash these metaphors out, as Taylor indeed tries to do, the 
discursive level of reason giving will never reach a non question begging foundational 
principle or set of descriptions. That is not to suggest that in such cases we can 
therefore describe or evaluate the practice independently of the theory, for the theory 
can certainly affect how we understand the practice. However, the point is that whether 
or not the theory that affects the practice in this way is seen to be convincing ultimately 
depends on the practical success of that theory-infused practice. The PoP theorist 
argues that one cannot ultimately reason to any discursive foundation or set of 
foundations that can act as independent normative criteria for a practice. The ultimate 
justification will be non-propositional practice, even if infused with a certain theory.
In effect, what the PoP theorist is proposing then is that the best explanation of our 
practically inculcated rational capacities and therefore our reasoned confidence in our 
practices is their substantive practical rationality. And part of what makes the 
confidence a reasoned confidence is the ability to discuss matters using the descriptive 
categories for which the practice itself is the intelligibility condition. The ultimate 
rationality of the practice can, to rewrite a Wittgensteinian phrase, be experienced but 
not said. The practice itself is the foundational background that defies our attempts to 
set out discursively the ultimate basis for our practice. However, once one is inculcated 
into the practice we see how it enables us to make our way in the social world that we
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find to be appropriate. And part of the reason that we come to see the practice as 
rational in this way is the ability we subsequently have to reason about it in a 
descriptive manner and thus develop the practice. But these are not the reasons that the 
practice as a whole is rational. Rather they are part of the pragmatic evidence for the 
substantive non-discursive rationality of the practice.
Before concluding this part of our discussion, we should point out a number of 
important implications that flow from this approach to justification. Firstly the sort of 
justification that we are speaking of will not yield a discrete discursive justification for 
each particular act, especially when one is speaking of religious ritual. On the one hand, 
in Judaism in particular, any halakhic decision must be discursively justified in 
traditional terms, and there is scope for argument regarding such decisions within those 
traditional terms. A number of arguments may be put up for consideration, each derived 
by accepted hermeneutic rules from an authoritative textual basis. However, there is a 
general underlying acceptance here of a basic halakhic practice and the question is how 
to go about carrying it out. The underlying philosophical justification for the practice is 
not subject to ultimate discursive justification. Yet we do not necessarily require a one- 
to-one correspondence between each facet of that practice and some discrete 
justification. The idea of justification that we are advocating it seems to me is more 
holistic than this, allowing that there may be elements of the practice that one is unable 
to understand either in terms of being able to give a discursive justification for it or in 
terms of being experientially convinced by it.53 However, one can nonetheless commit 
oneself to it as an element of a practice by which one is generally experientially 
convinced.
The very idea of a reasoned confidence allows for this flexibility inasmuch as reasoned 
confidence is not an all-or-nothing concept. One can have degrees of reasoned 
confidence in various aspects of a practice corresponding to one’s understanding of 
those aspects. What is important though is that a commitment to certain aspects of 
practice in which one has a low degree of reasoned confidence can be seen to be 
rational according to the PoP theory. For according to the PoP approach understanding 
a practice requires actually participating in the individual practices that make it up. It is 
only by doing so that one is able to gain the practical understanding that is of the 
essence of practical justifications. Certainly, if one comes to doubt the validity of the 
practice, these concerns must be raised. But at the same time the idea that practice itself 
yields substantive practical knowledge means that it can be practically rational to 
commit oneself to a part of the practice by which one is not as yet convinced. The idea
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here would be that it can be rational for one’s reasoned confidence in the practice as a 
whole to allow one to participate in aspects of the practice to which one is less attuned, 
since it is only by virtue of participation that one can understand the practical 
rationality of the practice.
A further facet of the PoP approach is that it seems to encourage a form of pluralism, at 
least at a practical rather than cognitive level. For it leads us to understand the value of 
our own practice, while accepting that others might be unable to understand why we 
see that practice as rational and may differ in the practices that they accept and can 
justify to themselves. They cannot justify them to us as we cannot justify our practice 
to them, for to do so requires that one is habituated to the practice in the first place. So 
we need not accept that an alternative practice is correct in a cognitive sense, or indeed 
in a practical sense from our own perspective. At the same time though we must 
recognise that the PoP approach implies that others will accept different practices to be 
reasonable and that it is both futile and contrary to the idea that practices can have their 
own practical form of rationality to try to argue that they should convert to one’s own 
practice. The important point is that practice performs the function of producing a 
reasoned confidence in one’s own practice.54
It is interesting to note in this regard the pluralistic strain that runs through Judaism 
concerning other religions. For Judaism does recognise that other religions may be 
valid, as long as they observe the minimum requirements of the seven Noahide laws. 
Moreover, following the logic of this position, Judaism is not a missionary religion.55 
This would all seem to follow from the logic of the PoP approach according to which 
we cannot justify all the intricacies of a practice to those that do not participate in it and 
cannot therefore expect them to either believe in or behave in accordance with its 
practical demands. At the same time though, this is not to say that it is not justified and 
that those within the practice should not continue to adhere to it. Thus, as Jonathan 
Sacks writes.
To be sure, a Jew is not allowed to abandon Judaism, but non-Jews are not called on to
embrace it. There are other equally legitimate ways of serving God.56
The idea therefore that there is more than one practically rational approach is allowed 
for, but the fact that this is not ‘our’ approach means that it is not rational for us to 
accept it.
In a similar vein it is interesting to note that Soloveitchik approach sets out a number of 
conditions for interfaith dialogue which include the following:
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It is self-evident that a confrontation of two faith communities is possible only if it is 
accompanied by a clear assurance that both parties will enjoy equal rights and full religious 
freedom. . . .  I do not deny the right of the community of the many to address itself to the 
community of the few in its own eschatological terms. However, building a practical 
program upon this right is hardly consonant with religious democracy and liberalism.57
Soloveitchik’s point here is specific to faith communities, which in his opinion could 
never understand each other’s faith gestures. The fundamental point for Soloveitchik is 
that the reason for this is the incommunicable nature of faith. If the PoP theorist is 
correct, certain practical justifications can fall into a similar category given that 
practical justifications are ineliminably practical and cannot be fully set out at a 
discursive level. Thus Soloveitchik’s practical point seems to be the very one that we 
are making. The PoP theorist must recognise that members of an alien practice might 
be perfectly rational to stick to their practice given their reasoned confidence in it that 
is nurtured by the practice itself. Thus no practice need acquiesce in its claims to 
rationality and may even assert this in dialogue with other practices. The fact that we 
cannot gain this practical insight is a function of the practical nature of such 
justifications. But unless one is willing to advocate a program of forced ‘conversion’ 
the PoP approach encourages a pluralistic approach to other practices at the practical or 
political level.
To conclude then, what the PoP approach argues is that we can justify decisions within 
a practice by giving descriptive reasons for action. But these are based upon the 
practice itself which is understood to be rational in itself on the basis of the experience 
of participating in it rather than on the basis of some set of principles. The central idea 
is that a practice is only to seen to be justified based upon participation in the practice 
which allows us access to its specifically practical rationality. The PoP theorist stresses 
therefore that we cannot always know before we do but must do before we know. But 
even then, this knowledge may not be capable of presentation in such a form as to 
convince members of another practice or indeed be capable of total articulation to 
oneself. We can merely appeal to our practice and say that it makes sense to us since it 
allows us to make sense of the world and decide upon courses of action in all situations 
in a way that makes sense to us. As such therefore, according to the PoP theorist, one 
cannot present a justification for a practice in the product sense of the term, by 
presenting a completed argument that justifies the practice for all time. Rather practical 
justifications can only be gained through a process of habituation. The experience of 
participating in the practice is not simply the foundation for our ability to make the 
descriptive discriminations but is itself the process of justification.
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5. The Explanatory Scope of the PoP Approach
We have been appealing to an approach that posits a non-discursive yet rational 
foundation for the rationality of practices. Yet why need we posit such a form of 
rationality? Indeed, MacIntyre, for example, simply introduces further ‘discursive’ 
concepts into his theory in which to locate the appeal to the particular internal goods of 
a given practice: those of the narrative unity of a single human life and that of a 
tradition.58 The former is supposed to locate one’s account of the virtues within a 
coherent life history that gives them their meaning and an overall sense of purpose. The 
latter serves the same purpose for the narratives of individual lives by locating them 
within a sustained attempt to reflect critically on the nature of the good life that 
traditions afford according to MacIntyre. Both of these ideas therefore emphasise the 
extent to which the content of the virtues is drawn from the social roles that we inherit 
from the past and project into the future and they allow us to justify the appeal to 
internal goods by means of discursive categories.
It seems to me, however, that the PoP approach has a certain explanatory power that is 
lacking even in these narrative approaches. Let us begin by noting the particular 
problems that even arise for the narrative approaches, beginning with the problem of 
circularity. We have previously seen how this is a problem for reflective equilibrium 
theorists. But the problem reappears for narrative theorists such as MacIntyre, for the 
choice between different narrative structures and traditions is as arbitrary as that 
between the different practices that they were supposed to ground. Goods are internal 
to a certain set of virtues that are internal to a specific narrative unity that is internal to 
a tradition which itself is partially constituted by those goods and as such we do not 
seem to have moved out of our original circle of descriptions. And this basically is the 
problem with any retreat to this sort of narrative account that still attempts to locate the 
rationality of practices and their justifications at the discursive level. While the 
subsumptive picture has been eliminated, the discursive foundation of practical 
justification has been retained and problems of circularity remain.
Moreover, while the narrative theorists are correct to move away from a subsumptive 
PoT picture, utilising descriptions that are derived from traditions as their ultimate 
justificatory basis does not allow them to address the question of how incompatible and 
incommensurable descriptions can be rational. To simply halt the search for reasons at 
the various incommensurable descriptions in order to avoid a regress seems rather 
arbitrary and leaves a number of questions unanswered. Firstly, if one wishes to speak 
of justifying various alternative practices by means of true propositional descriptions, it
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appears that one will come up against the problem of how contradictory descriptions 
can be true. Secondly if all there is to the rationality of the practice is the description 
and we can genuinely understand these propositions as Berlin thinks, why are we not 
convinced by them? Why do they not justify the practice to ‘outsiders’? On a 
traditional foundationalist account, the choice of foundations is often thought to look 
arbitrary given the variations that we find between practices. At the same time though, 
it seems just as arbitrary to refuse to look beyond the nonfoundational circular 
descriptions if different practitioners are unconvinced by a single set of descriptions. 
The fact is that narrative theorists such as MacIntyre appear to accept the possibility of 
the rationality of alternative and even incommensurable practices. If we accept this 
picture, it seems that we must be able to accommodate competing descriptive schemes 
that are rational. Yet the attempt to ground this rationality in prepositional descriptions 
leaves us unable to account for this rationality in a way that is consistent with our 
understanding of the nature of prepositional rationality.
The PoP approach in contrast would firstly allow us to halt the possibility of a regress 
of argumentative reasons that one might encounter on the traditional discursive 
foundationalism of many PoT theorists. We need not appeal to any dubious 
foundational principles that might involve us in an infinite regress of reasons. We can 
find a non-propositional end to this regress -  practice. On the other hand, it also allows 
us to understand how different practices can be rational yet incompatible and 
incommensurable, as reflective equilibrium and narrative theorists may hold, and why 
certain people might be blind, practically speaking, to their rationality. The point is that 
their ultimate rational foundation is practical rather than prepositional. It is this 
practically accessed practical rationality that ultimately justifies the descriptive scheme 
of a given practice and explains why we see one practice as superior to another. And 
since we are members of a specific practice with access to its practical rationality rather 
than to that of another practice, we are unlikely to be motivated to behave in 
accordance with a practice to which we are not habituated. Thus, the PoP approach 
seems to be the best explanation of the variation in the principles and considered 
judgements of different reflective equilibrium theorists. According to the PoP theorist, 
the very confidence that one has in them as considered judgements depends on 
habituation (or practice) itself and we are only habituated to one set of such 
judgements.59
All of this does mean though that as McDowell says, if you just can’t see things in the 
way that the person describes them when giving his reason for the action, then there is
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little more that one can say. The point that McDowell is correctly making is that at 
some point discursive reasons give out. But the reason for this is that discursive reasons 
be they subsumptive or narrative cannot be the foundation for practical rationality. 
Only the practice itself provides it and this does leave something that one can say or 
rather do: practise in order to understand. For it is only practice that will yield the 
requisite understanding and the practitioners have the advantage of actually trying out 
this particular mode of life in the world and seeing the benefits that accrue from it. 
Evidently, becoming convinced of the rationality of a practice would therefore require 
an initial plunge into the practice before it can be seen to be rational, a plunge that 
someone who is already a practitioner of another practice is unlikely to take. But that is 
for the very good reason that they are already attuned to the practical rationality of a 
different practice. The existence of different forms of practical rationality in no way 
impugns the rationality of the practice that you affirm as superior. What the PoP 
approach does is explain the reason why you see one approach as superior and why 
certain others appear to have little to recommend them.
What though of the central criticism of circularity that has been raised regarding both 
the reflective equilibrium approach and the narrative approaches? Rather than solving 
this problem, the PoP approach seems to exacerbate it. For on our PoP picture, the 
justification of the practice can only be cashed out in experiential terms that themselves 
simply refer to actual practice and the evidence of rationality afforded by the very 
judgements that constitute the practice in the first place. We avoid the use of principles 
but we have no more external justification of the practice than the theorists we have 
criticised.
At this point though it is important to stress what sort of approach the PoP approach is 
in contrast to the PoT approach. The PoT approach, with its particular ideas about what 
constitutes a justification of a practice, see theory and practice to be related in a certain 
way. One of the central assumptions of the PoT approach is that the norms of a practice 
are akin to propositions that need to be given a propositional justification. Any practice 
must be capable of subsumption by the principles of a theory. Then, since the principles 
are in some sense thought by the PoT theorist to be rational, the practices that derive 
from them are justified. Any justification though, according to this approach must take 
the form of an argument that can be represented as a set of propositions with the norms 
of the practice as the conclusion.
By taking this approach, it seems to me that one does open oneself up to the charge of 
circularity. For what is the problem of circularity? Circularity is a logical property of
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arguments whereby the premises that lead to the conclusion themselves rely upon that 
conclusion. The problem with a circular argument is not that it is invalid. It is just that 
it is not very useful as an argument if one is attempting to persuade somebody of a 
certain conclusion. A circular argument such as this is hardly likely to convince a 
person of the correctness of a conclusion given that one is relying upon that conclusion 
in the argument itself. Thus, in the reflective equilibrium approach what we have is a 
set of considered judgements treated as propositions from which we derive a set of 
principles and a set of principles from which we are supposed to derive the very same 
judgements. But as such, given that the function of a practical justification is to yield a 
reasoned confidence in the practice, this sort of PoT argument, if indeed it could 
actually be formulated, would be open to the charge of circularity. It does not yield the 
requisite reasoned confidence, which according to our functional approach is a 
legitimate reason for not accepting that it justifies the practice in question.
It seems to me though that the PoP approach is not open to these criticisms. For the 
very point that we have been stressing is that as an empirical matter of fact, practice 
does engender a reasoned confidence in a practice. Thus even if we were to agree that 
technically the PoP approach was circular, the problem of circularity, being a problem 
regarding the lack of persuasiveness of an argument, simply does not apply to the PoP 
approach. The fact is that in practice participation is a persuasive method of reaching a 
reasoned confidence in our practices that we have been identifying as the function of a 
justification. Practice therefore yields a reasoned confidence in our practices that is 
non-propositional and as such the problems associated with circularity do not arise. 
However, in fact to apply the logical notion of circularity to the PoP approach in the 
first place is to commit a category mistake. Firstly the PoP approach does not portray 
the justification of a practice as an argument that takes a propositional form. The point 
is that once we move away from the idea of argumentative or discursive justification, 
talk of circularity becomes irrelevant. There are no premises or conclusions to speak of 
in practical justifications. According to the PoP approach we have a non-propositional 
justification based on the practical rationality of the practice itself.
It appears to me therefore that the PoP approach is able to account for the sort of 
pluralism that narrative and reflective equilibrium theorists justifiably believe in 
without falling to objections concerning circularity. Indeed, the PoP theory gives us the 
sort of ultimate justification of foundationalism without falling into the regresses or 
absurdity that is the symptom of discursive foundations.
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Now one might be reluctant to accept this since we are inclined to think in terms of a 
PoT approach whereby only a propositional foundation could or could not be rational. 
What the PoT approach ignores though is the fact that we are not trying here to justify 
propositions but rather actions or commandments. The propositions of science can be 
assessed for truth or falsity and via logically correct argumentation we can therefore 
show that a given proposition is true by relating it to true premises. But a central feature 
of practical judgements is their prescriptive nature and the acceptance of the judgement 
has motivational effects lacking in purely factual propositions such as those of science. 
But the internally motivating practical judgements it can be argued are not the kinds of 
things that can be true or false. The conclusions of these arguments are prescriptions 
that do not state how things are but rather how things should be. They can be seen to be 
right or appropriate but surely not true or false, at least not in the same sense as a 
proposition.60 But if that is so their justification is unlikely to be straightforwardly 
propositional. Indeed practices should not be expected to yield to reasons of this type. 
But one should not therefore think of them as downgraded sciences. Rather than 
glancing over our shoulders at the PoT theorist we should be looking at the nature of 
practice itself and the types of reasons that it can yield.61
From a PoP theorist’s perspective therefore, the unwillingness to allow the term 
knowledge to the non-propositional reasoned confidence that we have in our practices 
is problematic. Certainly, it is important to distinguish this conviction from the 
propositional knowledge gained in other areas. But at the same time the honorific status 
of the term and the corresponding degradation of anything to which the term is denied 
can mislead one into dismissing the effects of practice as being of purely sociological 
interest. Whilst it is true that confidence is sociologically installed by practice, the 
important point that is obscured by the continual wish to model all justification on the 
PoT model is the fact that practices lead to a non arbitrary way of understanding the 
world, engendering a confidence in the rationality of the practice itself.
Indeed, Williams himself seems to tacitly recognise this when he writes: ‘We may not 
be able, in any real sense, to justify [our practice] even to ourselves[,]’ but then goes on 
to say that a practice ‘may be so directly related to our experience that the reason it 
provides will simply count as stronger than any reason that might be advanced for it.’62 
(Emphasis added). Williams here seems to say therefore that experience itself might 
provide the ‘reasons’, suggesting that in fact we can justify the practices to ourselves 
but it is just that the justification is practical rather than theoretical. The central point 
then is that given that we are talking about practices, their justifications are likely to
188
appeal to practical rather than ‘theoretical’ criteria. Why then should we expect to be 
able to justify them by relating them to further propositions in some subsumptive 
relationship as we do scientific propositions? Rather than expecting practices to live up 
to a standard of justification set by natural scientific disciplines and then being 
disappointed by their inability to live up to these strictures, we should rather set 
practical criteria for their justification and see whether or not they live up to them. The 
PoP approach emphasises that in the sphere of practice it should be practical criteria 
that decide whether or not our practices are justified or not, not theoretical ones.
In relation to these points it is interesting, given our claim that Judaism embodies a PoP 
approach, to note briefly that David Kraemer states how in the Babylonian Talmud ‘in 
recognition of the elusiveness of a single, definitive truth, practice is effectively 
divorced from truth’63, showing instead ‘a primary concern for human (rabbinic) 
community’.64 Such a separation between truth and practice or between theoretical 
validity and practice can be found in many classical Jewish sources.65 One that is 
particularly interesting from a PoP perspective and worth considering briefly is the case 
of the Zaken Mamre, the rebellious elder. The Zaken Mamre is an ordained judge who 
dissents from the authoritative halakhic ruling of the Supreme Jewish court. The Torah 
itself prescribes capital punishment for such a person (Deuteronomy, 17: 12). However, 
this is only if the Zaken Mamre actually issues a practical ruling for himself or others.66 
He is though perfectly at liberty to teach his views. The Zaken Mamre is therefore 
expected to act contrary to his own theory in this case but is not required to stop 
teaching his opinion from a theoretical perspective.
The point here is that there is certainly a concern with the giving of argumentative 
reasons for halakhic decisions within Judaism. These reasons are generally given in 
terms of derivations by accepted hermeneutic procedures from authoritative texts. 
Moreover, there is an explicit recognition of the theoretical value of a number of such 
derivations. Indeed, from the perspective of theoretical reasoning or ‘truth’, a number 
of derivations might be ‘correct’ including that of the Zaken Mamre.61 This view is 
classically embodied in the claim that ‘these and these are the words of the living 
God’,68 which is often read as conferring substantive theoretical legitimacy on the 
differing opinions. However, from a practical perspective, a decision must be reached 
and adhered to.69
From a PoP perspective we can begin to understand this stance, since according to the 
PoP theorist it is only through practice itself that we can understand a practice. Thus it 
is seen to be important that arguments against the practice are set within a framework
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of shared practice if they are to be taken seriously.70 What we find therefore is a PoP 
approach to understanding and justifying practices expressed in the manner in which 
Judaism accommodates a loss of reasoned confidence. For it is this that the Zaken 
Mamre has lost, and yet it appears that such a loss is accommodated as long as it is kept 
out of the realm of actual practice. One can continue to argue for one’s views, but one’s 
arguments can only be heard if one continues to practise. Indeed, only then could one 
be a party to the practical rationality of the practice in question and therefore expect 
one’s dissent to be seriously discussed.
There is one further problem that is worth mentioning here that is related to the sort of 
justifications we get on a PoP approach which is that the PoP approach undercuts itself 
by making the PoT approach appear justified according to PoP criteria. For it appears 
that many people have a reasoned confidence in practices due to the PoT approach to 
practical justification. What we find here, it might be argued, is a practice of theorising 
that engenders a reasoned confidence in our practices. As such, according to our 
functional approach, a PoT argument would justify a practice.
The fact is that the PoT approach does justify theoretical propositions and theorists 
therefore have confidence in the approach. However, the central point to recognise is 
that the reason for the PoT theorist’s confidence in the practice of theorising in the 
theoretical sphere is that his arguments do in fact bear the logical relations to his 
conclusions that he believes they bear. This is why his confidence is a reasoned 
confidence -  it is based on logical relations between propositions. Indeed, this it seems 
to me is a perfectly legitimate PoP justification of the PoT approach to theoretical 
arguments.
The problem arises when the PoT theorist applies his method to practices. For when it 
comes to practices the confidence gained is not actually the result of the reasons that 
the PoT theorist gives since those reasons, according to our uncodifiability arguments, 
do not bear the justificatory relation to the practices that the PoT theorist thinks they 
do. As such therefore, by the PoT theorists own criteria, his arguments could not yield a 
reasoned confidence in the practice - the principles of the PoT theorist do not bear the 
logical relation to the practice in question. Thus, on the one hand, it would be a hollow 
victory for the PoT theorist if he was to claim that his argument justified the practice 
but not according to his own criteria of rationality.
In fact, though, it seems to me that the PoT argument does not justify the practice, even 
according to PoP criteria. What the PoT theorist has, it seems to me, is a reasoned 
confidence in the practice of theorising, not a reasoned confidence in the practice itself.
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This reasoned confidence in theorising leads the PoT theorist to apply the theoretical 
method to practices. But the confidence thus gained in the practice is external to the 
practice itself (as well as to the purported reasons that the PoT theorist gives for it). The 
confidence is actually a confidence in a different practice - that of theorising -  
illegitimately transferred to the ethical or religious practice we are actually trying to 
justify. The PoT theorist has confidence in a method that they then apply to the 
practice, not a reasoned confidence in the practice. What the PoP approach insists upon 
is that for something to constitute a reasoned confidence in a practice, it must be based 
upon the actual participation in the practice itself. One might put the point in the 
following way -participation in practices is non-transitive for purposes of justification. 
The reasoned confidence in the theoretical method of the PoT theorist is non- 
transferable to the practices to which the PoT approach is subsequently (incorrectly) 
applied. Thus, the confidence that the PoT approach might yield in a practice does not 
make it a justified approach according to PoP criteria since it does not yield a reasoned 
confidence in the practice. It takes a reasoned confidence in its own method and 
transfers it to a practice that it cannot justify according to its own criteria.
6. The Problem of Relativism
What we have set out here is the beginning of a new account of practical rationality and 
practical justification. There remains much work to do on it which time and space do 
not here permit. However, there is one evident problem for the PoP theory that relates 
to some of the considerations just discussed and that needs to be addressed if only in a 
preliminary fashion. For it might be felt that the answer to the charge of circularity 
suggested in the previous section was a mere technical manoeuvre that does not address 
the real felt concerns regarding the status of our practices.
Regardless of the logical status of the prescriptions that we are trying to justify, the PoP 
approach would appear to allow for the internal practical justification of any practice at 
all and as such we would have no reason for giving preference to one practice over 
another. Effectively, the Aristotelian mechanism of rational habituation can work for 
any practice. Obviously, if we leave this as a sociological insight this is not a problem. 
But if we attribute cognitive value to habituation we appear to be able to justify 
anything and are led into a form of relativism whereby we can ask whether or not our 
practice is justified any more than any other. Can we make a rational choice between 
practices? Moreover, the flipside of this problem is that of evil practices. For if each 
practice can justify itself internally through practice itself, what do we do about those
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with practices that we would consider to be radically evil? Are we powerless to argue 
against and condemn the Nazis, for example?
Let us begin by noting that there are two aspects to the problem of relativism. For on 
the one hand there is an epistemological problem concerned with judging which is the 
best practice given that each practice will justify its demands from different and often 
incommensurable starting points. And the first thing to note here is that as soon as one 
moves to the reflective equilibrium approach, one has already admitted that there is no 
single Archimedean point from which to judge the superiority of one practice over 
another. Thus both PoP and some PoT theorists will have the same problems to deal 
with here. According to the PoP approach, though, as we have mentioned, a reasonable 
pluralism seems to be allowed for and indeed is claimed as a positive implication of 
such an approach. However, the question arises as to how the PoP approach can 
nonetheless allow for rational choice between practices. Moreover, over and above this 
epistemological problem there is the metaphysical question of whether or not there 
exists more than one correct morality. The question that arises for the PoP approach at 
this level is whether it is forced to accept evil practices as in some sense correct. 
Whether or not the PoT approach also has the resources to deal with this question will 
not be our central concern.71
Let us then take an imaginary practitioner in what we will term his home practice and 
ask whether he can rationally choose to affirm that this practice is more rational than 
any other. The first point to consider is whether or not this is a choice that he has to 
make. The fact is that one is not bom and faced with the question of deciding without 
prejudice which practice to live in. One is bom into a practice and is habituated into it 
by ‘training’ as we have seen. Significantly, therefore, in Judaism the definitive 
Halakhic criteria for membership of the religion is birth rather than the acceptance of 
any set of abstract principles. You are bom into the Jewish religion, into a certain pre­
existing framework, and practically habituated into the norms of that framework. But as 
such you are bom into a set of obligations and do not just freely choose them. This 
expresses the truth that we do not start from a neutral standpoint and simply choose a 
certain way of life from an array of theoretical options set before us in accordance with 
which we work out which is the best way to live. We neither do so nor indeed could do 
so for in order to be able to make such an informed decision, we must have some 
criteria to enable such a choice.
This reflects the communitarian view that ‘to have character is to know that I move in a 
history I neither summon nor command, which carries consequences none the less for
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my choices and conduct.’72 Such a view is at odds with the modem individualist view 
that my identity is entirely a matter of choice. According to the alternative view, in 
order to attain any sort of moral or religious identity, we have to be habituated into a 
certain mode of life and this is effected by participation in the practice itself. That is not 
to say that individuals are just ciphers who do not in any sense form their own 
identities. But it does mean that, as MacIntyre writes
Without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin.
. . . Particularity can never be simply left behind or obliterated. The notion of escaping
from it into a realm of entirely universal maxims which belong to man as such. . . is an
illncinn nr \A  an i11ncir*n nritVi noinfiil nnnoannarM-M ^AAAMUAVU Mil AA MUtViA M tUl J/UlUlUi VViilUWI^UVUVVUi
If one accepts such a view of the self then by the time one is given to rational reflection 
on one’s practice, one is reflecting very much with prejudice. Once we are in a position 
to make any reflective choice about practical options, we have already been inculcated 
into a certain way of life and according to the PoP approach, that very habituation 
enables us to understand the practice to be rational. What this means though is that we 
can at this stage rationalise our practice, if only ex post facto, and therefore we can see 
it to be rational and better than others that cannot be seen to be rational from the 
perspective of the home practice.
From a PoP perspective all of this is to be expected. For we will have a reasoned 
confidence in our practice as a result of participating in it and will not have a 
corresponding confidence in those in which we have not participated. The point is that 
according to the PoP approach, given the practical nature of practical justifications, 
other practices are not seen as live options from a practical point of view. Thus the 
question of the correctness of another system is unlikely to arise for as long as one can 
justify one’s own, even if that justification is internal to the practice and understood as 
such. Practically speaking we can continue to affirm our own practice until such time as 
it ceases to make sense to us. We cannot accept the claims of the other practice from a 
practical point of view and the fact that we cannot reject it from some foundational 
theoretical standpoint has no positive bearing on its claims nor any negative effect on 
our own, as long as they remain coherent from the experiential point of view.74 
The critic of the PoP approach seems to assume that if one reflects on practices in this 
manner, it will make one believe that one’s own practice is not therefore objective. 
However, it seems that we neither can nor need to gain the type of objectivity that our 
critics are using to beat us with here in order to judge the rationality of our own 
practice. The PoP approach of course would not expect there to be such a structure to
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our practical reasoning and is therefore not disappointed to find that this is the case. 
The PoT approach on the other hand in treating practices in a quasi-scientific way end 
up with a scientific model that does not live up to the expected criteria for scientific 
objectivity and is therefore seen as degenerate science rather than a cognitively 
respectable practice. There is no foundational theoretical reason for the choice of one 
practice over another that we require for practical objectivity. The very idea that there 
could be is illusory to begin with. What we need is the ability to understand our own 
practice as rational and as such, what is important is that we retain a reasoned 
confidence in our practice and continue to see it as the most viable way of life for 
ourselves. As long as the practice continues to make sense internally, the mere de facto 
existence of other practices need not lead us to accept that our practice is not the correct 
one and that some other one is.
However, the problem remains that if it is practke that ultimately justifies practices, are 
we led to have to conclude that the practice of the Nazi’s for example, was justified, at 
least from their own perspective? One point that the PoP theorist must admit is that we 
cannot show a Nazi that he is wrong by utilising principles as the PoT theorist does. As 
Taylor writes
If “showing them” means presenting facts or principles which they cannot but accept and
which are sufficient to disprove their position, then we are indeed incapable of doing this.75
However, as Taylor goes on to say, such an approach reflects a mistaken view of what 
practical reason is. According to Taylor, the Nazi’s did not really reject the 
fundamental principle against violating human life. Rather, they accepted the principle 
and excluded certain classes from it on specious grounds. Thus, says Taylor this sort of 
appeal to irrational special pleading shows that the very challenge itself is not a rational 
one. But what Taylor is saying here is that the real problem with the Nazi regime was 
in fact the use of a false pseudo-scientific race theory which can be fought on 
theoretical grounds rather than practical ones. He assumes that the problem here was in 
the theoretical realm which was thought to justify a certain modification to the practical 
norm, a modification that is exposed by similar appeal to considerations that are 
theoretical rather than practical. According to Taylor’s analysis therefore, the 
fundamental practical issue is agreed upon and what we find is the intrinsic irrationality 
of a certain theoretical stance that has grave practical implications. The refusal by the 
Nazis to countenance the theoretical arguments against such a stance constitutes their 
irrationality.
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What though if one cannot expose such theoretical problems or we are confronted with 
a bloody-minded refusal to countenance such evidence? Here it is essential to note that 
the PoP theorist may appeal to certain minimal universal moral standards in order to 
argue against evil practices. The fact is that a practical justification of a certain discrete 
practice such as that against violating human life may constitute evidence for 
practitioners to conclude that certain of their practices are justified universally. 
Generally, what is important here is the idea that these practical justifications can 
afford us evidence of the intrinsic practical rationality or irrationality of certain 
practices. It is true that recognising this might depend on one’s experience. As Rorty 
notes
The pragmatists’ justification of toleration, free inquiry, and the quest for undistorted 
communication can only take the form of a comparison between societies which exemplify 
these habits and those which do not, leading to the suggestion that nobody who has 
experienced both would prefer the latter?6 (Emphasis added).
As such, even for the Nazi’s themselves, we need not say that their practice is justified 
‘from their own point of view’. The fact is that the PoP approach can recognise that this 
experience is wrong simpliciter. Certainly the evidence for this assertion is experiential. 
But that is an epistemological point rather than a metaphysical one. The recognition 
that something is wrong may well depend for the PoP theorist on the constitutive 
experiences of practitioners. However, that the PoP theorist cannot prove this to those 
who are practically irrational does not constitute an objection to his general approach. It 
is no objection to the PoP theorist that certain Nazis did not recognise the practical 
irrationality of their practices any more than it is an objection to correct science that 
they refused to accept the falsity of their pseudo-scientific race theories.
Practice itself therefore can lead to an understanding of certain acts as universally 
prohibited and just because the same conclusion may be justified in different ways by 
different practices does not affect the fundamental intrinsic rationality of those
7 7conclusions. Thus, within Judaism for example there is the category of the seven 
Noahide laws, which are those laws that Judaism regards as incumbent on all human 
beings as such. The fact is that the constitutive experience of living according to these 
norms within Jewish practice leads to a reasoned confidence in their universality. Thus, 
evil practices such as those of the Nazi’s are ruled out as practically irrational given the 
fact that the PoP theorist understands their practice as violating a prohibition that is 
universally practically justified.
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Notwithstanding this, it has to be recognised that should enough people accept such 
evil practices, the failure to recognise the intrinsic irrationality of that practice would 
have grave practical consequences. But the fact is that these would be unlikely to be a 
result of some failure to follow an argument properly. And this returns us to Taylor’s 
analysis of the Nazis. For one might well attempt to show that the problem with the 
Nazis stems from their special pleading, but the fact is that arguments showing them 
these inconsistencies are unlikely to have any effect. What we have here is a grave 
practical problem stemming from an inability to recognise the practical evidence for the 
intrinsic practical irrationality of their practice. This inability might well stem from 
habituation to evil practices, but it is that practical starting point that is fundamentally 
irrational from a practical perspective, not some theoretical principle. The apparent 
‘ethnocentricity’ of such an assertion is only seen to be problematic since as Rorty 
observes, ‘the philosophical tradition has accustomed us to the idea that anybody who 
is willing to listen to reason . . .  can be brought around to the truth.’78 The fact remains 
that should a majority decide to act in such a manner, then the PoT theorist is no more 
likely to succeed in stemming the tide than the PoP theorist. But what the PoP theorist 
stresses, correctly in my view, is the essentially practical nature of this problem.
7. The PoP Approach: Summary
In summary, we have reached the following position. What we are looking for is a 
reasoned confidence in our practices. According to the PoT approach, the only way to 
gain such confidence is by setting out a propositional account of the practice that 
constitutes its rationality. The PoP theorist does not believe that this approach can be 
successful but believes that practice itself is a rational way of gaining a reasoned 
confidence in a practice. The process of habituation yields this reasoned confidence in 
two ways. Firstly, it yields a capacity to make reasoned decisions regarding practice 
based upon a certain situational appreciation of particular instances. This confers a 
retrospective confidence in the practice that led to this very appreciation, acting as 
evidence for the rationality of the practice itself. At the same time this process leads to 
what can best be described in vague terms as a practical understanding of the practice 
based on an experience that constitutes that understanding. It is this practical 
understanding that underlies our reasoned confidence in these descriptive categories 
and that we appeal to as evidence of the practical rationality of our practice when 
discursive justifications cease to convince. For in the final analysis, people from other 
practices might not recognise the validity of our descriptive categories given the
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absence of this practical justification. The very descriptive terms that we use are only 
convincing to one who has practised a certain way. At this point the notion of 
irreducible practical rationality comes into the equation, and the only justifications are 
non-discursive.
Nonetheless, the descriptive capacity that we do gain, while neither the foundation of 
our reasoned confidence, nor constitutive of the rationality of the practice plays an
essential role in the critical development of the practice and the avoidance of
\
conservatism. For mere participation in a practice that yields a certain form of 
understanding and practical justification is not sufficient for a reasoned confidence. A 
reasoned confidence requires that one can both develop one’s own practice in the face 
of changing realities and assert that one’s own practice is justified in full recognition of 
the existence and possible rationality of other practices. It is the ability to set out one’s 
views in a discursive manner that underlies these capacities, though they are to be seen 
as the tools for the upkeep and development of practical rationality rather than the 
fundamental rational foundation of the practice. We must accept that fundamentally we 
may not give a principled justification at the level of actual decision making nor a 
propositional justification at the most basic level of our general practices. But practice 
need not therefore be a matter of blind faith. It can be a matter of acting on a reasoned 
confidence. There are many further refinements that need to be made to this PoP
7Qtheory. But what we have here in essence is an alternative approach to rationalising 
practices in general that grows out of consideration of a model of Jewish philosophy 
that seems to me both truer to the nature of practices and greater in its explanatory 
power than a PoT approach.
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49 We will not dwell on the particular mechanisms for such criticism since a number of sophisticated 
analyses are already available that I believe could be effectively built upon by the PoP theorist. See, for 
example, Alasdair McIntyre Whose Justice Which Rationality (London: Duckworth, 1988), esp. Chapter 
18; Charles Taylor, ‘Explanation and Practical Reason’ in Philosophical Arguments, pp. 34-60; and 
Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1987).
Charles Taylor, ‘Social Theory as Practice’, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical
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vein Taylor constantly refers to ‘living’ in his elucidation of our understanding of the practical rationality 
of a given practice: ‘We are convinced that a certain view is superior because we have lived a transition 
which we understand as error-reducing and hence as epistemic gain.’ (Emphasis added). Charles Taylor, 
Sources o f the Self, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 72.
51 Taylor, ‘Social Theory as Practice’, pp. 11 Iff.
52 Given our discussion of Aristotle, it is interesting to note that Cooper comes close to attributing a PoP 
approach to Aristotle, writing that ‘the practically intelligent man’s knowledge o f the ultimate end, which 
determines his conception of good living, must be practical and nontheoretical. And since . . . this 
knowledge is not founded on any discursive process o f deliberative selection, it must be a kind of 
intuitive knowledge, not based on reasons of any kind.’ Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, p. 62 (my 
emphases).
53 Indeed, many details of the laws governing the practice may simply not require this level of 
rationalisation. This is something Maimonides recognised when he wrote that having a reason to 
sacrifice did not necessarily mean having a reason for the particular form each sacrifice took, such as 
whether one used a ram or a lamb. They are simply the technical rules that have been agreed upon for the 
performance of the general commandment.
We will see in the final section of this chapter that this PoP approach does though have limits and need 
not lead to relativism.
55 It is not relevant here whether or not Judaism ever was a missionary religion. The important point here 
is that it has now developed into a non-missionary religion, whether as a result o f its own volition or as a 
result of its contact with other religions. As we will see presently, the fact that this might have developed 
over time in response to other religions does not question its validity as a statement about Judaism.
56 Sacks, One People, pp. 143-4.
57 Joseph B. Soloveitchik ‘Confrontation’, Tradition, vol. 6 (1964), pp. 5-28. Quotation from pp.21-23.
58 See MacIntyre, After Virtue, Chapter 15.
59 Moreover on the PoP account the problems regarding the appeal to some a priori rationality of the 
properties utilised in the PoT theory disappear for the rationality of the practice turns out to be entirely a 
posteriori and dependent on habituation to particular practices.
60 Thus, Copp argues that the reason that the scientific CT model discussed in the previous chapter does 
not work to justify what he calls moral standards is that moral standards are not propositions that can be 
given truth-values. Since we cannot bring evidence for the truth of something that cannot be assessed for 
truth in the first place, we evidently cannot therefore empirically confirm (or refute as the case may 
be)moral standards via CT. See David Copp, ‘Explanation and Justification in Ethics’, Ethics, vol. 100 
(1990), pp. 237-258. What seems to me important to retain though is the idea that such standards do 
nonetheless have what John Skorupski has called ‘judgeable contents’ and as such can be assessed for 
some form of correctness. See John Skorupski, ‘Value-Pluralism’, in David Archard ed., Philosophy and 
Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 101-115.
61 David Wiggins makes a similar point in his Aristotelian discussion of akrasia, saying that we should 
not expect a perfect analogy between practical and theoretical syllogisms. Once one has a propositional 
demonstration in the theoretical case, there is nothing the will can (or should) do to affect whether or not 
one accepts the conclusion. In the practical case, where the conclusion of the syllogism is an action the 
operations of the will are of paramount importance. See David Wiggins, ‘Weakness of Will, 
Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire’, in Rorty ed. Essays, pp 241-265, esp. 
section V.
62 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p. 114.
63 Kraemer, The Mind o f the Talmud, p. 139.
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65 The best known of these is probably the story of ‘The oven of Akhnai’ in B. T. Baba Metzia 59b.
66 See B.T. Sanhedrin, 86b-89a and Moses Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Mamrim (Laws 
Concerning Rebels), III: 3-8, translated by Abraham M. Hershman in The Code o f Maimonides Book 14: 
The Book Of Judges (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 143-146.
67 However, the ‘truth’ of these derivations does not justify the commandment from some abstract 
philosophical point of view, it merely grounds it in the text. The philosophical justification is what 
remains out of the reach of these arguments.
68 B.T. Hagigah 3b and Eruvin 13b. There are many interpretations of the precise meaning of this phrase 
and many complex issues that surround it. For discussion of the issues see Avi Sagi, Eilu ve-Eilu: A 
Study o f the Meaning of Halakhic Discourse (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1996); and 
Michael Rosensweig, ‘ Eilu ve-Eilu Divrei Elohim Hayyim: Halakhic Pluralism and Theories of 
Controversy’, in Sokol ed. Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy, pp. 93-122.
69 Moreover, it seems to me highly significant that the final practical decision is not thought to 
correspond to some prepositional standard of theoretical truth. Indeed, after noting that the opposed 
schools of Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai both speak ‘the words of the living God’, the Talmud records 
that the Halakhah is fixed according to Beth Hillel ‘because they were kindly and modest, they studied 
their own rulings and those of Beth Shammai, and even were so humble as to mention the actions of Beth 
Shammai before theirs.’ (B.T. Eruvin 13b). The decision in favour of Beth Hillel could be seen therefore 
to be taken on practical grounds rather than on grounds of theoretical ‘truth’.
70 Thus as Lamm points out, within Judaism, ‘doubt can be acknowledged as part of cognitive faith . . . 
[but] the functional commitment must be absolute’. ‘Faith and Doubt’, p. 19. Though he somewhat 
overstates the case here, the fundamental point is correct. More generally, the concept of Rabbinic 
authority has an important part to play here in considering the case of Zaken Mamre. For more detailed 
consideration of these issues see Moshe Sokol ed. Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy 
(Northvale, N.J.: Aronson, 1992). The relationship between the various concepts discussed here and the 
PoP approach would be fertile areas for future research.
71 The move away from a traditional model of theoretical truth in the practical sphere may well allow the 
PoP approach to deal with some of the awkward questions that arise when attempting to formulate such a 
pluralistic view in terms of truth. Obviously though, this statement merely marks out an area for future 
research rather than any sort of argument. Indeed, the whole notion of ‘practical truth’ that we have 
appropriated from Aristotle needs to be developed far more rigorously than space here allows. Some of 
the relevant issues though that would need to be approached are discussed in Harry Bunting, ‘A Single 
True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism’ in Archard, ed., Philosophy and Pluralism, pp. 73-85; C. J. 
McKnight, ‘Pluralism, Realism and Truth’, ibid., pp. 87-99; and Skorupski, ‘Value-Pluralism’.
72 Michael Sandel, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered S e lf, in Shlomo Avineri and Avner 
de-Shalit eds., Communitarianism and Individualism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 12- 
28. Quotation from p. 23. Such communitarian considerations form the explicit background to Jonathan 
Sacks’ discussion of the ‘Traditional Jewish Self in One People, pp. 156ff. Moreover, the tension 
between freedom and necessity contained in this view is one of the focal points of Soloveitchik’s 
discussion of cleaving to God’s commandments in ‘U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham’.
73 MacIntyre After Virtue, p. 221.
74 This of course is to reject views such as those of Alan Gewirth for whom it must be possible ‘to 
present rationally grounded moral criticisms, in a non-question begging way’, and find the ‘necessity and 
universality that can be achieved by rational argument as applied to the context of action and morality.’ 
See Alan Gewirth, ‘Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge’ in Paul, Miller and Paul eds., 
Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge, pp. 22-43. Quotation from p.29.
75 Charles Taylor, ‘Explanation and Practical Reason’, p.35.
76 Richard Rorty, ‘ Solidarity or Objectivity’ in Objectivity Relativism and Truth, pp. 21-34. Quotation 
from p. 29. I would though, for all the reasons discussed, reject Rorty’s claim that any justification of 
these ‘habits’ is inevitably circular.
77 Note that appeal to universality does not vitiate our claims regarding uncodifiability, for a value can be 
universal without being overriding, i.e. without its being the case that it always takes precedence over 
other values. See John Kekes, ‘Pluralism and The Value of Life’, in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred. D. Miller 
and Jeffrey Paul eds., Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), pp.44-60.
78 Rorty, ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’, Objectivity Relativism and Truth, p. 188.
79 Two of the most important issues to discuss would be: 1) The development of the Aristotelian notion 
of practical truth; 2) If a practice is justified by practice, how can someone who has been habituated to a 
practice and is a participating member secede from it? One significant factor here would of course be 
akrasia. But it would be patronising to assume that this was the explanation for all such secession.
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Chapter seven
Conclusion: Autonomous Jewish Philosophy 
We began this thesis by looking at a particular topic discussed in the works of those 
who have been taken to be Jewish philosophers doing Jewish philosophy -  that of 
Ta’amei ha-Mitzyot. We have discussed the models of rationalisation of Maimonides 
and Soloveitchik and attempted to set out a contrasting model of rationalisation that we 
claimed was to be found implicit in classical Judaism. On the surface therefore it might 
seem as if we have been doing Jewish philosophy.
However, we also began this thesis with Levy’s dilemma concerning the very concept 
of Jewish philosophy. On the one hand the universal nature of philosophy seems to rule 
out the possibility of there being anything that Judaism qua Judaism can contribute to 
philosophical discussion. Any philosophical contribution would in the final analysis 
have to be universal and the Jewish origin of such a contribution would be of historical 
interest alone. Were any specifically Jewish content to remain it would fail to be 
philosophical by definition. To conclude this thesis therefore I would like to make 
some brief observations regarding how what we have done in this thesis relates to this 
dilemma.
Jewish practice, inasmuch as Jewish practice is particular to Jewish people, would seem 
to be a perfect subject for Jewish philosophy. However our historical studies at the 
beginning of the thesis seem to exemplify Levy’s dilemma perfectly. For what 
Maimonides does in his rationalisation is attempt to show that this particular practice is 
in fact an expression of a universal mode of rationality. Thus while making the practice 
intelligible to a universal philosophical readership, he has been accused of removing its 
Jewish content. We are presented with a universal philosophical practice rather than a 
Jewish one, as the first horn of Levy’s dilemma would have it.1
It is precisely this universalisation of Jewish practice that Soloveitchik criticises, 
holding that Jewish practice must retain its autonomy and as such should not be the 
handmaiden of some presumed universalistic mode of rationality. Soloveitchik attempts 
therefore to retain particularity by analysing Jewish practice in terms of specifically 
Jewish principles and concepts, an approach that as we have seen has been taken in the 
general philosophical field of ethics. For in the practical sphere many might reject 
universalism and accept that there are a number of different forms of rationality that 
practices can exemplify. However, we have argued that the problem with any such
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discursive approach to justifying practices is the circular nature of the justification that 
it yields. This problem of circularity seems to be a problem for the very reason that 
both the premises and the practice, while mutually coherent, cannot be justified beyond 
their own cultural boundaries and thus we end up with a particular coherent scheme 
that cannot be justified universally.2 As such its philosophical content is called into 
doubt according to the second horn of the dilemma. We therefore find that our models 
of rationalisation perfectly exemplify the very dilemma facing Jewish philosophy. 
However, we have attempted to locate an alternative approach to the whole issue of 
justifying practices that questions the presumption that the ultimate justifications of 
practice are discursive. Moreover, we have claimed that this is an approach that can be 
found in Jewish sources. Nonetheless, the manner in which we presented this 
alternative is as an approach to justifying practices that is philosophically and 
presumably therefore universally valid, thus still impaling ourselves once more on the 
first horn of Levy’s dilemma. In what sense then have we done, or can we do, Jewish 
philosophy?
Our reflections on approaches to justification are very much second order reflections at 
the meta level and it does seem prima facie implausible to think that such second order 
considerations can be limited to particular groups. If our arguments against PoT 
justifications and for a PoP approach work, they surely work across the board and as 
such, what we have been doing is not Jewish philosophy according to Levy’s dilemma. 
However, taking this approach at the meta level has certain ramifications for this 
dilemma at other levels.
The first point is that practical philosophy does not only take place at the meta level. 
Thus we find normative ethical theories that purport to give us substantive conclusions 
concerning what is right and wrong, Rawls’ theory of justice itself being a classic 
modem example. Now it is often claimed that we cannot do normative Jewish ethics 
any more than we can do meta Jewish ethics. Thus as Kellner notes, since Kant it has 
been accepted by philosophy at large that normative ethics has to be universally 
acceptable and universally applicable.3
We have seen that there is good reason to question this assumption. However, what the 
PoP approach shows us is that in fact the question of the particularity or universality of 
Jewish practice and Jewish practical philosophy is not the issue here. The reason that 
we cannot do practical Jewish philosophy at the normative level has less to do with this 
issue and more to do with the limits of philosophy in the practical sphere. What we 
have discovered is that the sort of discursive normative theory that would dictate the
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form that practice should take is not in fact possible. As such, it seems as if our meta- 
Jewish philosophy has an important critical function. It is critical of the positive 
contribution that philosophy as traditionally conceived as an exclusively discursive 
discipline can make to practices. That is not to say that we cannot reflect on our 
practices. It is just that such reflection is less abstractly philosophical than concretely 
practical. Again, this is not a particularistic Jewish conclusion. Bernard Williams in his 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy makes very much the same point and thus the 
conclusion is again maybe philosophical rather than Jewish. Nonetheless it is highly 
significant that though we might conclude that there can be no normative Jewish 
philosophy in the practical sphere, it is not for the reasons that we originally thought, 
certainly not for the reasons posited by Levy’s dilemma. The problem is that the 
formation of philosophical ethical theories in general as traditionally conceived is a 
futile task.
This in itself is a very notable conclusion for though it means that we may not therefore 
be able to do autonomous Jewish philosophy in this sphere, we have preserved the 
autonomy to some extent of Jewish practice, which need no longer be dictated to by 
any external theory. Certainly total autonomy is a chimera. Dialogue is a central part of 
the practice and since practices do not exist in vacuums, it is possible for different 
practices to have reciprocal influences. However, the PoP approach retains the idea that 
the litmus test of the acceptability of a practice is its practical acceptability to Judaism 
in the eyes of its expert practitioners who are fully aware of the practical rationality of 
Jewish practice (and ideally of the value of external contributions). The halakhic 
decision is final and authoritative within Judaism.
At the same time, despite our rejection of the idea that we can form a normative theory 
of the commandments we need not reject Soloveitchik’s idea that the commandments 
embody a certain world view. Indeed, it seems to me that this may indeed be in part 
correct. According to Soloveitchik the commandments are meaningful ‘expressions’ in 
Dilthey’s sense of the word that embody all sorts of presuppositions about the world 
and our place in it. What this leads to is a picture of Jewish philosophy as an 
interpretive task modelled on the later Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy 
according to which ‘we must do away with explanation, and description alone must 
take its place.’4 Jewish philosophy would therefore become an enterprise whereby we 
uncover the concepts and ideas embodied within the practice. Indeed, this interpretive 
task has been undertaken by many a Jewish philosopher throughout history and as 
Seeskin notes ‘Jewish thinkers did not have to wait for the latter part of the twentieth
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century to take seriously the goals of interpretation and critique.’5 Though we cannot in 
this conclusion evaluate the validity of such a conception of philosophy, it would need 
more than the simple statement of Levy’s dilemma to rule it out.
Whatever the value of this approach turns out to be, it is important to note that the 
halakhah seems in fact to overdetermine world views. The practice it seems embodies a 
variety of views about man and his relationship to God and the world. Indeed, in 
Judaism the realm of Aggadah is open to plural interpretations as recognised in the idea 
of Aggadic pluralism.6 Thus, it seems that what we have is a very pluralistic view 
whereby a number of philosophical frameworks can inform the same behavioural 
practice. What we end up with is what Rawls has, in a different context, termed an 
overlapping consensus. In Rawls an overlapping consensus describes the situation in 
which different reasonable doctrines can all affirm the same political conception and 
‘the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from its own point of 
view’.7 In effect, what we are arguing is that within Judaism, we find that clustered 
around the same halakhic way of life are very different philosophical views that all in 
support this halakhic way of life in different ways. We find an overlapping consensus 
in the realm of halakhah of reasonable philosophical doctrines.
But what is most important here is that as in Rawls’ picture, such philosophical views 
are not allowed to directly affect halakhic behaviour, which of course is precisely what 
we would expect of a PoP approach. There are a variety of different frameworks within 
which one can continue to act according to the dictates of the Halakhah. These 
frameworks might well hold the practice up in a different light to different people, but 
the outward behaviour remains the same for the theories do not generally dictate the 
content of the practice.8
As such what we seem to find therefore is a value in reflecting on these philosophical 
frameworks for their own sake rather than for the sake of the practice. The working out 
of a theoretical framework in which to locate one’s practice is a worthwhile intellectual 
enterprise in itself, which may affect how you conceive of your practice without 
necessarily affecting its behavioural form.9 In Judaism then the motivation to do 
philosophy is not primarily connected to its practical effects, for philosophy as 
traditionally conceived should more often than not be divorced from direct influence on 
practice. According to the PoP approach we do not ultimately justify practices by 
reference to these views. For the PoP theorist’s conceptual framework is not there to 
justify the practice. It is there to interpret its presuppositions and whilst this may well 
help us to understand more about Judaism, it cannot lead to a justification of its
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practical norms, but then again nothing discursive could; that justification can only be 
gained practically. Theoretical concerns in Jewish philosophy remain just that, but in 
that resides their very value.
Thus, it would appear that in Judaism appreciates the limits of philosophy in the 
practical sphere and the value of the interpretive task in the theoretical sphere. At the 
same time though, this does restrict Jewish philosophy in the theoretical sphere. One 
could, for example, elaborate a philosophical anthropology out of the sources of 
halakhah as Soloveitchik does, and tackle certain topics such as repentance. However, 
other questions on which there must be a single universal answer, cannot form part of 
Jewish philosophy. Thus, for example, the question of whether or not the world was 
created, one of the central questions in medieval Jewish philosophy, has it would seem 
a single correct answer and no ‘Jewish’ thinking on this can have any independent 
philosophical value. This of course would rule out much of what has passed for Jewish 
philosophy in the past. In relation to this, though it is significant that throughout this 
thesis we have been suggesting the inadequacy of a certain model of rationality in the 
practical sphere and suggesting an alternative in its place. Yeshayahu Leibowitz 
criticises the form of rationality we have rejected as follows:
A prevalent conception, which stems from a shallow rationalism, distinguishes the 
kernel from husk in religion; the eternal ideational content of absolute value becomes 
incarnate in various external forms, which may, without loss, be exchanged for others 
and ought to be superseded from time to time to fit changing circumstances. This 
distinction is baseless. Substance is embodied in form. The essence of a given content 
is inseparable from the particular form which it takes on. Were it clothed differently, 
it could not be the identical content.10
Now it is true that we have been stressing in this thesis the differences between 
practical and theoretical rationality. However, if we may conclude on a rather open 
ended note, it is interesting that this very general idea about rationality implicit in the 
PoP approach to practices, that ‘the essence of a given content is inseparable from the 
particular form which it takes,’ is an idea that has been much discussed by 
contemporary continental philosophers as having a wider application. We find the idea 
that while there may be a certain translatable propositional meaning common to 
different philosophies, other non-propositional ‘forces’ explicit and implicit, will also 
be involved that affect the nature of the philosophical act. As Alan Montefiore has 
written
Any unit of discourse whatsoever is bound to contain within it some complex and 
never determinable interplay of what we may characterise here as meanings and
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forces. This must be as true of philosophical discourse as of any other . . . explicit 
argumentation and conclusion never constitute the whole message (or messages) of 
any text or discourse whether they be philosophical or of some other kind; and . . . 
there can in principle be no apodeictically conclusive definition of determinate 
frontiers between that in the overall message which is of philosophical relevance and 
that which is not.11
This though leaves open the idea that we may even be able to do Jewish philosophy in 
those areas which admit of only one universal answer. For the very fact that this answer 
has been derived from classical Jewish texts and within a certain traditional mode of 
discourse may itself turn out to be of philosophical relevance. What is and is not 
philosophical may not be capable of being abstracted away from the mode of 
presentation of a certain type of philosophy, any more than the rationality of a practice 
can be abstracted away from the practice. Thus, the PoP approach to practice leaves an 
interesting track open for the Jewish philosopher in the realm of theory.
1 The interesting question that arises out of Maimonides’ analysis is whether or not he held that in virtue 
of its universal rationality, in principle every rational being could, and from a rational perspective should, 
take up this Jewish practice. In his writings on the days of the Messiah he notes only that all will be 
occupied with knowing God -  not that all will practise as Jews. See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, 
Hilchot Melachim, Chapter 12. Translated by Raymond Weiss as ‘Laws of Kings and Their Wars’ in 
Raymond L. Weiss and Charles Butterworth, Ethical Writings of Maimonides (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1975).
2 Of course, our alternative PoP approach also cannot justify itself beyond its own boundaries. However, 
on the PoP approach we can understand why this should be the case and of course can avoid the problem 
of circularity. Neither of these can be achieved on PoT approaches.
3 See Menachem Kellner, ‘Is Contemporary Jewish Philosophy Possible? - No’, in Samuelson, Studies, 
pp. 17-28.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans., G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell,
1953), I § 109.
5 Kenneth Seeskin, Jewish Philosophy in a Secular Age (New York: SUNY Press, 1990), p. 11.
6 Jonathan Sacks, One People (London, Littman Library of Jewish Civilisation, 1993), pp. 92-98. It is 
significant though that Sacks notes that Aggadic Pluralism extends to those areas that do not have direct 
legal consequences. Our argument has been that philosophical matters have this very characteristic.
7 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 134.
8 There are though debates concerning what does and does not constitute a halakhic issue and this is very 
much affected by one’s philosophical stance. See Lawrence Kaplan, ‘Daas Torah: A Modem Conception 
of Rabbinic Authority’, in Moshe Sokol ed. Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy (Northvale, N.J.: 
Aronson, 1992), pp. 1-60.
9 Thus, Soloveitchik might have had a point when he wrote that ‘theoretical Halakhah, not the practical 
decision, the ideal creation, not the empirical one, represent the longing of halakhic man’. (HMN 23-24). 
Though we would say that theoretical philosophy rather than theoretical halakhah was the longing of the 
philosophical Jew.
0 Yeshayau Leibowitz, Judaism, Human Values and The Jewish State, trans. Eliezer Goldman 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 7-8.
11 Alan Montefiore, ‘Philosophy in Different Cultural Contexts’, in David Archard, ed., Philosophy and 
Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.7-17. Quotation from pp. 16-17.
207
Bibliography
Ackrill, J.L., Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Altmann, A., ‘Maimonides’ Four Perfections’, Essays in Jewish Intellectual History (Hanover, N. H.: 
University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 65-76.
Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
 , The Physics, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Faye in Jonathan Barnes ed. The Complete Works of
Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 315- 
446.
 , Nichomachean Ethics, trans. (as Ethics) J.A.K. Thomson, revised with notes and appendices by
Hugh Tredennick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976).
Armstrong, D. M., Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume 1 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978).
Arneson, R., ‘Introduction [to a Symposium on Rawlsian Theory of Justice: Recent Developments]’, 
Ethics, vol. 99, no. 4, (July 1989), pp. 695-710.
Babylonian Talmud, trans. I. Epstein (London: Soncino Press. 1935-48).
Bambrough, R., ‘Objectivity and Objects’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 72, (1972), pp. 
65-81.
Barnes, J., Aristotle (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982).
Berkovits, E., ‘What is Jewish Philosophy?’, Tradition, vol. 3 (1961), pp. 117-130.
 , Major Themes in Modem Philosophies of Judaism (New York: Ktav, 1974).
 , God, Man and History (New York: Jonathan David, 1959).
 , Not in Heaven: the Nature and Function of Halakhah (New York, Ktav, 1983).
Berlin, I., The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy 
(London: Fontana, 1991).
Berman, L. V., ‘Maimonides, the Disciple of Alfarabi’, Israel Oriental Studies, vol. 4 (1974), pp. 154- 
178.
 , ‘The Ethical Views of Maimonides within the Context of Islamicate Civilisation’. In J. L.
Kraemer ed. Perspectives on Maimonides (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 13-32.
Besdin, A.R., ‘May we Interpret Hukkim?’ in Man of Faith in the Modem World, Reflections of the Rav 
Volume Two, (Hoboken, NJ.: Ktav, 1989), pp. 91-99.
Bleich, J.D., With Perfect Faith: The Foundations of Jewish Belief (New York: Ktav, 1983).
Boyd, R., ‘How to be a Moral Realist’, in G. Sayre-McCord ed. Essays on Moral Realism (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 181-228.
Brison, S., ‘The Theoretical Importance of Practice,’ in Judith De Cew and Ian Shapiro eds. Theory and 
Practice (New York: New York University Press, 1995), pp. 216-238.
Broadie, S., Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
Brown, H.I., Rationality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988).
Bulhof, I. N., Wilhelm Dilthey: A Hermeneutic Approach to the Study o f History and Culture (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980).
208
Bunting, H., ‘A Single True Morality? The Challenge of Relativism’ in David Archard, ed., Philosophy 
and Pluralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 73-85.
Bumyeat, M., ‘Aristotle on Learning to be Good,’ in Amelie A. Rorty ed. Essays on Aristotle's Ethics. 
(California, California University Press, 1980), pp. 69-92.
Cartwright, N., How the Laws of Physics Lie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
Cohen, H., ‘Charakteristik der Ethik Maimunis’, translated into Hebrew as ‘Ofyah shel Torat ha-Middot 
le-ha-Rambam’, in H. Cohen, Iyyunim be-Yahadut uve-Be’ayot ha-Dor, ed. Z. Wieslowski (Jerusalem: 
Mossad Bialik, 1978), pp. 17-59.
Collingwood, R. G., ‘Human Nature and Human History,’ in M. Martin and L. C. McIntyre eds.
Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 163-171.
Cnnnpr t m ‘ Aristotle on Natural Teleology,’ in M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum eds. Language and 
Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), pp. 196-222.
 , Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1986).
Copp, D., ‘Explanation and Justification in Ethics.’ Ethics, vol. 100 (January 1990), pp. 237-258.
Corrado, M., The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy: Background and Issues (Chicago: American Library 
Association, 1975).
Craig, E., Knowledge and the State of Nature, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
Dancy, J., Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).
 , ‘Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties.’ Mind, vol. 92 (1983), pp. 530-547.
 , Moral Reasons, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
 , ‘Why there is really no such thing as the Theory of Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, vol. 95 (1995), pp. 1-18.
Daniels, N., ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’, Journal Of Philosophy, 
vol. 76,(1979), pp. 256-282.
 , ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points’ Canadian Journal Of Philosophy, vol. 10,
no. 1 (March 1980), pp. 83-103.
Dobbs-Weinstein, I., Maimonides and St. Thomas on the Limits of Reason (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995).
Dorff, E. N., ‘Halakhic Man: A Review Essay’, Modem Judaism, vol 6 (1986), pp. 91-98.
Dummett, M., Origins of Analytic Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1993).
Fackenheim, E., ‘ The Revealed Morality of Judaism and Modem Thought,’ in Menachem M. Kellner 
ed. Contemporary Jewish Ethics. (New York: Sanhedrin Press, 1978), pp. 61-83.
 , To Mend the World. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982).
Fay, B., ‘General Laws and Explaining Human Behaviour’, in Martin and McIntyre eds. Readings in the 
Philosophy of Social Science, pp. 91-110.
 , Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996),
Fox, M., ‘On the Rational Commandments in Saadia’s Philosophy: A Re-examination’, Proceedings of 
the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies, vol. 3 (1977), pp. 33-43.
 , ‘The Unity and Structure of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Thought’, in Marc D. Angel ed.
Exploring the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, (Hoboken, NJ.: Ktav, 1997), pp. 25-53.
 , Interpreting Maimonides, (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
209
Frank, D., ‘The End of the Guide: Maimonides on the Best Life for Man’, Judaism, vol 34 (1985), pp. 
485-495.
Funkenstein, A., Maimonides: Nature, History and Messianic Beliefs (Tel Aviv: Naidat Press, 1997). 
Furrow, D., Against Theory (London: Routledge, 1995).
Gadamer, H.G., Truth and Method, (1960), ed. J. Cumming, trans. G. Barden and W. Glen-Doepel 
(1975), revised by J. Weinsheimer and D. G. Marshall. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1989).
Galston, M., ‘The Purpose of the Law According to Maimonides,’ Jewish Quarterly Review, vol.69 
(1978), pp. 27-51.
George, R. P.,‘ Moral Particularism, Thomism and Traditions.’ Review of Metaphysics, vol. 42 (1989), 
pp. 593-605.
Gersonides 1 he Wars ofiHc Lq?cI*9 3 volumes, trains. Ssymovir Feldman (PhiludclphiMi Jewish 
Publication Society, 1984,1987 & 1998).
Gewirth, A., ‘Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge’ in Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred. D. Miller 
and Jeffrey Paul eds. Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), pp. 22-43.
Goldman, E., ‘Rationality and Revelation in Maimonides’ Thought’, in S. Pines and Y. Yovel eds.
Maimonides and Philosophy (Dordrecht: Martinus NijdorffTKluwer 1986), pp. 15-23.
Goodman, N., Fact, Fiction and Forecast, (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973).
Grice, P., ‘Meaning’ Philosophical Review, vol. 66, (1957) pp. 377-88.
Guttmann, J., Philosophies o f Judaism, trans. D. W. Silverman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1964).
Habermas, J., Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Poliity Press, 1968). 
Halkin, A. & Hartman, D., Crisis and Leadership. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1985).
Hare, R., Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
Harre, R. & Krausz, M., Varieties of Relativism, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
Hartman, D., Maimonides: Torah and Philosophic Quest. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 
1986).
 , A Living Covenant: The Innovative Spirit in Traditional Judaism (New York: The Free Press,
1985).
 , ‘Soloveitchik’s Response to Modernity’, Conflicting Visions: Spiritual Possibilities of Modem
Israel (New York: Schocken, 1990), pp. 142-159.
 , ‘ Soloveitchik’s Religious Hero’, Ibid., pp. 160-172.
Harvey, S., ‘Maimonides in the Sultan’s Palace’, in Kraemer ed. Perspectives on Maimonides, pp. 47-75. 
Hempel, C. G., ‘The Functions of General Laws in History,’ reprinted in Martin and McIntyre eds.
Readings in the Philosophy o f Social Science, pp. 43-53.
Heinemann, I., Ta’amei ha-Mitzvot be-Sifrut Yisrael (Hebrew), 2 vols. (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency Press,
1954).
Hirsch, S. R., Horeb, trans. I. Grunfeld (London: Soncino Press, 1962).
Hocutt, M., ‘Aristotle’s Four Becauses’, Philosophy, vol. 49 (1974), pp. 385-399.
Horkheimer, M., ‘Means and Ends,’ The Eclipse of Reason, (New York: Seabury Press , 1947).
Husik, I., A History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy (New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1958). 
Hyman, A., ‘Demonstrative, Dialectical and Sophistic Arguments in the Philosophy of Moses
Maimonides,’ in Eric L. Ormsby ed. Moses Maimonides and His Time. (Washington: CUA 
Press, 1989), pp. 35-51.
Kamm, F.M., ‘High Theory, Low Theory, and the Demands of Morality,’ in De Cew and Shapiro eds. 
Theory and Practice, pp. 81-107.
Kant, I., ‘On the Proverb: That May Be True in Theory but Is of No Practical Use’ in Perpetual Peace 
and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1983), pp. 61-89.
Kaplan, L., ‘The Religious Philosophy of Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik’, Tradition, vol 14, no. 2 (1973), 
pp. 43-64.
 , ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Philosophy of Halakhah,’ The Jewish Law Annual, Vol. 7,
(1988), pp. 139-197.
‘Daas Torah* A Modem Conception of Rabbinic Authority’, in Moshs Sokol ed. Rabbinic
Authority and Personal Autonomy (Northvale, N.J.: Aronson, 1992), pp. 1-60.
Kekes, J., ‘Pluralism and The Value of Life’, in Paul, Miller and Paul eds. Cultural Pluralism and Moral 
Knowledge, pp. 44-60.
Kellner, M., Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought: From Maimonides to Abravanel. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986).
 , ‘Is Contemporary Jewish Philosophy Possible? ...No’, in Norbert Samuelson ed. Studies in
Jewish Philosophy: Collected Essays of the Academy for Jewish Philosophy, 1980-1985 (Lanham, 
Md.: University Press of America, 1987), pp. 17-28.
 , ‘The Conception of the Torah as a Deductive Science in Medieval Jewish Thought’, Revue Des
Etudes Juives, vol. 146 (1987), pp. 265-279.
 , Maimonides on Human Perfection (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990).
 , Must a Jew Believe Anything, (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilisation, 1999).
Kincaid H., ‘Defending Laws in the Social Sciences’, in Martin and McIntyre eds. Readings in the 
Philosophy o f Social Science, pp. 111-130.
Kogan, B., ‘Jewish Philosophy in the 1980’s: A Response to Professor Kellner,’ in Samuelson ed.
Studies in Jewish Philosophy, pp. 29-41.
Kolbrener, W., ‘Towards a Genuine Jewish Philosophy: Halakhic Mind’s New Philosophy of Religion’, 
reprinted in Angel ed. Exploring the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, pp. 179-206.
Kolitz, Z., Confrontation: The Existential Philosophy of Rabbi J.B. Soloveitchik (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav, 
1993).
Kraemer, D., The Mind of the Talmud (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Kraemer, J.L., ‘Maimonides on Aristotle and Scientific Method,’ in Ormsby ed. Moses Maimonides and 
His Time, pp. 35-88.
Kreisel, H., ‘The Practical Intellect in the Philosophy of Maimonides’, Hebrew Union College Annual, 
vol. 59 (1988), pp. 189-215.
Kurzweil, Z., ‘Universalism in the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’, The Modem Impulse of
Traditional Judaism (Hoboken, N.J.: Ktav, 1985), pp. 92-116.
Lamm, N., ‘Faith and Doubt’ in Faith and Doubt: Studies in Traditional Jewish Thought (New York: 
Ktav, 1986), pp. 1-40.
Leaman, O., Moses Maimonides (London, Routledge, 1990).
 , ‘Is Jewish Practical Philosophy Possible’, in Daniel H. Frank, ed., Commandment and
211
Community: New Essays in Jewish Legal and Political Philosophy (New York: SUNY Press,
1995), pp. 55-68.
Lear, J., ‘Ethics, Mathematics and Relativism’, Mind, vol. 92 (1982), pp. 38-60
 , Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Leibowitz, Y., ‘Religious Praxis,’ in Eliezer Goldman ed., Judaism, Human Values, and the Jewish 
State, trans. Eliezer Goldman et al. (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 3-29.
Lemer, R., ‘Maimonides’ Governance of the Solitary’. In Kraemer (ed.) Perspectives on Maimonides, 
pp. 33-46.
Levy, Z., Between Yafeth and Shem: On the Relationship Between Jewish and General Philosophy (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1987).
Lichtenstein A Joseph SoloVwitchilc,? in S. Novsck ed* Gvacit Jcwislz T'fzi*zItcvs Oj tJzs 7\Ar£Titi£ibi 
Century (New York: B ’nai B ’rith Department of Adult Jewish Education, 1963), pp. 281-297.
MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, second edition (London: Duckworth, 1985).
 , Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).
Mackie, J.L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977).
Maimonides, M., Commentary to the Mishnah, translated into Hebrew by Y. Kapach (Jerusalem: Mossad 
HaRav Kook, 1976).
 , Sefer ha-Mitzvot, 2 volumes, trans. Charles B. Chavel as The Commandments (London and
New York: Soncino Press, 1967).
 , Mishneh Torah (Bnei Brak: Yeshivat Ohel Yosef, 1986).
 , The Code of Maimonides Book 14: The Book Of Judges, trans. Abraham M. Hershman (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949).
 , The Guide of the Perplexed, 2 volumes, trans. S. Pines (Chicago & London: University of
Chicago Press), 1963.
 , Ethical Writings o f Maimonides, eds. Raymond L. Weiss and Charles Butterworth (New York:
Dover, 1975).
Makreel, R., Dilthey: Philosopher of The Human Studies, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
Marx, A ed ., ‘Texts by and about Maimonides,’ Jewish Quarterly Review, vol. 25 (1935), pp. 378-380. 
McDowell, J., ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volume 52 (1978), pp. 13-29.
 , ‘Virtue and Reason’ in R. Crisp and M. Slote ed. Virtue Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1997), pp. 141-162.
 , ‘Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics’ p.209, in Robert Heinaman ed. Aristotle and
Moral Realism, (London: UCL Press, 1995), pp. 201-218.
McIntyre, L. C., ‘Complexity and Social Scientific Laws’, in Martin and McIntyre, eds. Readings in the 
Philosophy of Social Science, pp. 131-143.
McKnight, C. J., ‘Pluralism, Realism and Truth’, in Archard ed. Philosophy and Pluralism., pp. 87-99 
Mill, J. S., A System of Logic, in Collected Works o f John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson, (Toronto Ont.: 
University of Toronto Press and London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), vol. 7.
Montefiore, A., ‘Philosophy in Different Cultural Contexts’, in Archard, ed., Philosophy and Pluralism, 
pp. 7-17.
Moravcsik, J., ‘Aristotle on Adequate Explanations’, Synthese, vol. 28 (1974), pp. 3-17.
212
Morgan, M. L., ‘Soloveitchik’s Halakhic Platonism’, Journal of Religion, vol. 66 (1986), pp. 194-198.
Mulhall, S. and Swift, A., Liberals and Communitarians, second edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
Munk, R., The Rationale of Halakhic Man: Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Conception of Jewish Thought 
(Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, 1996).
Nachmanides, M., Commentary on the Torah: Deuteronomy, trans. Charles B. Chavel (New York: Shilo, 
1976).
Nagel, E., The Structure of Science (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1979).
Neilsen, K., ‘Our Considered Judgements’, Ratio, vol. 19, (1977), pp. 39-46.
 , ‘In Defense of Wide Reflective Equilibrium.’ In D. Odegard (ed.) Ethics and Justification
(Edmonton, Canada: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988), pp. 19-37.
Nietzsche, F., On the Genealogy of Morals, (1887), trans. W. Kaufman and R..J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Random House, 1969).
Novak, D., ‘The Talmud as a Source for Philosophical Reflection’, in Daniel H. Frank and Oliver 
Leaman eds. History of Jewish Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 62-80.
Nozick, R., The Nature of Rationality, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
Peli, P., ed. On Repentance: The Thought and Oral Discourses of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik 
(Ramsey, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1984)
Philo, The Works o f Philo, New Updated Edition, translated by C. D. Yonge (Peabody: Hendrickson, 
1997).
Pines, S., ‘The Philosophical Sources of the Guide of the Perplexed,’ in The Guide of the Perplexed, 2 
vols., trans., Shlomo Pines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. lvii-cxxxiv.
 , ‘The Philosophical Purport of Maimonides’ Halachic works and the Purport of the Guide of the
Perplexed’, in Pines and Yovel eds. Maimonides and Philosophy, pp. 1-14.
 , ‘Truth and Falsehood Versus Good and Evil: A Study in Jewish and General Philosophy in
Connection with the Guide of the Perplexed, 1,2’, in I. Twersky, ed. Studies in Maimonides (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 95-157.
Plantinga, T., Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1980).
Price, H. H., Belief ‘In’ and Belief ‘That’, Religious Studies, vol. 1 (1965), pp. 5-27.
Quine, W.V.O., ‘Five Milestones of Empiricism’, Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), pp. 67-73.
Ravitzky, A., ‘ Rabbi J. B. Soloveitchik on Human Knowledge: Between Maimonidean and Neo-Kantian 
Philosophy,’ Modem Judaism, vol. 6 (1986), pp. 157-188.
Rawls, J., ‘Outline of a Decision Procedure in Ethics’, Philosophical Review, vol. 60 (1951), pp. 177-
197.
 , A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
 , Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
Raz, J., ‘The Claims of Reflective Equilibrium’, Inquiry, vol. 25 (1982), pp. 307-330.
Rickman, H., Dilthey: Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
 , Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human Studies (London: University of California Press, 1979).
Rorty, R., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).
 , ‘Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, Ethnocentrism and Liberalism’, Objectivity, Relativism
213
and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. 1-17.
 , ‘ Solidarity or Objectivity’ in Objectivity Relativism and Truth, pp. 21-34.
 , ‘The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy’, Objectivity Relativism and Truth, pp. 175-196.
Rose, G., ‘Is There a Jewish Philosophy.’ Judaism and Modernity. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 11-24.
Rosenberg, S., ‘The Concept of Emunah in Post-Maimonidean Jewish Philosophy’, in I. Twersky, ed. 
Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1984), pp. 273-307.
Rosensweig, M., ‘Eilu ve-Eilu Divrei Elohim Hayyim: Halakhic Pluralism and Theories of Controversy’, 
in Sokol ed. Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy, pp. 93-122.
Ross, D., Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939).
T ?nt#»n«treich, N., The Recurring Patterns Studies in Anti-Judaism in Modern Thought (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963).
Roth, L., ‘Is There a Jewish Philosophy?’, in R. Goldwater ed. Jewish Philosophy and Philosophers 
(London: B’nai B ’rith Hillel Foundation, 1962), pp. 1-19.
Ruben, D. H., Explaining Explanation (London: Routledge, 1990).
Rudavsky, T., ‘Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Gersonides’, Journal o f the History of 
Philosophy, vol. 21 (1983), pp. 513-36.
Ryan, A., The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, second edition (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1970).
Saadiah Gaon, Book of Beliefs and Opinions, trans. S. Rosenblatt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1948).
Sacks, J., ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik: Halakhic Man’, Tradition in an Untraditional Age 
(London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1990), pp. 267-285.
 , ‘Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Early Epistemology’, Ibid., pp. 287-301.
 , One People, (London, Littman Library of Jewish Civilisation, 1993).
Sagi, A., ‘Rav Soloveitchik and Professor Liebowitz as Theoreticians of the Halakhah’, (Hebrew) Daat, 
vol. 29, no.l (1992), pp. 131-148.
 , Elu va-Elu: A Study on the Meaning o f Halakhic Discourse. (Hebrew) (Hakkibutz Hameuchad,
1996).
Samuelson, N., ‘Gersonides’ Account of God’s Knowledge of Particulars’, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, vol. 10 (1972), pp. 399-416
 , ‘Issues for Jewish Philosophy in the 1980’s’ in Samuelson ed., Studies in Jewish Philosophy,
pp. 43-59.
Sandel, M., ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,’ in Shlomo Avineri and Avner de- 
Shalit eds. Communitarianism and Individualism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 12-28.
Sayre-McCord, G., ‘The Many Moral Realisms’, in Sayre-McCord ed. Essays on Moral Realism, pp. 1- 
23.
Schwarzschild, S., ‘The Halakhic Mind - An Essay on Jewish Tradition and Modem Thought’, Sh’ma, 
vol. 16, no. 316 (September 1986), pp. 127-8.
 , ‘An Agenda for Jewish Philosophy in the 1980’s’ in Samuelson ed., Studies in Jewish
Philosophy, pp. 101-125.
Scriven, M., ‘A Possible Distinction between Traditional Scientific Disciplines and the Study of Human 
Behaviour’, in Martin and McIntyre eds. Readings in the Philosophy o f Social Science, pp. 71-77.
214
Seeskin, K., Jewish Philosophy in a Secular Age. (New York: SUNY Press, 1990).
Sherman, N., Making a Necessity o f Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).
Shihor, R., ‘On the Problem of Halacha’s Status in Judaism: A Study of the Attitude of Rabbi Josef Dov 
Halevi Soloveitchik,’ Forum, vols. 30-31, (1978), pp. 149-153.
Singer, D. & Sokol, M., ‘Joseph Soloveitchik: Lonely Man of Faith,’ Modem Judaism, vol. 2 (1982), pp. 
227-272.
Skorupski, J., ‘Value-Pluralism’, in Archard ed., Philosophy and Pluralism, pp. 101-115.
Soloveitchik, J. B., Confrontation’, Tradition, vol. 6, no. 2 (1964), pp. 5-28.
 , ‘The Lonely Man of Faith,’ Tradition, vol. 7 no. 2 (1965), pp. 5-67.
‘'KYil TVyjj Dofek’ (Hebrew) in P. H. Peli ed. Besod Ha-Yahid Ve Ha~Yahud (Jerusalem: Orct, 
1976), pp. 331-400.
 , ‘Mah Dodekh mi-Dod’ (Hebrew), Ibid., pp. 189-254.
189-254.
 , ‘The Community,’ Tradition, vol. 7, no. 2, (1978), pp. 7-24.
 , ‘Majesty and Humility’, Ibid., pp. 25-37.
 , ‘Catharsis’, Ibid., pp. 38-54.
 , ‘Redemption, Prayer, Talmud Torah’, Ibid., pp. 55-72.
 , ‘A Tribute to the Rebbetzen of Talne’, Ibid., pp. 73-83.
 , U-Vikkashtem mi-Sham’, in Ish ha-Halakhah Galuy ve-Nistar (Jerusalem: World Zionist
Organisation, 1979), pp. 115-235.
 , Halakhic Man, trans. L. Kaplan. (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1983).
 , The Halakhic Mind, (New York: Free Press 1986).
 , ‘Sacred and Profane’, in J. Epstein ed. Shiurei HaRav (Hoboken, N. J. Ktav, 1994), pp. 4-32.
Sorabji, R., ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue in Rorty ed, Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics, pp. 201-219.
Sosa E., “Circular’ Coherence and ‘Absurd’ Foundations’, in Ernest Lepore ed., Truth and
Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy o f Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 
387-397.
Stephens, I. K., ‘Cassirer’s Doctrine of the A Priori’, in P. A. Schlipp ed., The Philosophy of Ernst 
Cassirer, (Evanston:, Illinois: Library of Living Philosophers inc., 1949),
Stem, J., ‘The idea of a Hoq in Maimonides’ Explanation of the Law,’ in Pines and Yovel eds.
Maimonides and Philosophy, pp. 92-130.
Strauss, L., Persecution and the Art o f Writing (New York: Free Press, 1952).
 , ‘How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed,’ in The Guide of the Perplexed, trans.
Shlomo Pines, pp. xi-lvi.
Taylor, C., ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,’ in Martin and McIntyre eds. Readings in the 
Philosophy of Social Science, pp. 181-211.
 , ‘Social Theory as Practice’, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers vol.
2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp. 90-115.
 , ‘Rationality’, Ibid., pp. 134-151.
 , Sources of the Self, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
215
 , ‘Overcoming Epistemology’, Philosophical Arguments, pp. 1-19.
 , ‘Explanation and Practical Reason’ in Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1995), pp. 34-60.
 , ‘Lichtung or Lebensform: Parallels between Heidegger and Wittgenstein’, Philosophical
Arguments, pp. 61-78.
Twersky, I., Introduction to the Code o f Maimonides (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).
Von Wright, G.H., Explanation and Understanding, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).
Walzer, M., Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
Wamke, G., Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Stanford, California: Stnaford University 
Press, 1987).
Weinshcimer, J., Ga.do.mer’s Hermeneutics, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985).
Wettstein, H., ‘Doctrine’, Faith and Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 4 (October 1997), pp. 423-443.
Wieland, W., ‘The Problem of Teleology,’ in J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji eds. Articles on 
Aristotle Vol.l (London: Duckworth, 1975-9), 141-160.
Weiss, R.L., Maimonides’ Ethics: The Encounter of Philosophic and Religious Morality (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991).
Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953).
Wolfson, H .A ., ‘Maimonides and Halevi,’ Jewish Quarterly Review, vol. 2, no. 3. (1912), pp. 297-339.
Wiggins, D., ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason’, in Rorty ed. Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, pp. 221-240.
 , ‘Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliberation and Desire’, ibid., pp.
241-265.
Williams, B., Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy, (London: Fontana Press, 1985).
Winch, P., The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, second edition, (London: 
Routledge, 1990).
Wurzburger, W., ‘The Maimonidean Matrix of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Two-tiered Ethics’, 
Gesher, vol. 16 (1985), pp. 118-129.
 , Ethics of Responsibility: Pluralistic Approaches to Covenantal Ethics, (Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society, 1994).
 , ‘The Centrality of Creativity in the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik,’ reprinted in
Angel, ed., Exploring the Thought o f Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, pp. 277-289.
216
